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1.1 Nature protection of coastal areas 
Coastal areas are important not only as natural areas but also as economic hotspots. Most 
of the human population lives in coastal areas, where they conduct a large number of eco-
nomic activities, including fishery and fossil fuel exploitation. This human pressure on 
coastal areas results in resource overexploitation and habitat loss. Simultaneously, there 
are legal protections and management policies that recognize the natural values of coastal 
areas all over the world. This combination of economic use and nature protection is a major 
challenge for the conservation of coastal areas. Legal protection is not always sufficient to 
prevent the deterioration of coastal areas. For example, the Great Barrier Reef in Australia 
is nationally and internationally recognised as a marine protected area; however, the reefs 
have still been disturbed by harbour expansions for the coal industry (Morrison 2017). 
  Decisions about human activities in protected nature areas fall within the field 
of governance. Coastal areas are governed in relation to nature protection in the sense 
that decisions are made regarding what is allowed in the area and which activities are 
undertaken to preserve and improve the natural value of the area. These political de-
cisions are connected to what is valued most and to beliefs about how different inter-
ests should be balanced. These decisions are often officially made by the responsible 
governmental actors; however, market and civil society players also influence the de-
cision-making process. To emphasize that decision-making and implementation of 
policies are shaped by multiple actors, the term governance is used in this PhD thesis. 
The use of this term follows the broad definition of Van Assche et al. (2015), accord-
ing to which governance is “the taking of collectively binding decisions for a commu-
nity in a community, by governmental and other actors” (Van Assche et al. 2015, p.20). 
  Knowledge plays an important role in decision-making processes. Knowl-
edge claims are used to legitimize decisions about whether to continue or change 
human activities, especially with regard to nature protection (Beunen and Duinev-
eld 2010; Turnhout et al. 2015; Wesselink et al. 2013). Nature protection can be sup-
ported by very different and complementary arguments, such as aesthetic and ethical 
considerations or the need to preserve resources for future generations (Van Koppen 
2000). However, these arguments are often combined with knowledge components to 
emphasize their scientific basis (Stone 2012). Scientists have played a key role in put-
ting nature protection on the political agenda, both historically – at the start of the 
nature conservation movement – and presently. The general trend in political de-
cision-making is the increasing importance of scientific expertise (Weingart 1999). 
  The important role of knowledge-based decision-making has triggered a 
new challenge: knowledge uncertainties. When decisions need to be legitimised by 
a knowledge base, the certainty of this knowledge can become an issue in itself. The 
marine aspect of nature in coastal areas makes knowledge generation difficult. ‘In-
visible’ nature that is under water, as well as dynamic water flows, contribute to eco-
systems that are difficult to study (Owens 2008). These aspects contribute to a large 
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number of knowledge uncertainties concerning coastal areas. Furthermore, the in-
volvement of diverse stakeholders – with their own knowledge interpretations – 
also contributes to knowledge uncertainties, as is shown in several empirical stud-
ies on governance processes (Pellizzoni 2011; Sarewitz 2004; Turnhout et al. 2008). 
  This PhD thesis will explain the role of knowledge uncertainties in deci-
sion-making processes focused on the nature protection of coastal areas. The importance 
of science-based expertise in nature protection of coastal areas is recognised by a large 
number of scholars (Seijger 2014; Stange 2017; Van Buuren and Edelenbos 2004; Van der 
Molen 2017; Van Tatenhove 2013; Wesselink et al. 2013). Although knowledge uncer-
tainties challenge the legitimacy of science-based decisions, scientific expertise contin-
ues to dominate decision-making processes. To unpack this puzzle, I selected the Dutch 
Wadden Sea as case study to analyse the role of knowledge uncertainties in the govern-
ance of this coastal area.
1.2 The Dutch Wadden Sea 
The empirical insights of this thesis are based on the governance of the Dutch Wad-
den Sea. This coastal area is selected as a case to study the role of knowledge uncer-
tainties in the governance of protected marine nature. Here, I will highlight the factors 
that contributed to the decision to study this area. First, the Dutch Wadden Sea is rec-
ognised as an important nature area. The Wadden Sea is a shallow estuarine sea lying 
along the north coast of the Netherlands to the west coast of Denmark, see Figure 1.1. 
The main characteristics of this area are its tidal mudflats. As a result of high tidal dy-
namics, large areas of the Wadden Sea fall dry during low tide. These mudflats contain 
high numbers of shellfish and worms that provide a feeding ground for many birds. 
The area is especially renowned for migrating birds; each year, millions of water birds 
use the Wadden Sea as a foraging and resting place (Boere and Piersma 2012). These 
natural values have contributed to the international recognition of the Dutch Wadden 
Sea as an important nature area. The Dutch Wadden Sea is, for example, protected as 
a wetland area under the Ramsar convention, as a Natura 2000-site under the Europe-
an Bird and Habitat Directive, and as a World Heritage site by UNESCO. These desig-
nations have contributed to the national legal protection of the area under the Dutch 
Nature conservation act (in Dutch ‘Wet Natuurbescherming’ in 2017), which, for ex-
ample, regulates the permit procedures for activities in the area. The aim of the Dutch 
nature protection legislations is not only the preservation of current natural values but 
also the restoration of lost natural values, such as seagrass fields (PRW 2015). Hence, 
the Wadden Sea is both scientifically and legally recognised as an important nature area. 
  Secondly, the governance of the Dutch Wadden Sea is an exemplary case of a 
continuous struggle between nature protection and economic activities. The strug-
gle started in the 1960s with protests against large-scale embankment plans. This trig-
gered the establishment of the Wadden Society (in Dutch ‘Waddenvereniging’), which 
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is currently a prominent NGO in Wadden Sea governance. During the same period, 
the Wadden Sea Working Group was established by a group of concerned scientists 
(Wolff 2013). Ever since, the human use of the area has been a topic of debate, even 
though the Wadden Sea area was recognised as a nature area by the national govern-
ment in the 1970s and embankment plans were cancelled. The different interests of the 
stakeholders and the resulting tensions become particularly clear in conflicts about gas 
mining, cockle fishery and mussel fishery. Scientific knowledge, scientists and uncer-
tainties have played an important role in these conflicts over nature protection versus 
economic activities. There is a large Dutch scientific community, connected to several 
research institutes and universities, currently studying different aspects of the Wadden 
Sea. This research started in the 19th century with marine laboratories, the predecessors 
of the Royal Netherlands Institute for Sea Research (NIOZ). Active advice from scientists 
started in 1965 with the Wadden Sea Working Group and was institutionalized in 1975 
into the Co-ordination Group for Research and Management of the Wadden Sea area. 
The research and an advisory role was taken up by research institutes and universities 
in the 1980s (Wolff 2013). The knowledge of these science-based experts has been used 
by actors at opposing ends of the conflict; furthermore, some scientists themselves have 
played crucial roles in conflicts over human activities (Steins 1999; Turnhout et al. 2008). 
Figure 1.1. The Dutch Wadden Sea, with mudflats in brown, salt marshes in green and the grey 
rectanggles indicate the mussel cultivation plots (map from WaddenSleutels, 2018).
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  Thirdly, there is a willingness on the part of Wadden Sea professionals to learn 
about science-policy interactions. In particular, the conflicts in 2004 on gas mining and 
cockle fishery triggered a discussion about the role of scientists and scientific knowledge. 
This resulted in reflections by several key actors regarding the use of knowledge. For 
example, the Dutch ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality commissioned an 
evaluation of a research project conducted on the effects of fishery policy in the Wad-
den Sea (1999-2003) in order to learn about the science-policy interactions (Hanssen 
et al. 2007). This led to several questions about how the use of knowledge for policy 
could be improved and how policy-makers could address knowledge uncertainties and 
risks. This interest in science-policy interactions was incorporated into a large-scale re-
search program on the Dutch Sea and Coast; this project was called ‘NWO-ZKO’ and 
supported this PhD research. Furthermore, the topic of science-policy interactions was 
recognised by the scientific network organisation known as the Wadden Academy. The 
Wadden Academy organised several symposia for both scientists and policy-makers, and 
science-policy interactions were included as one of the topics. This shows that in addition 
to funding for science-policy interaction research in the Wadden Sea, there is also the 
potential to actually contribute to science-policy interactions in this area. 
1.3 Science-policy interactions 
Science-policy interactions are studied within the fields of knowledge utilisation, sci-
ence and technology studies, sociology of knowledge, and predominantly within the 
field of environmental management. This PhD thesis will contribute to these fields of 
literature with new empirical and conceptual insights into the role of knowledge un-
certainties in decision-making processes based on the Dutch Wadden Sea case study. 
In this section, I will first introduce three theoretical perspectives on science-poli-
cy interactions. Secondly, the conceptual framework of boundary objects is intro-
duced as a tool to identify and study how science-policy interactions take place. Fi-
nally, I describe the challenges for the use of knowledge in decision-making through 
the processes of scientification and politicisation. These processes highlight how 
knowledge uncertainties can challenge the legitimacy of science-based decisions. 
  In this thesis, science-policy interactions are perceived as interactions between 
knowledge producers and knowledge users in the context of policy-making. Often, pub-
lic policy-making is associated with governmental decisions and procedures that guide 
appropriate actions in the public domain. However, the governance perspective of this 
thesis makes clear that a vast number of actors are involved in the field of policy formu-
lation and implementation, including such stakeholders as nature organisations and eco-
nomic entrepreneurs. Furthermore, scientists are not the only knowledge producers. The 
concept of science-policy interactions highlights that the analytical focus of this study is 
on the role of knowledge processes, including knowledge production, exchange, transfor-
mation and use. 
17
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1.3.1 Different conceptualisations of science-policy interactions
There are different theoretical understandings of science-policy interactions. I will dis-
tinguish three ways of conceptualizing science-policy interactions, similar to Janssen 
(2015). The first perspective is based on a clear distinction between a science world and 
a policy world. This conceptualisation of ‘Two-Communities’ emphasizes that knowl-
edge producers of the science world live in a world separated from the knowledge us-
ers of the policy world, with their own values, reward systems and language (Caplan 
1979). For example, the different worlds can be characterised as scientists looking for 
the truth based on sound scientific methodology, whereas policy-makers are looking 
for power and fast solutions. Roughly stated, the science world deals with facts and the 
policy world with values. In line with the traditional perspective of the Enlightenment, 
the role of scientific knowledge in decision-making should be ‘speaking truth to pow-
er’ (Hoppe 1999). From this perspective, the issue of knowledge in decision-making 
is problematized as underutilization, explained by the gap between the science world 
and the policy world. Approaches within this strand of literature often focus on bridg-
ing this gap between science and policy, for example with participative approaches that 
bring together knowledge producers and knowledge users (Van Koningsveld 2003). 
  The second perspective on science-policy interactions criticises this conceptu-
alisation of two clearly divided worlds and instead highlights the intertwinements of the 
science and policy worlds (Beck 2011; Carter 2013; Van Buuren and Edelenbos 2004; Van 
der Molen 2017; Wesselink et al. 2013). This conceptualisation of ‘Intertwinement’ em-
phasizes the socially constructed nature of science and knowledge production. The social 
process of knowledge production is stressed: “science is not the objective procedure by 
which facts are uncovered, but the way of life in which facts are made” (Van Buuren 2009, 
p.291). Furthermore, the boundary between science and non-science is perceived as 
changeable and context-dependent. This active process of drawing the boundary between 
science and non-science is called boundary work (Gieryn 1999). Moreover, from this per-
spective, science has no exclusive status as the appropriate knowledge provider for deci-
sion-making. Often, the broader term of expertise is used to highlight the various sources 
of knowledge that are used in policy-making (Janssen 2015; Wesselink et al. 2013). Addi-
tionally, the multiple uses of knowledge in policy-making are stressed. Knowledge can be 
used not only instrumentally but also conceptually and strategically (Hisschemöller 2005; 
Wesselink et al. 2013). Additionally, the performative aspect of knowledge is addressed, 
highlighting the entwinement of power and knowledge (Turnhout et al. 2016; Van Assche 
et al. 2017). Several empirical studies have shown the blurred character of the division 
between the science and policy worlds. In particular, the study of Jasanoff (1994) on 
the role of policy advisors has been very influential in this field. This study revealed the 
political role of scientific experts in the policy-making process. This supports the con-
ceptualisation of science-policy interactions as a two-way process between knowledge 
production and decision-making (Wesselink et al. 2013). Based on the intertwined con-
18
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ceptualisation of science-policy interactions, the issue of knowledge in decision-making 
is analysed from the perspective of how science-policy interactions take place. The chal-
lenge is not the underutilization of knowledge but rather finding the most appropriate 
science-policy interactions (Turnhout et al. 2008). The aim is to find the correct balance 
between the extremes of negotiated nonsense and superfluous knowledge (Janssen 2015). 
  The third perspective is based on a similar conceptualisation of science-policy 
interactions as that used in the intertwinement perspective, acknowledging that there is 
not a clear boundary between the science and policy worlds. However, it adds the per-
spective of multiple coalitions that interact in a decision-making process. This concep-
tualisation of ‘Knowledge Coalitions’ emphasizes that groups of people see the world in 
different ways. Each group or coalition has its own particular type of knowledge, fosters 
different knowledge production processes and gives different interpretations to research 
results. These knowledge coalitions can include actors from both the science and policy 
worlds who share a common perspective (Janssen 2015). This approach was triggered 
by research on conflict situations: the presence of different knowledge coalitions was 
identified as cause for lack of knowledge utilization (Van Buuren 2009; Van Buuren and 
Edelenbos 2004). Another term for this model of science-policy interactions is Ways of 
Knowing (WOKs). Van Buuren (2009) describes the aforementioned model as follows: 
“Different WOKs give rise to different understandings of precisely which factual knowl-
edge is valid and relevant; they feed different world views, problem perceptions, and val-
ues” (p.209). Analytically, groups that share a way of knowing can be identified as coali-
tions. Based on this perspective, the focus of studies on knowledge use expands towards 
the interactions between different coalitions instead of the science-policy interactions 
that can be observed within a coalition. For example, in current debates on flood protec-
tion, a coalition with a safety perspective and a coalition with an ecological perspective 
can be distinguished. These coalitions both use and produce knowledge to support their 
positions in favour of or against the building of new dams (Janssen 2015). According to 
this perspective on science-policy interactions, the problem of knowledge use in deci-
sion-making is not at the science-policy boundary but at the boundary between different 
knowledge coalitions. The aim is to facilitate cooperation between these coalitions that 
have different ways of knowing. The three conceptual models of science-policy interac-
tions described above are summarized and visualized in Figure 1.2.
1.3.2 Boundary objects
Although the three models of science-policy interactions described in the previous sec-
tion emphasize different perceptions of science-policy interactions, they share the con-
ceptualisation that people from different social worlds interact. The boundaries between 
these worlds are drawn in different places, either between the science and policy worlds 
or between different coalitions. Still, the question remains, how do these people inter-
act and cooperate? This question of cooperation between people in diverse intersecting 
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social worlds initiated the research of Star and Griesemer (1989), who developed the 
concept of boundary objects to explain how to overcome the tension between diversity 
and cooperation. Their starting point is that “consensus is not necessary for cooperation 
nor for the successful conduct of work” (Star and Griesemer 1989, p.388). Without elim-
inating the differences between different social worlds, cooperation can be facilitated by 
boundary objects. They describe boundary objects as:
“objects which are both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constrains of the several 
parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites. They are 
weakly structured in common use, and become strongly structured in individual site use. These 
objects may be abstract or concrete. They have different meanings in different social worlds but 
their structure is common enough to more than one world to make them recognizable, a means of 
translation” (Star and Griesemer 1989, p.393).
The concept of boundary objects is used to study a diverse range of interactions, e.g., to 
identify and study how science-policy interactions take place (Stange 2017; Star 2010; 
Turnhout 2009). A crucial aspect of a boundary object is its interpretative flexibility. The 
boundary indicated in the concept of boundary objects is often placed between the sci-
ence and policy worlds. However, in this study, I will not base my analysis on the assump-
tion that the main boundary is between the policy and science worlds; the main bounda-
ry could also be between knowledge coalitions with their own ways of knowing. For this 
reason, I will take an open approach and observe empirically between which groups of 
people interactions are facilitated by boundary objects.
1.3.3 Scientification of politics and politicisation of science 
In relation to knowledge use in decision-making, a trend of scientification of politics 
and politicisation of science is described by Weingart (1999). This trend is indicated by 
the increased role of scientific expert advice in policy decision-making since World War 
II. This is a general trend for all policy fields but has received particular emphasis in the 
environmental field, which is historically driven by scientists. This ‘scientification’ of na-
Figure 1.2. Visualisation of three conceptual models of science-policy interactions, 
based on Janssen (2015).
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ture conservation and environmental issues indicates that scientific experts dominate the 
decision-making process as “the ones in charge of defining and assessing environmental 
problems as well as providing the knowledge and solutions to solve them” (Wesselink et 
al. 2013, p.2). In this way, decisions about nature conservation are transferred to the do-
main of scientific expertise, whereas the ‘politicisation’ of science and expertise refers to 
the contestation of science-based knowledge in public debates (Mouffe 2000; Pellizzoni 
2011). In the words of Pellizzoni, politicisation is “the opening, broadening or restoring 
of a public space of discussion” (Pellizzoni 2011, p.711). The opposite process of depo-
liticisation implies that an issue is taken out of the public domain and, for example, into 
the domain of scientific or bureaucratic expertise (Behagel 2012). A clear example in 
which science has become a topic of debate is climate change (Beck 2011; Pielke 2004). 
  The process of the politicisation of science is especially perceived as a problem 
by those who hold the ‘Two-Communities’ perspective on science-policy interactions, 
as it would diminish the objectivity and independence of scientific experts (Pellizzoni 
2011). Whereas from the ‘Intertwinement’ perspective, the political aspect of scientif-
ic knowledge is the starting point. Knowledge production involves all types of social 
factors, including political choices. From this perspective, the scientification of pol-
itics is criticised, as the perception of apolitical experts can hide the political choices 
that are made in the decision-making process (Pellizzoni 2011; Wesselink et al. 2013). 
  However, from both perspectives, an important challenge that is acknowledged 
is that of uncertainty (Pellizzoni 2011; Pielke 2004; Weingart 1999). With the scienti-
fication of politics, science-based knowledge becomes essential for decision-making. 
However, this becomes problematic when the knowledge is questioned because of un-
certainties. The politicisation of science implies that there is a debate between experts, 
increasing the uncertainty about which knowledge should be the basis of decisions. This 
challenge – of both the increased importance of scientific knowledge and the recognition 
of uncertainties – triggered the decision to focus my research on knowledge uncertain-
ties. 
1.4 Knowledge uncertainties
The main focus of this thesis is on knowledge uncertainties. However, what are knowl-
edge uncertainties? Within the literature, there is an abundance of definitions. Im-
portant for my research are uncertainty concepts that enable me to analyse the role of 
uncertainties in decision-making processes. Often, uncertainties are positioned as op-
posites of knowledge: as unknowns or ignorance (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990; Gross 
2010). In this way, uncertainties are connected to what knowledge is. In this thesis, I 
will use the broad definition of knowledge as justified true belief that is connect-
ed to a purpose or use (Elder-Vass 2012; Gross 2010). In this way, scientific knowl-
edge is the type of knowledge justified through a scientific method or the authori-
ty of a scientist. However, uncertainty is not only the lack of knowledge but also the 
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lack of coherence among competing knowledge claims (Sarewitz 2004; Stirling 2010). 
 Several studies have shown that knowledge uncertainties play a central role in envi-
ronmental controversies. Shackley and Wynne (1996) have shown that for a decision-mak-
ing process, it are the uncertainties that are constructed in a particular setting that are 
important, not the multitude of potential uncertainties. This issue is addressed in the rela-
tional approach of Brugnach et al. (2008): “The definition of a problem and what is uncer-
tain about it depends not only on scientific or expert understanding, but on the knowledge, 
views, and preferences of the decision-maker in relation to those of other actors with whom 
the decision-maker interacts to make sense of the situation” (Brugnach et al. 2008, p.5). 
  To acknowledge the different types of knowledge situations and the relational 
character of uncertainties in decision-making processes, I will distinguish three types 
of uncertainty. Building on Brugnach et al. (2008) and Van den Hoek (2014), I concep-
tualise uncertainty as incomplete knowledge, unpredictability and ambiguity, see Figure 
1.3. In my approach, the uncertainty of incomplete knowledge refers to expressions of 
knowledge imperfections: to what is unknown at the moment but could be made avail-
able with additional research. The uncertainty of unpredictability refers to what is seen 
as unknowable: certain elements of complex systems are unpredictable. For example, the 
current state of science is unable to give predictions about several aspects of marine eco-
systems that are characterised by chaotic dynamics. The uncertainty of ambiguity refers 
to the situation of actors presenting diverging knowledge claims, with ambiguity defined 
as “the existence of two or more equally plausible interpretation possibilities” (Dewulf et 
al. 2005, p.116). This perception of ambiguity is closely linked to the perception that there 
are different ways of knowing, which I presented in the conceptual model of Knowledge 
Coalitions, see paragraph 1.3.1 (Armitage et al. 2008; Folke et al. 2005; Holling 2001; 
Janssen 2015; Van Buuren and Edelenbos 2004).   
These different types of uncertainties also imply different strategies for addressing un-
certainties in decision-making. When the uncertainty is perceived as incomplete knowl-
Figure 1.3. Schematisation of types of uncertainties based on Van den Hoek (2014).
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edge, one strategy could be to invest in more research or collect better data. In this case, 
the expectation is that the new knowledge will improve the understanding of the situ-
ation. This perception can be used to postpone a decision, or the research can be seen 
as input for future decision-making. However, more research could also reveal new un-
certainties and make the decision-making process more complicated (Brugnach et al. 
2008; Sarewitz 2004; Turnhout et al. 2008). When the uncertainty is perceived as un-
predictability, this implies that not knowing is accepted. Strategies to address this un-
certainty often focus on risk reduction, for example through capacity-building to an-
ticipate several possible scenarios. A decision-making approach that starts from the 
acknowledgement of not knowing enough, which can be both incomplete knowledge 
and unpredictability, is adaptive management. This approach is based on the learning 
capacity of decision-makers and the need to respond to unpredicted surprises (Armit-
age et al. 2008; Brugnach et al. 2008; Folke et al. 2005; Gross 2010; Holling 2001). 
  In contrast, the uncertainty of ambiguity implies that there are multiple, con-
flicting interpretations among the actors involved in the decision-making process. This 
can result in conflict situations; either a cold conflict, in which actors distance them-
selves from each other and avoid confrontation, or a hot conflict, in which actors ex-
plicitly criticise the opposite camp. Strategies that seek to address this uncertainty of 
knowing differently often focus on the relations between and perceptions of the actors 
involved, for example through participative and deliberative approaches (Brugnach and 
Ingram 2012). However, another response of a decision-maker can be to support one 
of the camps and ignore or discredit the alternative perspective (Turnhout et al. 2008). 
  This typology of uncertainties as incomplete knowledge, unpredictability and 
ambiguity will be used to analyse how uncertainties played a role in the decision-mak-
ing processes in the Dutch Wadden Sea. Although the interrelated character of these 
uncertainties is recognised (Van den Hoek et al. 2014) in this study, the classification of 
different types of uncertainties will be used to analytically make the distinction between 
different understandings of uncertainty and different reactions to these perceptions of 
uncertainty. Together, the explicit acknowledgement of uncertainties and the implicit im-
plications of strategies that address uncertainties will serve as a starting point to analyse 
the role of knowledge uncertainties in the decision-making processes. 
1.5 Research objective and questions 
As stated, this thesis analyses the challenge of knowledge uncertainties in coastal nature 
conservation decision-making. Although the legitimacy of science-based decisions is 
questioned by knowledge uncertainties, this has not reduced the dominance of scientific 
expertise in nature governance. This puzzling combination is also known as the paradox 
of both the scientification of politics and the politicisation of science (Weingart 1999). 
The aim of this thesis is to explain this paradox and understand the role of knowledge 
uncertainties in decision-making processes. To this end, the Dutch Wadden Sea was se-
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lected as a case study in order to achieve an in-depth understanding of knowledge uncer-
tainties in decision-making processes about coastal nature conservation. The first objec-
tive of this thesis is to clarify science-policy interactions in the Dutch Wadden Sea, both 
theoretically and empirically. Science-policy interactions are perceived as the location in 
which the meaning of knowledge uncertainties for governance processes is formed. The 
second objective is to describe the role of knowledge uncertainties in decision-making 
processes about the use and restoration of the Dutch Wadden Sea. For this analysis, a 
relational approach to knowledge uncertainties is used, based on the concepts of incom-
plete knowledge, unpredictability and ambiguity. The third objective is to understand 
and explain the role of scientific knowledge and experts in decision-making processes in 
which knowledge uncertainties are expressed. Based on the insights of the Dutch Wad-
den Sea case, the paradoxical stable domination of scientific expertise in nature govern-
ance within a context of knowledge uncertainties will be explained.
Given the research objectives of this thesis, the research questions are as follows: 
1. How to understand science-policy interactions in the governance of Dutch Wadden Sea 
nature?
2. How do knowledge uncertainties play a role in decision-making about the use and the 
restoration of Dutch Wadden Sea nature? 
3. What does this analysis of knowledge uncertainties in decision-making processes in the 
Dutch Wadden Sea reveal that can explain the role of science-based expertise in nature 
conservation governance?
1.6 Research approach 
In this section, I will elaborate on my ontological and epistemological research position 
and describe my research design. My relational approach of knowledge uncertainties 
suggests particular theoretical perspectives on science-policy interactions and specific 
ontological and epistemological viewpoints, which will be clarified in this section.     
  First, ontology is the study of being and centres around the question of 
“what exists in the human world that we can acquire knowledge about?” (Moon and 
Blackman 2014, p.1169). Different positions are identified within philosophy, and 
a central concern is whether an external reality exists independent of human be-
liefs and interpretations. These positions range from realism, which states that there 
is only one reality, to relativism, which states that multiple realities exist (Ritch-
ie et al. 2014). A middle position is critical realism, which states that there is an ex-
ternal reality independent of humans; however, this reality is only knowable through 
socially constructed meanings. This connection between meaning and being is em-
phasized in social constructionism: “the ways in which we collectively think and com-
municate about the world affects the way that the world is” (Elder-Vass 2012, p.4). 
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  Secondly, epistemology explores how we can know and how we create knowl-
edge. Two opposing views can be identified as positivism and interpretivism. Where-
as positivism is based on the discovery of objective truth, interpretivism emphasizes 
that researchers and the social world impact each other. The interpretative approach 
highlights a double hermeneutics for social science – knowledge is not only created 
by the interpretations of the researcher but also by the understandings of the people 
connected to the studied phenomena (Toonen 2013; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006). 
  In the following subsections, I will position myself as having a critical construc-
tivist perspective with an interpretative approach. My research objectives connected to 
these ontological and epistemological positions have shaped my research design, which 
consists of a case study approach based on interviews, observations and document anal-
ysis.
1.6.1 Critical constructivist perspective 
My research approach is in line with a critical constructivist perspective, which implies “a 
critical stance towards the object of study and the perception that this object of study is 
socially constructed” (Behagel 2012, p.27). My main objects of study are knowledge un-
certainties, which I study from a relational perspective. This relational perspective focuses 
on the different meanings actors attribute to knowledge uncertainties in a decision-mak-
ing context. Especially with the concept of ambiguity, I acknowledge that there are mul-
tiple constructed realities. For example, the mass mortality of birds can be perceived as 
a natural phenomenon or as a human-caused catastrophe. These different realities do 
not differ in their view that there is an external world with birds. However, they give the 
event a different meaning, and in this way, they change what the event is, indicating the 
constructed nature of knowledge and knowledge uncertainties. As explained by Van As-
sche et al. (2015), knowledge “does not mirror a pre-existing order or an external reality, 
but it is always an active discursive construction of that reality. It cannot be detached 
from the historical and cultural context in which it is produced and performed” (p.20). 
  Furthermore, my critical constructivist perspective on knowledge uncertainties 
includes the acknowledgement that knowledge and knowledge uncertainties are con-
nected to power relations. Some perceptions are included in the decision-making pro-
cess, whereas others are excluded. Moreover, I critically challenge the naturalness and 
self-evident nature of scientific knowledge in decision-making processes by emphasiz-
ing the historical and contingent roots of power and knowledge. I emphasize the politi-
cal choices that are made in decision-making processes, even though these choices can 
be hidden in knowledge argumentations. This is consistent with the conceptual mod-
els of science-policy interactions called Intertwinement and Knowledge Coalitions, as 
described in paragraph 1.3.1. My starting point is that I criticise the conception of the 
science and policy worlds as having a fixed nature. However, at the same time, I acknowl-
edge that the Two-Communities model has empirical relevance as a dominant view of 
science-policy interactions (Carter 2013). 
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1.6.2 Interpretative approach
To analyse the construction and use of knowledge uncertainties in decision-making pro-
cesses, I will use an interpretative approach. I acknowledge the value-laden aspect of 
knowledge production, both in the knowledge production processes regarding the Dutch 
Wadden Sea, which I studied empirically, as well as in my own knowledge production 
process that has led to this PhD thesis. My own values, interests and historical trajectory 
from a natural to a social scientist have shaped this research in several ways, for example, 
in my connection to some of my interviewees. Instead of aiming to present objective truth 
in this thesis, my knowledge production objective is to provide a trustworthy account of 
the empirical events I have studied, as well as new conceptual insights into knowledge 
uncertainties that can have practical implications for future decision-making processes. 
To support the trustworthiness of this research, I will give an account of how I collected 
my data and analysed the meanings and interpretations of actors in the decision-mak-
ing processes I studied. Furthermore, I used informant feedback to check whether my 
interpretations of the processes were recognizable to people with direct experiences 
in the cases I studied (Hajer 2006; Wagenaar 2011; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006). 
  To structure the analysis of the different meanings and interpretations of knowl-
edge uncertainties in the decision-making process, I used a discourse approach. Here, 
I use the definition of Hajer (1995) of discourses as “a specific ensemble of ideas, con-
cepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particu-
lar set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” 
(p.44). Actors that share specific discourses can form coalitions around specific issues. 
These discourse coalitions construct different realities. Although the concepts origi-
nate from different strands of literature, discourse coalitions can be seen as a way to 
analytically operationalise the Knowledge Coalition model1,  see paragraph 1.3.1.   
  The discourse approach is used to structure and understand the interpretations 
and relations of actors in my case studies. Through the lens of discourse analysis, dif-
ferent storylines of actors can be distinguished with specific framings of problems and 
solutions that are relevant to the decision-making process. Although the aim of this study 
is not to explain the emergence of specific discourses and storylines, the contingent and 
changing nature of discourses and storylines is acknowledged: “The articulation of a dis-
course is always non-necessary or contingent: it could have been articulated otherwise” 
(Behagel 2012, p.32). A specific historical path has led to specific discourses and govern-
ance arrangements (Van Assche et al. 2015). For this reason, the stability and flexibility 
of interpretations are best perceived through historical analysis, which contributed to the 
decision to analyse long time periods in most of my case studies.  
1 Another way to operationalize this conceptual model of science-policy interactions is with knowledge 
arrangements that consists of 4 dimensions, including discourses (Janssen 2015).
26
Chapter 1
1
1.6.3 A case study approach
My research design can best be described as a qualitative case study approach that fits 
well with my critical constructivist perspective and interpretative approach to under-
standing knowledge uncertainties in nature conservation governance (Ritchie et al. 2014; 
Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006; Yin 2014). A qualitative case study design supports my 
goal of studying meanings in a specific context (Yin 2014). As I am interested in the 
different meanings people attach to knowledge uncertainties and the role of those uncer-
tainties in marine governance processes, a concrete and specific decision-making process 
should be studied to acquire new insights. The selected nature conservation governance 
setting for my research is the Dutch Wadden Sea. However, there are several parallel 
and interconnected decision-making processes within the field of nature conservation 
of the Dutch Wadden Sea. To obtain in-depth insights, additional concrete case stud-
ies were selected. This case selection took place through an iterative process, combining 
theory and empirical observations to find interesting research puzzles (Wagenaar 2011). 
  The first cases that were studied are the activities of cockle fishery and gas ex-
ploitation within the Dutch Wadden Sea. These two cases formed the cornerstone of 
the review I undertook in order to build upon the insights of social science research 
regarding science-policy interactions in the Dutch Wadden Sea. Cockle fishery and gas 
exploitation started in the 1950s and 1960s. Their regulations were connected in 2004 by 
a governmental decision to use gas revenues to ban mechanical cockle fishery from the 
Dutch Wadden Sea. The controversies over these activities not only triggered complex de-
cision-making processes in the 1990s and 2000s, in which scientific ecological knowledge 
became part of the controversy, they also triggered several social science studies of the re-
sulting science-policy interactions. The review of this literature is presented in chapter 2. 
  One of the insights of my review was the important role that court rulings 
had played in decision-making processes. Furthermore, my explorative interviews 
with key actors indicated the dominance of Natura 2000 and the assessment of ef-
fects on decisions regarding the Dutch Wadden Sea. This led to the selection of two 
cases: the controversy over the 2006-spring permit for the mussel seed fishery and 
the 2011 permit for the planned World Championship powerboat races. The mussel 
seed fishery case was selected because it played a crucial role in shaping the position 
of nature conservation NGOs in the Wadden Sea; the court ruling in 2008 consider-
ably changed the power field of the governance setting. Additionally, the very differ-
ent activity of a planned power boat race within another political context was selected 
to give in-depth insights into the different roles that knowledge uncertainties can play 
in permit and juridical processes. These empirical insights are presented in chapter 3. 
  During the analysis and writing process on the mussel seed fishery contro-
versy, more interesting elements were observed than could be addressed in the scope 
of the permit and juridical process study. This led to the re-examination of the mus-
sel fishery case for a longer time period, spanning from 1990 until 2016. In this study, 
27
 Introduction
1
the linear science-policy model – and its assumption that research can resolve reg-
ulation debates – is criticised. I observed this expectation of knowledge production 
for decision-making in my interviews and during meetings I attended – even though 
that expectation did not correspond with my observations of the policy process. 
Through an in-depth analysis of the mussel fishery case, the persistence of the high 
expectation that research projects could resolve the conflict is explained in chapter 4. 
   Complementary to the controversies over human activities in the Wadden 
Sea, which can be characterised by the policy discourse described by Runhaar (2009) 
as “Human activities within ecological limits” (p.206), I observed another dominant 
policy discourse – “Hands on: restore the Dutch Wadden Sea”. This perspective was ar-
ticulated by nature conservation organisations in a restoration plan in 2005 (Van der 
Eijk 2005), and the restoration aim was institutionalised in the Programme Towards a 
Rich Wadden Sea (‘Programma naar een Rijke Waddenzee’ in Dutch). Since 2010, na-
ture organisations and the government have cooperated within this restoration pro-
gramme to enhance nature restoration of the Wadden Sea (PRW 2015). To address this 
different governance setting for nature protection, the seagrass restoration case was 
selected to analyse the science-policy interactions in a more collaborative setting. The 
decision-making process surrounding the restoration of seagrass fields in the Dutch 
Wadden Sea is studied for the period 1989-2017; this analysis is presented in chapter 5. 
  These selected cases all contributed to my understanding of the role of knowl-
edge uncertainties in decision-making processes in the Dutch Wadden Sea. These cases 
all met the overarching case selection criteria that knowledge uncertainties should play 
a key role in the analysed decision-making processes. The insights obtained about the 
different roles of knowledge uncertainties in the power boat  case, the mussel fishery case 
and the seagrass restoration case have led to the conclusions presented in chapter 6. 
1.6.4 Data collection methods
This thesis builds on qualitative data collected from documents, interviews and observa-
tions (Crag and Cook 2007; Ritchie et al. 2014). A wide range of documents on general 
issues of the Wadden Sea, as well as specific documents for the selected case studies, 
were collected. Both primary and secondary literature was used. Data were gathered 
from research reports, governmental documents, project plans, websites of stakehold-
ers, blogs, newspaper articles, scholarly articles and PhD theses within the ecological 
and social science fields. Especially for the reconstruction of the mussel fishery and 
seagrass restoration case studies, newspaper articles retrieved from the LexisNexis data-
base gave useful insights into the positions and perspectives of actors some decades ago. 
  A crucial source of data was a set of semi-structured interviews with key in-
formants from scientific institutes, nature organisations, national and provincial gov-
ernments and the mussel fishery sector. In total, I conducted 28 interviews, for a list 
of the interviewees, see Appendix I. Potential interviewees were selected based on ex-
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isting contacts; document analysis provided the names of key actors, and the snowball 
method was used to identify more relevant interview candidates. Most of the inter-
views took place face-to-face with the interviewee at their work location or their home. 
Only the first four interviews involved groups. These interviews were conducted in 
co-operation with Chris Seijger, a colleague PhD researcher from the NWO-ZKO re-
search project. Additionally, there was one interview that took place via telephone and 
one via e-mail. The interviews were guided in a semi-structured way: a specific in-
terview guide was prepared for each interviewee; open-ended questions were used to 
start the conversation; followed by probing questions to deepen and steer the topics 
that were discussed. Almost all interviews were recorded (with permission of the in-
terviewees) and later transcribed for analytical purposes. One interview took place 
spontaneously during the coffee break of a workshop, and detailed notes were taken. 
  In addition to the documents and interviews, observations during meetings, 
symposia and conferences have been valuable for this research. These sites of interac-
tions provided me with the opportunity to have informal conversations with key actors. 
Holding conversations with such key actors, as well as other event participants, enabled 
me to gain insight into many more opinions and ideas than I could have accessed through 
interviews exclusively. Furthermore, I could observe the interactions between the actors 
and develop an idea of their relationships. I visited several public meetings, which were 
often organised by the Wadden Academy; for an overview of attended meetings, see 
Appendix II. In addition to these more general observations, I also participated in the 
seagrass restoration efforts of autumn 2015. For three days, I was part of the team that 
executed the introduction of seagrass seeds at intertidal areas near Uithuizen and Schier-
monnikoog. This gave me in-depth insights into the practice of seagrass restoration and 
allowed me to have long conversations with the persons involved in executing the project. 
  These three methods of data collection were used to complement each other. 
In some instances, interviews triggered the discovery of documents crucial to the deci-
sion-making process, whereas at other times, insights based on document analysis shaped 
the probing of in-depth interview questions. The data collection took place in an iterative 
process parallel to the development of the case study selections. In the first phase of the 
research, a broad scoping approach was used, starting with explorative interviews with 
key actors in the science-policy field and a broad literature overview. In a later phase, the 
documents and interviews became more specific to the selected case studies. 
1.6.5 Data analysis 
This research is based on an interpretative approach, which means that I am interested 
in the different understandings and meanings people have. This approach is applied in 
different ways for each of my four studies. In my first study, the different understandings 
of science-policy interactions in the Dutch Wadden Sea in social science literature are 
analysed. Here, the different perspectives of scholars on science-policy interactions are 
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the objects of analysis. Whereas in my other studies, the understandings of science-based 
experts, nature organisations, governmental actors and economic entrepreneurs are the 
objects of analysis. In my second study, two empirical controversies are analysed – focus-
sing on the different interpretations of significant effect and knowledge uncertainties. To 
structure this analysis, discourse coalitions were distinguished as opposing each other 
in the controversy, with a discourse coalition understood as “a group of actors that, in 
the context of an identifiable set of practices, shares the usage of a particular set of story 
lines over a particular period of time” (Hajer, 2006, p.70). Documents, interview tran-
scripts and notes were analysed to categorize the arguments and expressions of knowl-
edge uncertainties provided by each coalition. Furthermore, the assessment of signifi-
cant effect was approached as a boundary object to identify where and how interactions 
took place. In my third study, the debate on mussel fishery is re-analysed, building on 
the previous distinction of two discourse coalitions. Here, a more historical analysis is 
conducted in which four periods are distinguished. These periods are based on the anal-
ysis of the mussel fishery regulation and the storylines about regulation and knowledge 
uncertainties expressed by the discourse coalitions. In the fourth study, the focus is on 
the storylines of seagrass restoration. Here, the storylines structure the analysis of the 
different understandings: the reasons for restoration, the role research should play and 
how knowledge uncertainties should be addressed. This is, again, a historical analysis in 
which changes and stability are highlighted through the distinction of three episodes. 
  To support the trustworthiness of my analysis, interactions took place with key 
actors in the field. Feedback was provided on draft versions of manuscripts, and I pre-
sented my research findings not only at international conferences to scholars in my field 
but also to Wadden Sea professionals during symposia and conferences, see Appendix 
II. This led to interesting and insightful conversations about my research results. These 
interactions not only supported my views but also highlighted the different perspectives 
on science-policy within the Dutch Wadden Sea context.  Furthermore, the collected data 
are archived for potential audits. Copies of data, including interview transcripts, docu-
ments and observer notes are stored at the Environmental Policy Group of Wageningen 
University.  
1.7 Outline of the thesis
This thesis has been compiled in a publication-based format, which means that chap-
ters 2-5 are written as articles for peer-reviewed journals. These articles are written with 
co-authors. However, I was the main researcher who conducted the data collection and 
analysis. The outline of this thesis is as follows. This introduction provides an overview 
of the research topic, the conceptual framework, the research objectives and questions, 
as well as my methodological position. In chapter 2, a review of the social science lit-
erature on science-policy interactions in the Dutch Wadden Sea is presented. This re-
search provides lessons learned about science-policy interactions in the Dutch Wadden 
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Sea. This chapter addresses the first research question on understanding science-policy 
interactions in the Dutch Wadden Sea. In chapter 3, the permit and legal procedures on 
the mussel seed fishery and a planned powerboat race are analysed. Furthermore, this 
chapter explains how science-policy interactions are shaped through the boundary ob-
ject ‘significant effect’. In chapter 4, the mussel fishery case is re-examined. A typology 
of depoliticisation mechanisms is used to describe the decision-making processes and 
explain the persistent belief that more knowledge can resolve controversy. In chapter 5, 
a more collaborative context is examined in the analysis of the seagrass restoration case. 
This chapter shows the impact of storylines and knowledge uncertainties on decisions 
concerning restoration action and research. The empirical case studies on the use and 
restoration of the nature of the Dutch Wadden Sea contribute to answering the second 
research question on the role of knowledge uncertainties in decision-making processes. 
In chapter 6, the conclusions of this thesis are presented. The empirical findings are dis-
cussed, and conclusions are drawn based on the insights into knowledge uncertainties 
presented in the empirical chapters. Furthermore, chapter 6 presents a reflection on the 
politics of knowledge uncertainties and the broader contributions of this PhD thesis. 
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Chapter 2
A review of science-policy interactions 
in the Dutch Wadden Sea 
– The cockle fishery and gas exploitation controversies
This chapter has been published as: 
Floor, J.R., Van Koppen, C.S.A, Lindeboom, H.J. (2013). A review of science-policy 
interactions in the Dutch Wadden Sea – The cockle fishery and gas exploitation con-
troversies. Journal of Sea Research 82: 165-175.
Floor, J.R., Van Koppen, C.S.A, Lindeboom, H.J. 
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Abstract
The potential ecological effects of cockle fisheries and gas exploitation in the Dutch 
Wadden Sea and their implications for policy and management have been the topic of 
vigorous societal debates. Ecological science has played crucial but controversial roles in 
these debates. Several social science studies have been dedicated to analysing these roles 
and making recommendations for the improvement of science-policy interactions. In 
reviewing these studies, this article aims to draw lessons for (ecological) scientists and 
policy-makers on how to understand and guide the interactions of science and policy in 
Wadden Sea management. Studies addressing science-policy interactions in the Dutch 
Wadden Sea can be grouped into three main perspectives, emphasizing the social and 
economic dynamics of resource management, the role of nature views and discourses in 
controversies, and the influence of science dynamics in policy and management debates. 
The review demonstrates that ecological knowledge and ecological scientists have played 
important roles in the controversies on cockle fisheries and gas exploitation. However, 
scientific knowledge was not always the most important factor in the decision-making 
process, and scientific insights were not always used as expected by the scientists. How 
scientific knowledge is used and interpreted by stakeholders was dependent on their 
interests, their nature views and on the dominant policy discourses. Ecological knowl-
edge and scientists themselves became part of the policy debates, e.g. in discussions on 
uncertainty and reliability. The position of scientists in policy debates was strongly in-
fluenced by the policy setting and by changes in this setting, e.g. by the operation of 
mediators or by new interpretations of legal rules. A lesson to be drawn for scientists is 
that they should reflect on the sort of position - e.g. independent outsider, or engaged 
stakeholder - they take in a debate. They should also be aware that this position cannot 
be chosen at will: it is strongly influenced by the policy context. For government and 
other stakeholders, an important lesson is that by shaping adequate policy settings they 
can contribute to more productive and effective interactions with science and scientists. 
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2.1 Introduction
The Dutch Wadden Sea is a dynamic ecosystem, but also a dynamic and conflictual social 
arena. There have been vigorous debates on the possible effects of economic activities 
on the ecology of the Wadden Sea, which in the last 10-15 years mainly concentrated 
on shellfish, in particular cockle fishery, and on gas exploitation. In these controversies 
scientific knowledge and scientists not only had substantial influence but also became 
subject of controversy and debate themselves. Central to this article will be this disputed 
involvement of natural science in social and political conflicts.
 Nature conservation plays a very important role in the management of the 
Dutch Wadden Sea, recognised as an important nature area, especially for birds. Main 
legislations are the Dutch Key Planning Decision, the EU Birds and Habitat directive, 
the Dutch Nature Protecting Act and the Trilateral agreements between the Netherlands, 
Germany and Denmark. Together with the diverging economic and nature conservation 
interests in this area, these different regulatory frameworks constitute a complex and 
multi-level governance context to the science-policy interactions in the Dutch Wadden 
Sea. Many different actors are involved, including governmental bodies (municipalities, 
three provinces, several ministries, Germany, Denmark and the European Union), envi-
ronmental organisations (particularly the Wadden Society, in Dutch ‘Waddenvereniging’, 
an NGO with a large number of members that aims to protect the nature of the Wadden 
Sea), economic entrepreneurs (fishermen, tourist organisations, sand/shells/salt/gas ex-
traction companies), as well as scientists. The ecological research on the Dutch Wadden 
Sea is undertaken by research institutes and universities, especially NIOZ (Royal Neth-
erlands Institute for Sea Research), IMARES (Institute for Marine Resources and Eco-
system Studies) and the University of Groningen. These different actors come together 
during official and unofficial negotiations, but also meet each other in courts, such as the 
‘Raad van State’, the supreme administrative court of the Netherlands. 
 The policy processes of cockle fishery and gas exploitation have attracted the 
attention of several scholars that took an interest in the science-policy interactions in this 
dynamic arena of the Dutch Wadden Sea. Applying insights from international strands of 
science-policy studies (e.g. Gibbons 2000; Halfmann and Hoppe 2004; Jasanoff 1994; Star 
and Griesemer 1989), these scholars have explored how ecological knowledge and scien-
tists played a role in the policy-making for the Wadden Sea. This article aims to review 
these studies to assess how they can contribute to our understanding of science-policy 
interactions, and also to draw lessons for (ecological) scientists and policy-makers on 
how these interactions can be improved in coping with the challenges the Wadden Sea is 
faced with.
 The literature reviewed for this article was limited to peer-reviewed articles and 
PhD theses of the last 15 years with a focus on the Dutch Wadden Sea. Based on these 
criteria five PhD theses and ten articles of social research on the Dutch Wadden Sea have 
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been selected for review. Almost all of this research has focused on the decision-making 
process around the activities of cockle fisheries and gas exploitation. This review aims 
to combine their different insights to give an overview of the current knowledge on this 
topic. However we will first give a brief historical overview on the cockle fisheries and the 
gas exploitation conflict and their governance context.
2.2 Historical overview 
2.2.1 The cockle fishery and gas exploitation conflicts
A timeline of governmental decisions and important events for the cockle fishery and 
gas exploitation in the Dutch Wadden Sea is given in Figure 2.1. The next two sections 
present them in more detail.
2.2.2 Cockle fishery
Two shellfish species in the Wadden Sea are fished commercially: cockles (Cerastoderna 
edule) and mussels (Mytilus edulis). The mechanical cockle fishery has been the most 
controversial. This type of fishery started in the 1950s. It uses a hydraulic suction dredge 
alongside a ship to systematically harvest the shellfish from the tidal sand flats. Before, 
the cockles were harvested manually during low tide. In 1973, the mechanical cockle 
fishery became regulated through a license system (Van Nieuwaal 2011; Verbeeten 1999). 
  Since the 1980s, research on the possible impact of mechanical cockle fishing on 
the ecosystem of the mud flats and the availability of the shellfish for birds, started to play 
a role (De Vlas 1982; Dankers & de Vlas 1992; RIN 1987). This research became highly 
relevant when in 1988 and 1989 an extremely low spat fall of cockles and mussels was 
observed. After a request of nature organisations to reserve the low amount of shellfish 
for the birds, the ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (in Dutch ‘LNV’) 
decided to partly close the Dutch Wadden Sea for shellfish fishing in 1990. However, 
this decision was successfully opposed by the fishermen at the Raad van State, which 
resulted in the fishing of the cockles and mussel banks in 1990. This was followed by 
large protests of the nature organisations in the media, blaming the fishermen for the 
large mortality of birds in the winters of 1990-1991 and 1991-1992 (Imeson and van 
den Bergh 2006; Verbeeten 1999). In reaction to this conflict, the ministry of Agricul-
ture, Nature and Food Quality came in 1993 with new regulations in the form of the 
Sea and Coastal Fisheries Policy: 26% of the Dutch Wadden Sea area became closed for 
mussel seed and cockle fishing and enough cockles and mussels should be left to sat-
isfy 60% of the food requirement of the bird populations (LNV 1993). Also the fisher-
men came up with new initiatives, such as fishing plans, logging their activities through 
black boxes, and organising themselves in a Producers Organisation (Steins 1999). 
   This did not stop the controversy on the impacts of the mechanical cockle 
fishery. The outcomes of research on the effects of the fishery on the ecology were in-
terpreted differently by the fishermen and the nature organisations, which resulted in 
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Figure 2.1. Timeline of important events and decisions for the cockle fishery and gas exploitation 
case, with major ecological events in light grey and the policy connection in 2004 in dark grey.
38
Chapter 2
2
commissioning their own research (Nomden et al. 1999). In 1998, an ecological evalu-
ation program (EVA I) assessed the impact of the restrictive fishing policy, but the re-
sults were inconclusive, there was insufficient data to make strong conclusions (LNV 
1998). A debated NIOZ report, however, stated there were long-term negative effects 
(Piersma & Koolhaas 1997), this rapport was criticised for not being scientific, until it 
was put into an academic publication (Piersma et al. 2001). Based on EVA I, the min-
ister of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality planned a more thorough evaluation 
(EVA II) for the period 1999-2003 (Ens et al. 2004). During this period there was a large 
disagreement over the effects of the cockle fisheries. Research outcomes were used as 
arguments in this controversy, and some researchers took an active stance in the con-
flict (Swart and Van Andel 2008; Turnhout 2003). The observations of high mortality 
of Eider ducks in the winters of 1999-2001 intensified the debate (Camphuysen et al. 
2002; Ens 2000; LNV 2000; ). The dispute on cockle fishery was also taken to the Raad 
van State, but every year the fishermen won and got a permit to fish (Hanssen et al. 
2009; Swart and Van Andel 2008). The EVA II reports were finalized in December 2003. 
        Before the EVA II process was finished, however, a new policy dynamic came 
into play, connecting the cockle fisheries with gas exploitation. This was influenced by 
the activities of the environmental research and consultancy company IMSA, which 
became a mediator in the controversy on gas exploitation (see also section 2.3). Dur-
ing the mediation activities, IMSA connected the cockle fishery - which was perceived 
as major threat to the ecological quality of the Wadden Sea – to possibilities for new 
gas exploitations. During an expert workshop organised by IMSA in 2004, in which 
ecological experts ranked the impacts of existing activities, cockle fishery came out as 
having the largest negative effects, much more than gas exploitation (Runhaar 2009). 
 Another important factor in the controversy was the Commission Meijer which 
was installed by the Dutch government to explore possible policies for gas exploitation, 
shellfish fishing, and conservation of the Wadden Sea nature. Supported by EVA II results 
and researchers, in 2004 this Commission, together with its advice on gas exploitation, 
proposed a 7 year transition period for the cockle fishery to develop sustainable fishing 
methods, and advised to use part of the revenues from gas exploitation for a fund support-
ing restoration, conservation and research in the Wadden Sea area (Meijer et al. 2004). 
 In September of the same year, and perhaps most influential of all developments 
in 2004, the court ruling of the European Court of Justice stipulated that the cockle fish-
ery should be handled as a project for which an appropriate assessment is required. The 
appropriate assessment should establish whether the cockle fishery has negative signif-
icant effects on the nature values of the Wadden Sea (European Court of Justice 2004). 
The Court’s ruling also implied that the precautionary principle should be applied for 
the cockle fishery, which put the burden of proof with regard to effects on the ecosystem 
with the fishermen. Against this background the national government decided to stop 
mechanical cockle fishing in the Dutch Wadden Sea and to buy out the cockle fishermen. 
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This was the end of the mechanical cockle fishery in the Dutch Wadden Sea. Manual 
harvesting cockles continued and was intensified (Runhaar 2009; Swart and Van Andel 
2008). 
2.2.3 Gas exploitation
In 1963, the NAM (Dutch oil and natural gas producer) obtained the gas exploitation 
concession for the area of Groningen (including Slochteren and part of the Wadden Sea) 
and in 1969 it got an additional concession for the area around the island Ameland. The 
NAM intended to start gas exploitation on Ameland in 1971, but was delayed by pro-
tests of the local municipality, the Wadden Society and the province. In another area, the 
Zuidwal (in the west part of the Wadden Sea), a concession was requested in 1971 by the 
private company Elf Petroland. Finally, in 1981 the national government decided not to 
give this concession to Elf Petroland, because of possible negative effects on the Wadden 
Sea nature, but was forced to give the concession on the basis of a court ruling of the 
Raad van State in 1982. In that year gas exploitation started on Ameland and Zuidwal. 
Against this background of controversies, for the period of 1984-1994, a moratorium on 
further gas exploitations in all parts of the Dutch Wadden Sea was agreed on between 
the government and gas exploitation companies (Van Nieuwaal 2011; Verbeeten 1999). 
   In 1992 the discussion on gas exploitation started again when the Dutch gov-
ernment made clear that it wanted to prolong the moratorium, while the gas exploitation 
companies declared that they wanted to start with new gas exploitations. A compromise 
was reached in December 1993, by allowing pilot gas explorations (Lindeboom 1993; 
Verbeeten 1999). In 1998 the discussion on gas exploitation in the Wadden Sea gas was 
reopened, with again an important role for scientific knowledge on the impacts of gas 
exploitation, specifically the effect of subsidence and coastal erosion. The discussion fo-
cussed on the question whether sedimentation in the Wadden Sea could keep up with 
subsidence, in which case hardly any actual decrease of the intertidal area and thus effects 
on the ecosystem would occur (Dijkema 1997; Oost et al. 1999). However, scientific re-
ports that stated that the effects of exploitation would be negligible were contested because 
they were commissioned by the NAM (Eysink et al. 1995; Eysink et al. 2000). Greenpeace 
commissioned a contra-expertise rapport in which the economic effects were calculated 
for the hypothetical case of large subsidence (Van Wetten et al. 1999). In November 1999 
a political crisis emerged when the government decided to allow gas exploitation and the 
parliament rejected this. After a debate about the reliability of no-effect predictions, the 
government decided against gas exploitation in the Wadden Sea (Turnhout et al. 2008). 
    A new dynamic started when the issue of gas exploitation became connected 
with cockle fishery, as described in the previous section. In the period of 2002-2004 IMSA 
carried out a project to bring stakeholders and politicians together, financed by the NAM. 
In April 2004 the Commission Meijer (a governmental advice commission) concluded 
that gas exploitation without significant ecological effects appeared to be possible and 
40
Chapter 2
2
advised the ‘hand on the tap’ method. This method implies structured monitoring for 
unwanted effects: to prevent irreversible effects to occur, the amount of gas exploitation 
per year is restricted (Meijer et al. 2004). This advice was taken up in the governmental 
decision in 2004 to allow gas exploitation (Runhaar and van Nieuwaal 2010). The protest 
against this decision was fought out in court, and was settled in 2007 with the Raad van 
State deciding that the gas exploitation would be allowed (Raad van State 2007). 
2.3 Review of the social science literature on the Dutch Wadden Sea 
2.3.1 Structuring the literature
The selected review publications can be clustered around three main themes based 
on their different perspectives on the Wadden Sea controversies, see Figure 2.2. 
The theme ‘resource management’ refers to studies that deal with science-poli-
cy issues within a perspective of stakeholders in the management of the Wadden 
Sea as a common resource. The theme ‘nature views & discourses’ deals with sci-
ence-policy interactions from a perspective in which different interpretation frame-
works are key structuring factors. Finally, the publications in the theme ‘science 
dynamics’ take the science-policy interactions as the main topic of their research. 
  In reviewing the publications, we particularly focus on science-policy interac-
tions and pay less attention to other arguments presented. We have tried to stay close 
to the authors’ interpretation of success and failure in the controversies described. It is 
obvious that in these much-debated conflicts there are diverging views on the policy 
processes and outcomes. When describing the arguments of the authors, we do not claim 
that these arguments are beyond dispute.
2.3.2 Resource management
In one of the earliest studies on science-policy interactions, Verbeeten (1999) investigat-
ed the cases of gas exploitation and cockle fishery from a perspective of policy-oriented 
learning. In this perspective, the role of new knowledge and insights in changing policy 
is central to the analysis. Regarding the cockle fishery Verbeeten looked at the period 
1950-1998, with the license system decision of 1974 and the fishery regulations of 1993 
as landmarks. The process towards the decision on fishery regulation in 1993 was charac-
terised by conflicting views on the ecological effects of mechanical cockle fishery. In the 
1980s there had been large uncertainties in the knowledge about the impacts of mechan-
ical cockle fishery and effects were generally considered to be low. In the 1990s, however, 
new research concluded that there was a causal relationship between mechanical fishery, 
benthic food availability and negative trends in bird populations (Dankers & De Vlas 
1992; De Vlas 1982; RIN 1987). This information was contested and strategically used 
by stakeholders: nature organisations emphasized the negative effects, while fishermen 
claimed these effects were exaggerated and tried to show this by commissioning more 
research. Although there were differences of interpretation, there was a dialogue between 
41
Review of science-policy interactions
2
the actors involved about the research outcomes. Moreover, since 1992 the fishermen, 
nature organisations and the government acknowledged their mutual dependence and 
the new policies of resource conservation were considered legitimate by them. According 
to Verbeeten, these circumstances made it possible for policy-oriented learning to take 
place. This means that due to new knowledge and insights the definition of the policy 
issue, the policy goals and the policy instruments changed in a way that maintained or 
even improved the legitimacy of the policy. 
 Regarding gas exploitation Verbeeten looked at the period 1960-1998, distin-
guishing two decisions that changed the policy direction: the moratorium on gas ex-
ploitation in 1984 and the decision in favour of pilot gas explorations in 1993. Verbeet-
en interpreted the moratorium decision as a result of policy-oriented learning. For the 
process towards the political compromise that allowed gas exploration in 1993, however, 
she concluded that there was no policy-oriented learning. The new policy was not broad-
ly supported, but rather the result of a power play, in which economic considerations 
were most powerful. Learning through new knowledge occurred, but the opponents 
of gas exploitation contested the validity of this knowledge. Rather than disputing the 
Figure 2.2. Visual representation of the reviewed literature, with authors, research themes and last 
year of their research period. The research in the ovals focused  on the fishery conflict, research 
in the rectangles focused on both the fishery conflict and the gas exploitation, the research in the 
triangle did not focus on either of these conflicts. 
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knowledge on scientific grounds, they questioned the legitimacy of the knowledge, be-
cause all the research on the effects of gas exploitation was commissioned by the NAM. 
   While Verbeeten stressed the importance of policy-oriented learning, she also 
added that the economic context and the relations between relevant parties are very im-
portant in influencing the policy-making process. To improve policy-making, she rec-
ommends regular interactions between parties, with a focus on knowledge sharing. Here 
Verbeeten sees an important role for science, under the condition that scientists and sci-
entific information are experienced as independent.
 
In contrast to Verbeeten, Steins (1999) focused more specifically on the resource (co-)
management of the shellfish fishery in the period 1993-1998. After some voluntary meas-
ures by the fishing industry in 1991, the Sea and Coastal Fisheries Policy (SCFP) in 1993 
meant a shift from the situation of complete freedom for each fisherman with a licence, 
towards common property fishing. This entailed that the Producers Organisation was 
responsible for dividing the fish quota and fishing days between the fishermen. Accord-
ing to Steins the aim of this policy was to integrate shellfish fisheries and nature values 
through a multi-party process, encompassing the government, the shellfish industry, na-
ture conservation groups and scientists. This process was partly successful, and there 
were indeed official negotiations between the main stakeholders. On the other hand, 
however, there were sharp conflicts about the mechanical cockle fishery and there was 
only limited trust between the different parties. There was disagreement on when and 
where fishing took place, however, this was settled by the black boxes that monitored the 
fishermen’s activities. Steins stated that the unsuccessful functioning of this management 
process was influenced by several factors: initially not all cockle fishermen’s were part of 
the agreed regulations; no common rationality was developed because of the strategic 
participation of nature conservation organisations; and there was limited interaction be-
tween the stakeholders, only during periods in which policies were designed or evaluated. 
 An unlucky accident in the process was the fishing of the scientific research 
plots just after implementing the SCFP. This was probably a mistake caused by an in-
correct map in the SCFP on which the research plots were not designated as closed 
areas. Nonetheless, it had a negative influence on the relationship between fisher-
men and scientists, particularly for the scientists that Steins calls ‘political biologists’: 
the biologists that advocated nature protection and publically claimed that there 
were negative effects of cockle fisheries. Steins also asserts that the different positions 
of the stakeholders in the management process are related with their nature views. 
   According to Steins, science was important in the management process, how-
ever differently for each stakeholder. The government used scientific knowledge 
to justify their policy. Nature organisations used scientific knowledge that proved 
the negative effect of the (cockle) fishery to support their position against the fish-
ery practice. Fishermen were dependent on the scientific inventory of the shell-
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fish stock and on the development of new fishing techniques. In addition, fisher-
men commissioned new scientific research to show there were no adverse effects. 
 
Like Steins, Imeson & Van den Bergh (2006) analysed the fishery management process, 
but their research scope expanded until 2003. They investigated the impacts of the Sea 
and Coastal Fisheries Policy (SCFP) on the objectives of the various stakeholders and 
the  implications of this policy for establishing a sustainable fishing practice. The stake-
holders they distinguished were the government, the conservationists, the fishing sector 
and researchers. In doing so they categorized scientists as actors having a stake in the 
outcome of the process: “scientists can be considered a stakeholder group because their 
research can benefit from the establishment of areas permanently closed to fishing” (Im-
eson and van den Bergh 2006, p.499). The authors concluded that the SCFP could not 
realize the different objectives of the stakeholders. Explaining factors for this were the 
lack of communication between stakeholders, the lack of a common objective shared by 
all stakeholders and disagreement about which policies were appropriate. Imeson & Van 
den Bergh criticised the national government for inconsistently applying the precaution-
ary approach for the Wadden Sea. According to them the fishing practices were tolerated 
until it would be proven to be a threat to the sustainability of the ecosystem, whereas gas 
extraction in 1999 was not allowed because the absence of effects could not be guaranteed. 
 
Van Nieuwaal (2011) brings in a new perspective to the resource management theme: 
that of the economic entrepreneur. Van Nieuwaal analysed the cockle fishery and gas 
exploitation cases as firm-government interaction process and investigated the institu-
tional survival path of the cockle fishery sector and the NAM. These survival paths were 
structured by controversies in which actions were mobilised. With regard to the cockle 
fishery, Van Nieuwaal analysed several controversies over the period of 1973 to 2004. 
In his view, the central controversy for the cockle fishery is on the ecological effect of 
mechanical cockle fishery, specifically the effects on bird populations. While other con-
troversies, such as the one on fishing rights, were settled, the central controversy on the 
effects on the ecosystem has not been settled according to Van Nieuwaal, at least not for 
the fishermen. However, the controversy ended with the buyout of the fishermen in 2004. 
   Van Nieuwaal showed that knowledge played a central role in this contro-
versy. Uncertainty of knowledge was an issue of dispute, but also the question whose 
knowledge is more valuable: the practical knowledge of fishermen or scientific knowl-
edge. With the decision of the European Court that the mechanical cockle fishery 
should be considered as a project for which the precautionary principle applied, the 
direction of the discussion changed, putting the burden of proof on the fisherman. 
The mobilisations of the fishermen were insufficient to prevent the buyout of their 
enterprises in 2004. They relied too much on their position as an established activity 
and on following the rules without being pro-active. For example, they did not invest 
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in technological innovation. At the same time, there was a strong counter-mobiliza-
tion from nature organisations, especially the pressure group ‘the Wild Cockles’ (in 
Dutch ‘De Wilde Kokkels’) that protested against all their permits in court. In public 
media, the arguments of the fishermen that they would not ruin their own resources 
was not convincing enough against the images of death birds and disturbed sediments. 
   Also in the gas exploitation case, Van Nieuwaal regards the effects on the ecolo-
gy of the Wadden Sea as the central controversy. According to him, this controversy was 
only temporarily settled in 1999 by the parliamentary decision against gas exploitation. 
Van Nieuwaal posits that through strategic mobilisation of the NAM, gas exploitation 
came back as a potential option, especially after the link with the cockle fishery and the 
IMSA session on ranking activities on their effects. The ranking workshop by ecological 
experts facilitated a shift in environmental attention from gas extraction to another ac-
tivity that was now perceived as more harmful: mechanical cockle fishery. Van Nieuwaal 
claimed the strategy of NAM to have IMSA facilitate interactions between stakeholders 
was very successful. In their facilitation of interactions not only natural science insights 
were used, but also lessons from social science. The remaining doubts on gas exploitation 
were met through the ‘hand on the tap’ method.
Resource management conclusions
The review of the  resource management literature leads to the following conclusions. 
Firstly, scientific knowledge - mainly with regard to the ecological effects of activities 
within the Wadden Sea - played a very important role in resource management. Here sci-
ence was used as source of information. Secondly, the scientific knowledge itself became 
problematic. The legitimacy of knowledge was contested, depending on who commis-
sioned or carried out the research, and information was strategically used by stakehold-
ers. Thirdly, next to the role of (new) scientific knowledge in resource management, other 
factors such as economic interests, the perception of uncertainties, power relations, and 
the shifts in burden of proof by the application of the precautionary principle, had an 
impact on how and when knowledge was used. Finally, science was not only a source of 
information, but some scientists (‘political biologists’) took an active role. Thus, to some 
extent, scientists acted as stakeholders with specific interests in the policy outcomes, al-
though their interests did not play a substantial role in the conflict. 
2.3.3 Nature views and discourses
Focusing on nature views, Swart & Van Der Windt (2005) specifically looked at the views of 
nature incorporated in the different perceptions of sustainability that clashed in the shell-
fish conflict until 2004. They analysed the nature views of the shellfish organisations, the 
national government and the Wadden Society. According to this analysis, the shellfish or-
ganisations perceived sustainability mainly in terms of ‘economically profitable’ and ‘eco-
logically sound’, drawing on their traditional knowledge of the sea and their own interest 
to sustain their resource. The Dutch government gave priority to both human welfare and 
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human duties towards nature. In policy documents both human welfare and the intrinsic 
value of nature were stressed. The Wadden Society emphasized the intrinsic value of na-
ture, as well as the mutual dependency of humans and nature: they perceived the Wadden 
Sea as a last wilderness, but also saw the traditional hand-catchment of cockles as a sustain-
able way of dealing with nature. With their approach, Swart & Van der Windt illustrated 
that the conflicts not only involved different interests but were also connected with diverg-
ing deeper beliefs and ideas. They argued that these deep beliefs are very hard to change 
on a short term, and concluded that it is therefore unlikely that deliberation and commu-
nication between the Wadden Society and fishery organizations will result in consensus. 
 
In contrast to the research of Swart & Van der Windt the analysis of Steins (1999)  does 
not start with the conflict, but with the co-operation between fishery organisations and 
the Wadden Society in the co-management of the shellfish fisheries in the period 1993-
1999.  Although Steins also concludes: “of crucial importance for the relationship between 
nature conservation groups and the shellfish industry, and therefore for resource use ne-
gotiation, are the images both groups have of nature and each other” (Steins 1999, p.139). 
With regard to the images of nature she found similar differences between the shellfish 
industry and the nature conservationist as Swart & Van der Windt: while the shellfish 
industry agreed with a need for sustainable ecosystems, they saw the Wadden Sea at the 
same time as a production area. Nature conservationists perceived the Wadden Sea first 
and foremost as a nature monument in which natural processes should take place without 
interference for purposes of human use. These different views explain why the proposal of 
cockle fisherman to rotate the closed areas was not an option for the nature conservation-
ists. For the nature conservationist this nature should be without human intervention, 
for the fishermen the nature could only be seen in combination with human activities. 
 
Extending the scope of Swart & Van der Windt and Steins, who focused on the nature 
views of the fishermen and the nature organisations, Turnhout (2003) also analysed 
the nature views of scientists involved in the policy process. She based her analysis on 
three ideal types of nature: nature as resource, as a pastoral idyll and as wilderness. In 
the nature policy of the Wadden Sea, she observed an increase of the wilderness view, 
linked to an upcoming trend of nature development with a focus on dynamic natural 
processes. This trend is shown in her analyses of the trilateral expert workgroup in 
1994, whose aim was to develop ecological targets for the Wadden Sea. These ecolog-
ical experts “perceived the Wadden Sea as a robust and dynamic nature area” (Turn-
hout, 2003, p. 80), which made it undesirable or even impossible  to develop fixed 
quantitative targets. However, because of policy requirements also elements of the 
pastoral idyll view were added, in particular by including concrete species as nature 
conservation targets. Turnhout’s analysis illuminates the role of different nature views 
in interactions between scientists and policy-makers in the policy-making process. 
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Adding a new dimension to the views of the previous researchers, Runhaar (2009) in-
vestigated the policy process from the perspective of policy discourses, which he defined 
as “the frames through which groups of actors give meaning to aspects of the world” 
(Runhaar et al. 2010, p.339). In his analysis he looked specifically at discourses on hu-
man-nature relations in the Wadden Sea area and observed a change in the dominant 
policy discourse over the period of 2000-2004, from ‘Hands off the Wadden Sea!’ to ‘Hu-
man activities within ecological limits’, implying no new activities in the Wadden Sea 
towards a discourse that implies that activities that do not harm the ecosystem should 
be allowed. Runhaar made an explicit link between the dominant discourse and the use 
of knowledge: “the use of environmental knowledge depends on the degree to which 
environmental knowledge fits into the dominant discourse” (Runhaar 2009, p.207). For 
example, he explained the change in use of the scientific knowledge on the effects of 
gas exploitation on the ecosystem in 1999 and 2004 as follows. In 1999 the statement 
that the effects of gas exploitation were minimal was not a convincing argument for 
the Dutch parliament, because within the dominant discourse ‘Hands off the Wadden 
Sea!’ the normative position of no additional human activities was dominant. With the 
change towards a discourse in which human activities are allowed within ecological lim-
its, the emphasis shifted to the scientific analysis of ecological effects and limits, which 
in this case strengthened the power position of the actors in favour of gas exploitation. 
   From his perception that discourses are very important in decision-making, 
Runhaar recommends discourse articulation and reflection for better understanding in 
decision-making processes. Acknowledging the structural and implicit elements of dis-
courses, which makes change very difficult, Runhaar et al. (2010) explore the conditions 
for discourse reflection, connecting it with concepts as reframing and policy learning. 
According to these authors, important factors for discourse reflection are the malleability 
of discourse, the openness of actors involved, the role of a mediator as a neutral party 
and exogenous factors, like court rulings. They state that when the dominant discourse is 
incongruent with environmental assessment outcomes, these outcomes will likely not be 
used in decision-making. To increase knowledge utilization discourse reflection can be 
encouraged. For the Wadden Sea case these authors describe IMSA as an important me-
diator that helped to change the dominant discourse. Runhaar et al. (2010) recommend 
scientists in environmental assessments to collaborate with mediators to encourage dis-
course reflections and recommend scientists to reflect on their own discourses.  
Nature views & discourses conclusions
From the literature with the nature views & discourses perspective, the following conclu-
sions can be drawn. First of all, conflicts of stakeholders were connected to their differ-
ent nature views. Secondly, the nature views of scientists had an impact on their policy 
advices. Thirdly, which knowledge is used and how scientific knowledge is interpreted 
in the policy process depended on the dominant discourse. Finally, it was recommended 
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for scientists to enhance knowledge utilization by facilitating discourse reflection, for 
example by collaborating with mediators.
2.3.4 Science dynamics
In one of the first studies of science-policy dynamics in the Wadden Sea, Van der Windt 
(1995) focused on the Amoeba-framework in the Wadden Sea policy development. This 
is a tool to visualise the quality of an ecosystem, see Figure 2.3. The debate on the ef-
fects of economic activities on the ecosystem is connected with the ecological quality 
of the Wadden Sea. In 1989, the Amoeba-framework was used for the Wadden Sea to 
show its ecological quality. The Amoeba-framework was developed by ‘Rijkswaterstaat’, 
part of the ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. Van der Windt 
analysed the Amoeba-framework as a boundary object, bridging different worlds that 
could connect through this object. It connected different ministries, policy-makers and 
scientists. The object could be used from a technical water quality view and a nature 
protection view. In its target species also commercially fished species were included, 
combining the view on the Wadden Sea as a production area and as a nature area. The 
visualisation of target species and their states against reference values made it possible to 
discuss nature goals and policy measures. The strength of the approach was its clearness, 
however the choice for target species meant also a simplification of the ecosystem. The 
development of the Amoeba-framework stimulated more research to underpin the target 
parameters, while at the same time it was criticised for not being scientific enough. The 
Amoeba-framework showed the mixing of science and policy-making and the close re-
lations between (some) scientists and policy-makers in the Wadden area, which made it 
possible to establish new policy measures.
 
Within the same line of thought on boundary objects and close science-policy interactions, 
Turnhout (2003) studied the development of ecological targets for the trilateral policy of 
the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark by an expert working group in the period 1992-
1994. In that case the Amoeba-framework was not used, but new targets were formulated 
that can be described as qualitative open-ended ecosystem objectives. At that moment 
the Amoeba-framework could no longer work as a boundary object. The strict quanti-
tative targets in the Amoeba-framework were not politically feasible and its rigid aspect 
and historical reference were contested by scientists (Turnhout 2003; Turnhout 2009). 
    Reflecting on ecological indicators as boundary objects between the science and 
policy domain Turnhout (2009) emphasized the need of a common culture between the 
parties involved for boundary objects to be effective. After a reflection on knowledge uti-
lization in Turnhout et al. (2007), where the authors start with the paradox that science is 
aimed to close the debate but only exacerbates it, they recommend to include stakeholder 
perspectives in the development of ecological indicators to be effective boundary objects. 
   Next to the role of ecological indicators as boundary objects, Turnhout 
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(2003) examined the science-policy interactions and the role of scientists in the 
cockle fishery and gas exploitation controversies in the period 1998-2002. She per-
ceived both controversies as debates between two knowledge coalitions: Pro Nature 
and Pro Fisheries/Gas-exploitation.  Scientific uncertainty and knowledge gaps were 
used to undermine knowledge claims. In the cockle fishery controversy the claim 
that the fishery had long-term negative effects was questioned in a scientific debate. 
In the gas exploitation controversy the claim that there were no significant effects 
was questioned, the Wadden Society started the discussion to what extent you can 
prove there will not be an effect. According to Turnhout the science-policy bound-
ary was used to “undermine the claims of the other coalition. Within coalitions, the 
boundaries between science and policy were not contested” (Turnhout, 2003, p.92). 
   According to Turnhout et al. (2008) the role of scientists is connected with the 
type of policy problem. These authors distinguish well-structured problems with science 
as problem solver, unstructured problems with science as problem signaller, badly struc-
Figure 2.3. The Amoeba-framework shows the quality of a water ecosystem by presenting the 
present values of parameters against reference values that are set on 100% plotted in a circle (from 
Turnhout et al. 2007). 
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tured problems with science as accommodation and moderately structured policy prob-
lems with science as advocacy, see Table 2.1. The scientists involved in developing the 
ecological targets in the trilateral working group were seen as accommodating the pro-
cess by depoliticizing the sensitive issue, while scientists on ecological effects of cockle 
fishery and gas exploitation were (willingly and unwillingly) part of advocating a specific 
position. Based on this analysis Turnhout et al. (2008) conclude that there are different 
science-policy structures, and these structures  can change in the process from policy 
development to policy implementation. These authors criticise the general claim that sci-
ence and policy should cooperate more closely. Instead, to avoid endless debates between 
competing knowledge coalitions, they recommend to recognise more unstructured prob-
lems in decision-making, and to enable more open dialogues.
Policy problem: Well structured Unstructured Badly structured Moderately structured 
Policy process Rule Learning Compromise Negotiation 
Role of scientist Problem solver Problem signalling Accommodation Advocacy 
Knowledge Data Perspectives of 
intervention 
Concepts Arguments 
 
Table 2.1. Science-policy typology from Turnhout et al. (2008).
Also focusing on the role of science in the debate on the Wadden Sea, Swart & Van Andel 
(2008) specifically looked at the controversy on cockle fishing between 1990 and 2004. 
Based on the changing roles of scientists, these authors distinguish four episodes. The 
first episode, 1990-1998 was characterised by the fishery measures and its first evaluation 
(EVA I) by ecological research institutes (LNV 1998). The second episode, 1997-1999, wit-
nessed the intensive public debate on cockle fishery, triggered by a report of NIOZ (that 
was not part of EVA I) that stated that cockle fishery had long-lasting negative effects (see 
Piersma & Koolhaas 1997). The validity of this research was questioned as it was not ac-
ademically published and scientists were criticised as behaving as conservationists rather 
than independent scientists. In the third episode, 1999-2003, the second evaluation study 
(EVA II) was carried out with a supervising steering committee with representatives from 
different stakeholders groups and an independent audit committee. At the same time 
there was the public debate on cockle fisheries, in which some (NIOZ) scientists, nature 
organisations (particularly the aforementioned ‘Wild Cockles’) and cockle fishermen 
took positions. In this period the research of NIOZ was published in reviewed literature 
(Piersma et al. 2001). After several postponements the EVA II research was finished (Ens 
et al.2004). In the fourth episode, 2003-2004, after some debate on the statement in the 
public summary about the role of the reduced nutrient load on the carrying capacity of 
the Wadden Sea, the dominant conclusion was that there were negative effects of me-
chanical cockle fishery. This episode also featured the advice of the Meijer commission to 
give the cockle fishery a 7 year-transition period, which was criticised by scientists for not 
50
Chapter 2
2
reacting fast enough on the scientific insights that there were negative effects. The debate 
stopped with the EU-court rule and the decision to buyout the cockle fishermen in 2004. 
    According to Swart & Van Andel, this process can best be described as societally 
contextualised science, where “contextualization implies the involvement of societal players 
in the research process by which the difference between scientific and societal statements 
may become less clear” (Swart and Van Andel 2008, p.86). In the public debate it was often 
unclear whether biologists were speaking as scientists, citizens or stakeholders. Swart & Van 
Andel used the concept of boundary work and boundary objects to describe these tensions. 
   According to Swart & Van Andel one way to deal with social contextual-
ization is trying to cool down the public debate by stressing the necessity to wait for 
final scientific results. This approach failed for the EVA II research because the de-
bate was heated up by external players. They propose another approach: extend-
ed accountability for (ecological) scientists, with a focus on sound ways of inter-
acting and communicating with society. Therefore, scientists should accept that 
public controversy may arise, should have an open scientific debate, should consider 
seriously competing rationalities, should present scientific results in publicly accessi-
ble texts, and should scientifically evaluate political decisions based on research results. 
 
The EVA II process between 1999 and 2004 was also evaluated by Hanssen et al. (2009). 
According to these authors the EVA II process had several shortcomings: the exclusion of 
the NIOZ, the limited time for deliberations, and the reduced scope of the research during 
the process. The Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality reduced the EVA II 
scope with the decision to postpone the questions on the legal robustness of the fisheries 
regulations and the involvement of stakeholders and scientists in designing new regulation 
options. Hanssen et al. criticise both the unrealistic expectations of policy-makers that 
more research will quickly reduce uncertainties, and the unrealistic expectations of scien-
tists that if they tell policy-makers what science reveals, correct policies will simply follow. 
   Hanssen et al. analysed the EVA II process as a failed pacification strategy of 
policy-makers. Within the pacification strategy it is assumed that scientific uncertainties 
can be reduced by doing more research, and this should bring parties together, see Figure 
2.4. According to Hanssen et al., uncertainties were not successfully reduced in the EVA 
II process, due to a lack of an open dialogue between conflicting points of view, because 
of insufficient time to reach scientific consensus, and because of inherent uncertainties 
of the complex Wadden Sea nature. 
 As a reaction to this failed strategy, Hanssen et al. propose a facilitation strate-
gy, with the aim first to reduce societal dissent, and then scientific uncertainties. With-
in this facilitation strategy, policy-makers should find shared ambitions by confronting 
and eliciting stakeholders perspectives to minimize polarization, and should use stake-
holders’ knowledge to maximize knowledge utilization. Scientists should involve stake-
holders and policy-makers in knowledge production and scientists should participate 
51
Review of science-policy interactions
2
in policy formulation and evaluation. These scientists should facilitate such participa-
tive processes by providing facts as well as educated guesses to evaluate policy plans. 
  Hanssen et al. claim that contesting beliefs and divergent directions of solutions 
should not be neglected. Scientific claims are always interpreted from different viewpoints. 
Accepting these limitations of scientific research for policy-making, ecological scientists 
can play their necessary explanatory role to understand the ecosystem complexity, without 
having an advocacy role which leads to scientific uncertainties used by vested interests. 
 
In reaction to the analyses of Swart & Van Andel (2008) and Turnhout et al. (2008), that 
mainly focused on the role of scientists, Runhaar and Nieuwaal (2010) tried to explain 
the change in science utilization in 2004 by including the role of stakeholders. In their 
analysis they built on the earlier insights of Runhaar (2009) on the important role of me-
diator IMSA. Runhaar and Nieuwaal start with a reflection on science, arguing that “sci-
ence and scientists generally are not value-free” (Runhaar and van Nieuwaal 2010, p.241) 
and that research that insufficiently reflects values of stakeholders is often ignored or 
contested. According to them the following science conditions are important for knowl-
edge utilization: knowledge should be scientifically sound, research should be structured 
to search for policy options, research should have a broad focus, analysis should be trust-
worthy, analysis should bridge interests, assessment should have a legal requirement, the 
research and decision-making processes should be aligned, and the research should have 
sufficient resources. Based on these conditions Runhaar and Nieuwaal identify two dif-
ferent science-policy interfaces in the Dutch Wadden Sea debate on ecological effects: 
before 2000 a science-dominated science-policy practice and between 2000-2004 an in-
Figure 2.4. The facilitation and pacification strategy of policy-makers to structure the policy prob-
lem (from Hanssen et al. 2009).
52
Chapter 2
2
teractive science-policy practice with IMSA as a key mediator. According to these au-
thors, the main reasons for not utilizing the research on the ecological effects on cockle 
fishery and non-effects of gas-exploitation in policy decisions before 2004 was the lack 
of interactions of scientists with decision-makers and stakeholders, and the narrow focus 
of research activities. Through the involvement of IMSA, with a focus on ecological ef-
fects of multiple activities and stakeholder participation, a reframing of the problem took 
place. However, crucial for this change in knowledge utilization in the decision-making 
was the sentence of the Court of Justice on the cockle fisheries. Referring to knowledge 
utilisation Runhaar & Van Nieuwaal stress the important role of mediators that encour-
age interaction with stakeholders and can facilitate reframing of problems and objectives.
Science dynamics conclusions
The following conclusions can be made based on the science-policy interactions analysed 
in the science dynamics perspective literature. First, there have been flexible bounda-
ries between the domains of science and policy. Communication between these domains 
could take place through boundary objects. Secondly, within the conflicts on cockle fish-
ery and gas exploitation the crucial boundary was the one between different knowledge 
coalitions, each consisting of actors from both the policy and the science domain with a 
shared position and interpretation of information. Scientists were willingly and unwill-
ingly part of these coalitions. This advocating role of scientists within the management 
conflicts was seen as problematic. A proposed reaction, by Swart & Van Andel (2008), on 
this is an extended accountability of scientists. Thirdly, the EVA II process was perceived 
as a failed policy strategy to pacify the debate, both scientist and policy-makers had un-
realistic expectations. A  suggested alternative policy approach, by Hanssen et al. (2009), 
is the facilitation strategy: starting with the societal differences and an explanatory role 
for scientists. Fourthly, there have been different science-policy interfaces which are de-
pendent on the policy problem and amount of interactions with stakeholders, resulting 
in different roles for scientist: from accommodating to advocating. Finally, mediators can 
play a crucial role in science-policy interactions to increase knowledge utilization. 
2.4 Discussion 
2.4.1 Shifting analytical perceptions of science
A shift can be observed in the way science is perceived in the three themes that we dis-
tinguished in this review. In the resource management literature, the role of science 
was mainly analysed as scientific information that was used as a resource in the man-
agement conflicts. In the nature views & discourses literature the role of beliefs, view-
points and dominant frameworks on the interpretation and use of scientific informa-
tion became important. In the science dynamics literature, the role of scientists and the 
flexible boundaries between the science and policy domain was central to the analysis. 
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   These different interpretations of science-policy interactions can be connected 
with the analytical perception of what science is. We can roughly make a division in two ap-
proaches: a traditional realist perception, and a constructivist perception. Within a tradi-
tional view of science there is a clear distinction between the political and scientific domain, 
between values and facts. Scientific knowledge is obtained through asking methodologi-
cally sound questions which can be objectively answered. Within the constructivist view 
of science, on the other hand, there is contextualised knowledge: the political and scientif-
ic domains are intertwined, their boundaries are context dependent, and social processes 
co-determine the stabilization of scientific knowledge (Van Buuren & Edelenbos 2004). 
   Comparing the three described perspectives on the science-policy inter-
actions a shift towards a more constructivist view can be observed. The reviewed lit-
erature within the theme resource management stays close to the traditional view 
of science, with scientific information as a resource for stakeholders, for exam-
ple in the strategic use of information identified by Verbeeten (1999) and Steins 
(1999). They emphasized that stakeholders use scientific knowledge to legitimize 
their position. The focus was on the use of the knowledge, there was some atten-
tion on the role of scientist, but not on the scientific knowledge production process. 
   This is in contrast to the reviewed literature of nature views & discourses, where 
science is mostly approached from a constructivist view. For example by Turnhout 
(2003), who describes the role of nature views on the development of targets by ecological 
experts. And also by Runhaar (2009), who emphasized the role of dominant discourses 
on knowledge utilization, and explained the new interpretation of the same scientific 
information with a discourse change. In these publications, the policy frameworks and 
nature values were seen as connected to the understanding and production of knowledge. 
   The reviewed literature on the science dynamics perspective shows even more 
constructivist elements. Van der Windt (1995), Turnhout (2003) and Swart & Van Andel 
(2008) used the concepts boundary objects and boundary work between the science and 
policy domain, based on the assumption that these boundaries are actively formed. For 
example in the knowledge coalitions of Turnhout (2003), there was a difference between 
what a scientist could say and do inside a coalition and outside this coalition. Runhaar 
and Van Nieuwaal (2010) clearly express a constructivist point of view with their reflec-
tion that in general, science and scientists are not value-free. However, at the same time 
the traditional view of science has not disappeared. For example in the mixed position of 
Hanssen et al. (2009), in their recommended facilitation strategy they stress the legitima-
cy of stakeholder’s knowledge, but also put emphasis on fact finding and the independ-
ency of scientists.
2.4.2 Normative perception of science
Within the reviewed literature there are also differences with regard to the normative 
perspective on science-policy interaction: on how scientific knowledge should be pro-
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duced and what role scientists should play in the decision-making process. The general 
position of the reviewed publications is that involvement and commitment of all parties 
are very important, including scientists. 
 Not all authors have made explicit recommendations. With regard to knowledge 
production and interpretation, the following recommendations were made. Swart & Van 
der Windt (2005) recommended that different nature views should be acknowledged as 
a source of conflict and different interpretations of information. According to Runhaar 
(2009), reflection on the dominant discourse should be encouraged among scientists and 
other stakeholders. Mediators could be helpful for this purpose, although it should be ac-
knowledged that dominant discourses are hard to change. Next to this, the involvement of 
stakeholders in the knowledge production process is recommended by Hanssen et al. (2009). 
   With regard to the role of scientists in decision-making, Hanssen et al. (2009) 
recommended an explanatory role, in which independent scientists provide facts and 
evaluate policy plans. Also Verbeeten (1999) stresses that scientists should be perceived 
as independent. At the same time, several authors recommended that scientist should 
interact more with stakeholders and the government. According to Swart & Van Andel 
(2008) scientists should aim for transparency through good communication, they should 
bring their scientific results to society and play a role in decision-making by evaluating 
political decisions. The advice of Runhaar and Van Nieuwaal (2010) to scientists is to take 
an active role by cooperating with mediators and involve policy-makers and stakeholders 
in the knowledge production process in order to bring together multiple perspectives on 
a broad research problem. They propose a form of co-production of knowledge. However, 
according to Turnhout et al. (2008), the role of scientists is connected to the policy prob-
lem, and closer science-policy interactions will not always be the best solution.        
   As some of the studies have demonstrated, the advocating role of scientists in the 
cockle and gas cases have been problematic. When scientists are perceived as independ-
ent authorities who can provide valid knowledge claims and this knowledge expresses 
stakeholders views, their knowledge claims will more easily be used in the decision-mak-
ing process. To successfully address these challenges of independence ánd involvement, 
careful and deliberate choices have to be made with regard to the different modes of 
co-production of knowledge and the involvement of different parties in the knowledge 
production processes. In doing this, we can learn from the problems and successes in the 
EVA II process, and the influential contributions of mediators as IMSA.
2.4.3 The role of the government
The reviewed studies pay varying attention to the role of the government in the sci-
ence-policy interactions. In the resource management studies, the government was the 
crucial player. In Steins (1999) and Imeson & Van den Bergh (2006), the fishery reg-
ulations in 1993 by the government was the starting point of their analysis. In other 
studies, particularly that of Verbeeten (1999) and Van Nieuwaal (2010), the government 
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was analysed as an actor structuring the process. In structuring the process, the gov-
ernment played a very important role as user of scientific knowledge to legitimize its 
decisions. In addition to these roles, the government was also very important as com-
missioner of research. For the EVA II process the role of the government, and more spe-
cifically the ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, was analysed in more 
detail by Hanssen et al. (2009). The ministry initiated the EVAII research process and 
decided which research institutes were involved, when research results could be com-
municated and to what extent stakeholders could participate in the research process. 
Next to this, the ministry initiated another advisory commission with scientists in-
volved, known as the commission Meijer. Remarkably, however, these active roles of 
the government in initiating and structuring the science-policy interactions were usu-
ally described as context factors, and not analysed as thoroughly as the role of scientists. 
 Moreover, the very important court rulings were positioned as context. All re-
viewed studies after 2004 acknowledge the crucial role of the European Court of Justice 
in the cockle fishery case with the ruling that the precautionary principle should be ap-
plied. The roles of the different stakeholders, governments on different levels and scien-
tists in the process towards this court ruling are unfortunately not analysed.
2.5 Conclusions 
This review has shown that ecological knowledge and scientists have played a very 
important role in the cockle fisheries and gas exploitation controversies of the Dutch 
Wadden Sea. In the cockle fishery case, ecological scientists signalled a possible nega-
tive relation between mechanical cockle fishery and birds populations. This was used 
as legitimation to regulate the fishery. The causal relation between the fishery and a 
long-term negative impact was however disputed. In the debate, the uncertainty and re-
liability of the ecological knowledge were discussed. Different scientific interpretations 
were strategically used by the government and stakeholders to legitimize their position. 
During EVA II (1999-2003), two parallel debates took place, inside the official scientific 
evaluation process and in the media by stakeholders and scientists who were not part 
of EVA II. The independence of scientists became criticised, as scientists were willing-
ly or unwillingly placed in the coalition in favour or against the activity. In the gas ex-
ploitation case, the possible negative ecological impacts of subsidence of gas exploitation 
formed the argument to (temporally) prohibit the activity: in the decision for a mora-
torium (1984-1994) and the compromise to allow only pilot gas explorations in 1993. 
The scientific claim in 1998 that there would be negligible ecological effects was dis-
credited as research financed by the NAM and politically contested by highlighting the 
uncertainties. The two controversies were settled in 2004 after the connection of cockle 
fisheries with gas exploitation was made. Crucial events were the EVA II process, the 
ranking of the impacts of different activities by ecological experts organised by IMSA, 
the advice of the committee Meijer and the European court ruling on the cockle fisheries. 
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 These science-policy interactions have been analysed in the reviewed literature 
from three main perspectives. Central in the resource management perspective analysis 
was the strategic use of scientific knowledge in the policy process. In the perspective of 
nature views & discourses, the structuring influence of these views and discourses on the 
interpretations and use of knowledge was exposed. Finally, the science dynamic perspec-
tive highlighted the flexible boundaries between the science and policy domains and the 
role of scientists in the debates.
Summing up, the following lessons can be drawn from this review:
• Scientific knowledge is only one of the influential aspects in decision-making, next 
to e.g. economic interests and power relations.
• How scientific knowledge is used and interpreted by stakeholders depends on their 
nature views and on the dominant policy discourses. Different interpretations of 
knowledge explain why producing more scientific knowledge is in itself insufficient 
to find consensus between stakeholders. Reflection on nature views and discourses 
can be helpful to increase learning and resolve deadlocks. Independent mediators 
can play an important role in these difficult processes, but it should be acknowledged 
that dominant discourses can be very persistent.
• The science-policy interactions are structured by the policy setting. In the Wadden 
Sea context, the policy rules were mainly shaped by decisions of the national gov-
ernment, EU directives and court rulings. Next to the legal rules, the decision-mak-
ing setting of who is involved with what kind of responsibilities, structures the sci-
ence-policy interactions. Also the policy expectations influence these interactions, 
there are different relations when policy-makers expect first to reduce uncertainties 
(pacification strategy) or first to reduce the societal dissent (facilitation strategy). 
These policy settings are formed by the stakeholders, with an important role for the 
government. However, also other actors can influence the decision-making setting, 
as the mediating intervention of IMSA aptly illustrates. 
• When scientific knowledge is an established condition - juridical or otherwise - for 
legitimate policy argumentations, this has a strong impact on the structure of the 
policy-science interactions. In the cockle fishery and gas exploitation controversies 
scientific knowledge was a pre-condition to make a legitimate claim in the debate. As 
a result, the focus was directed to the scientific knowledge itself, making it the topic 
of debate. 
• In controversies there are roughly two positions in how a scientist can be perceived: 
as independent outsider or as connected to a societal position. How scientists are 
perceived only partly depends upon their own behaviour; in the cockle fishery con-
troversy scientists became willingly and unwillingly part of a coalition. Scientists can 
actively emphasize their independent position or take up an extended accountability 
and acknowledge their connections with the societal field.
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• Scientists can play different roles in science-policy interactions, from problem sig-
nalling, accommodation, to advocacy or a more explanatory role. These roles are 
framed by the policy setting, however scientist also influence their own role. One 
choice scientists have to make is to what extent there is co-operation with stake-
holders in the knowledge production. With co-production of knowledge multiple 
perspectives, scientific and societal, are taken into account. This can increase the 
relevance of the knowledge for the decision-making process, but can also reduce the 
independent status of the research.
2.6 Epilogue                                                                                    
In this review article the emphasis has been on the cockle fishery and gas exploitation 
controversies. These controversies were largely settled in 2004. Since then new contro-
versies on ecological effects of activities in the Dutch Wadden Sea emerged, for example 
on the mussel fisheries in 2008, and currently around Energy plants near Delfszijl. Future 
policies and projects, among which prominently the new Delta-program, will not fail 
to generate new and equally arduous debates on nature protection in relation to safety 
and other societal interests, not just in the Wadden Sea but also in other parts of the 
Netherlands, such as the South-West Delta. Scientific knowledge will remain a crucial 
and disputed factor in conflicts between environmental organisations, local residents, 
economic interest groups,  and the government. The lessons from the cockle fisheries and 
gas exploitation cases, as they were presented in this review, may help to better structure 
the science-policy interactions in these new controversies. This will not likely prevent the 
conflicts, but it may help to find better and more timely solutions, with a broader legiti-
macy among the stakeholders involved.

Chapter 3
Uncertainties in the assessment of “significant effect” 
on the Dutch Natura 2000 Wadden Sea site 
– The mussel seed fishery and powerboat race controversies
This chapter has been published as: 
Floor, J. R., van Koppen, C. S. A., & van Tatenhove, J. P. M., 2016. Uncertainties in the assess-
ment of “significant effect” on the Dutch Natura 2000 Wadden Sea site – The mussel seed 
fishery and powerboat race controversies. Environmental Science & Policy, 55: 380-392.
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Abstract
Natura 2000, the nature network based on the European Bird and Habitat Directives, is 
explicitly grounded on ecological science. To acquire a permit under the Dutch Nature 
Conservation Act, an appropriate assessment of significant effects must be conducted 
based on the best available scientific knowledge. In this way the scientific and policy 
world are directly linked. This article focuses on ‘significant effect’ as a boundary ob-
ject to analyse how science-policy interactions shape the meaning and assessment of 
significant effect and how these interpretations influence the decision-making process. 
To this end, two conflicts over significant effect are investigated: the conflict over the 
2006-spring permit for the mussel seed fishery, and the 2011 permit for the planned 
World Championship powerboat races. In both cases nature organisations started a court 
process against the government-granted permits in protest to the “no significant effect” 
claim, stating that there was insufficient certainty for this conclusion. These conflicts are 
approached as controversies between discourse coalitions with different interpretations 
of the ecological knowledge. We show how significant effect became a focal point in the 
controversies, limiting the debate to ecological arguments and science-based expertise, 
but also creating options for parties to advance their protest by articulating uncertainties. 
Only uncertainty of incomplete knowledge was explicitly addressed, excluding ambiguity 
of values and unpredictability of the actual ecosystem. We suggest that acknowledging 
the value aspect in disputes on significant effect would leave more space for effective 
solutions of the problems under debate. 
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3.1 Introduction
Determining which human activities are allowed, or more precisely, which effects of hu-
man activities are acceptable, is a central issue in the regulation of protected nature areas. 
In the discussions about effects of human activities scientific reports and uncertainty 
arguments often play a major role (Floor et al. 2013). Regulatory frameworks are set up 
to structure and guide these discussions over what is acceptable. In the EU, the main legal 
framework to protect nature areas is Natura 2000, based on the Bird Directive (79/409/
EEC) and Habitat Directive (92/43/EEC). This legislation is science-based. Permits for 
human activities are dependent on the assessment of ‘significant effect’. According to the 
Habitat Directive:
 “Any plan or project not directly connected with or necessary to the management of the site but 
likely to have a significant effect thereon, either individually or in combination with other plans or 
projects, shall be subject to appropriate assessment of its implications for the site in view of the site’s 
conservation objectives” (article 6.3, Habitat Directive 92/43/EEC, emphasis by the authors). 
The aim of this procedure is to prevent adverse effects on the protected habitats and spe-
cies under the EU directives.
 As a consequence, controversies over what is allowed in nature areas have trans-
formed into disputes over the assessment of significant effect (Beunen 2006; Beunen et 
al. 2013). Although there is no fixed definition of what significant effects are in this legal 
context2, it can be characterised as “a change in the conditions affecting the conservation 
objectives of a site to an extent which is considered unacceptable” (Opdam et al. 2009, 
p.913). This element of acceptability of effects falls within the tradition of environmental 
impact assessments (EIA). Ehrlich and Ross (2015) show in their overview of EIA academ-
ic literature that value judgement is an important part of such significance determination. 
According to them, the assessment of  significance is open for multiple interpretations 
by actors from both the policy and the science world and is not a deterministic scientific 
outcome (Ehrlich and Ross 2015). However, these interpretations of significant effect are 
not arbitrary. Interpretations are context specific and shaped by the European legal ori-
gin, the national implementation and the course of the assessment process (LNV 2009). 
 An important aspect in the acceptability of an effect is the certainty of the 
knowledge used. This aspect of uncertainty has become very explicit through the EU 
case law on cockle fishery in 2004. In this case, the EU Court of Justice emphasized the 
precautionary principle and ruled that the authority could only permit the activity if “no 
reasonable scientific doubt remains as to the absence of such effects” (ECJ 2004, para-
graph 61). This EU court decision became the benchmark for the role of scientific knowl-
edge in permit procedures all over Europe, and opened the discussion on uncertainties, 
2 It should be noted that 'significant', in this context, has not the same meaning as the well-defined 
term significant used in statistical testing
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which nature organisations effectively used to stop planned activities (Beunen 2006). 
  Several studies have been conducted on the implementation of Natura 2000 and 
the technical aspects of the assessment of significant effects (Beunen 2006; Beunen and 
De Vries 2011; Opdam et al. 2009; Söderman 2009; Therivel 2009). While these studies 
underline the importance of science-policy interactions and the pivotal role of assess-
ment procedures, detailed empirical studies into science-policy dynamics are limited 
(Hommes et al. 2009). This is where our study contributes to existing literature on the 
European nature policy. As we will elaborate in the next section, we analyse ‘significant 
effect’ as a boundary object, to unpack the science-policy interactions that take place in 
the implementation of the EU legislation. The aim of the article is twofold. First, to give 
insight in the different meanings and interpretations of significant effect by scientists, 
policy-makers, and interest groups. Second, to explain how different interpretations of 
significant effect and uncertainties affected the decision-making process.  
 To this end, we selected the controversies over the 2006-spring permit for the 
mussel seed fishery and the 2011 permit for the planned World Championship pow-
erboat races. These are two different activities with different political contexts, which 
will enable us to give in-depth insights on how science-policy interactions shape 
the meanings and assessments of significant effect. In both cases, the controversy 
was centred around the effects on the Dutch Wadden Sea. The Wadden Sea is a shal-
low estuarine sea, stretching from the Netherlands to Denmark, and is an impor-
tant feeding ground for birds. The management of the Wadden Sea area is character-
ised by a continuous struggle of nature organisations against economical activities, a 
struggle in which scientific knowledge and scientists play an important role (Floor et 
al. 2013). Also in our cases, the credibility and legitimacy of the knowledge used for 
the assessment of significant effect was disputed, but the need for ecological knowl-
edge, and the salience of this knowledge was not contested (Van Enst et al. 2014). 
  The article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we elaborate on our analytical 
framework of boundary objects and a typology of uncertainties. In Section 3, we explain 
the permit process and the steps in the assessment of significant effect. In Section 4, we 
describe the mussel and powerboat cases. In Section 5, we reflect on significant effect at 
the science-policy boundary. In Section 6, we draw conclusions on the science-policy 
interactions and the role of ambiguity in the decision-making processes over significant 
effect. 
3.2 Science-policy interactions around a boundary object: discussing uncertain-
ties 
The assessment of significant effect shows the importance of scientific knowledge and 
expertise for nature regulation. Within the assessment knowledge of what will probably 
happen is combined with a value judgements on what is allowable. The first is tradi-
tionally seen as the scientific aspect, the latter as the policy or political aspect. In our 
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research, we do not assume prescribed boundaries demarcating the science and policy 
worlds (Gieryn 1999; Jasenoff 1994; Turnhout et al. 2008; Weingart 1999; Wesselink et al. 
2013). In the field of policy advice “the traffic between the institutional domains of pol-
itics and science is rather dense” (Wesselink et al. 2013, p.2). However, the perception of 
scientific advice as value-free is still very dominant (Carter 2013), also within the set-up 
of the Habitat Directive and within guidelines aiming to assess significance in an objec-
tive way (Alphandéry and Fortier 2001; Opdam et al. 2009). To analyse the science-pol-
icy interactions around the assessment of significance, we use the concepts of boundary 
objects and uncertainty.  
3.2.1 Significant effect as boundary object
In this paper ‘significant effect’ will be perceived as a boundary object. Crucial for a 
boundary object is its interpretative flexibility. It should be “plastic enough to adapt the 
local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough 
to maintain a common identity across sites” (Star and Griesemer 1989, p.393). Bounda-
ry objects have been used in many studies analysing co-operation between actors from 
different social worlds (Iorio and Taylor 2014; Mattor et al. 2014; Star and Griesemer 
1989; Star 2010; Swart and Van der Windt 2012; Turnhout 2009). For the assessment 
of significant effect, actors from research institutes, governmental departments and na-
ture organisations, with different perspectives and daily activities all contributed their 
interpretation of what significance means. We use the concept of boundary object as 
an analytical tool to analyse a conflict situation, in contrast to the more common use 
of boundary objects as a way to bridge boundaries or even as a design tool to facilitate 
co-operation (Hegger et al. 2012; Swart and Van der Windt 2012). In our case studies 
the assessment of significant effect is not functioning in the way that it brings people 
together to work on a common goal, as with Swart and Van der Windt (2012). However, 
even in conflict situations, boundary objects can focus people towards the same topic 
and facilitate sharing of knowledge (Iorio and Taylor 2014; Turnhout 2009). In this way, 
the assessment of significant effect gives insight in interactions between different actors 
in structured conflicts, based on formal rules of the game, such as consultation and legal 
protest. However, boundary objects can also reinforce existing power structures and per-
form as a barricade that excludes people (Oswick and Robertson 2009). In the analysis of 
the debates which are centred around this boundary object, we will focus on this role of 
inclusion and exclusion. In the permit and juridical processes we analyse who was able to 
get access and which arguments were perceived valid.
3.2.2 Uncertainties in the significance of effects 
The aspect of uncertainty has become crucial in controversies over activities in Nat-
ura 2000 sites. Especially since the EU case law demands certainty that activities not 
adversely affect the integrity of a Natura 2000 site (ECJ 2004). We perceive uncertain-
ties as relational and constructed in particular situations (Shackley and Wynne 1996; 
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Van den Hoek 2014). Much can be uncertain in the assessment of significant effects, 
such as which protected species could be affected, the prediction of impacts, and the 
assessment to what extent this would influence the site’s conservation objectives (Op-
dam et al. 2009). However, these uncertainties only become meaningful when they 
are acknowledged and expressed by actors involved in the decision-making process. 
  With the term uncertainty different knowledge situations can be addressed. We 
distinguish three types of uncertainty: incomplete knowledge, unpredictability and am-
biguity, see Figure 3.1. The uncertainty of incomplete knowledge refers to imperfection 
of knowledge: to what is unknown at the moment but could be available with additional 
research. The uncertainty of unpredictability refers to what is seen as unknowable, for 
example the unpredictable chaotic dynamics of the Wadden Sea ecosystem. This un-
certainty cannot be taken away by more research. The uncertainty of ambiguity is about 
actors knowing differently. Opdam et al. (2009) relate such ambiguity mainly to a lack of 
quantitatively defined indicators in the policy formulation of objectives. However, we will 
use a broader definition of ambiguity as “the existence of two or more equally plausible 
interpretation possibilities” (Dewulf et al. 2005, p.116). This classification of uncertainty 
will be used to distinguish how uncertainties are used in debates over significant effect.
Figure 3.1. Schematisation of types of uncertainties based on Van den Hoek (2014).
3.2.3 Methodological approach
We use an interpretative approach to analyse the science-policy interactions in the con-
troversies we selected (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006). Interpretative approaches focus 
on the construction of reality by people “in a hybrid of social, political and scientific 
practices” (Beunen and Duineveld 2010, p.325). We structure our case studies by identi-
fying discourse coalitions (Hajer 1993; Hajer 2006; Wagenaar 2011). A discourse coali-
tion is “a group of actors that, in the context of an identifiable set of practices, shares the 
usage of a particular set of story lines over a particular period of time” (Hajer 2006, p.70). 
In conflicts over knowledge interpretations, these coalitions can consist of both scientists 
and policy-makers (Turnhout et al. 2008; Van Buuren and Edelenbos 2004). 
 In our analysis, we focus on the storylines about what should be part of the 
assessment of significant effects, including the use of knowledge and articulation of 
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uncertainties. For each case, we analysed reports, court rulings, newspaper articles, 
parliamentary proceedings, stakeholder websites and meeting notes. In addition, 17 
semi-structured interviews were carried out to explore the role of Natura 2000 within 
the Wadden Sea area and reconstruct the relations between actors. In total 18 persons 
from scientific institutes, nature organisations and the national and provincial govern-
ment were interviewed. Furthermore, observations and informal interactions with actors 
during 7 symposia and workshops contributed to our understanding of the Wadden Sea 
context. As a final step we confronted our key respondents with our findings, to check if 
our analysis was recognisable by actors with close experience of the cases (Hajer 2006).
3.3 Permit procedure within the Netherlands 
Based on the European Habitat Directive, member states are required to implement the ap-
propriate assessment procedure for significant effects, resulting in a variety of legal transla-
tions and assessment practices (Alphandéry and Fortier 2001; Beunen et al. 2013; Söderman 
2009; Therivel 2009). In the Netherlands, the implementation of this European legislation 
has led to a large number of court cases (Beunen 2006; Beunen et al. 2013), among which 
Wadden Sea cases have been prominent. The combination of active nature organisations 
protecting the nature values of the Wadden Sea, a large group of researchers investigating 
the area, and important economical functions of the Wadden Sea has been a recipe for 
several conflicts over nature protection (Floor et al. 2013). Jurisprudence from the court 
cases has shaped the interpretation of European legislation, not only in the Netherlands, 
but also on a European level. A perfect example is the aforementioned ruling on scientific 
doubt in a Wadden Sea case for the European Court of Justice in 2004 (ECJ 2004).   
 Since 2005, the assessment of significant effect is part of the permit procedures 
under the Dutch Nature Conservation Act. The aim of this procedure is to protect the 
nature area as expressed in conservation objectives. For this, every initiator planning a 
potentially harmful activity must provide the permit authority with an assessment of 
significant effects on the Natura 2000 site’s conservation objectives. Often the initiator 
of an activity commissions this appropriate assessment to science-based experts. The as-
sessment of significant effect consists of determining the relevant conservation objectives 
and conservation status, and predicting the impact caused by the planned activity on the 
site conservation status. Finally, the value judgement has to be made whether a nega-
tive effect is significant, taking into account the vulnerability of the affected species, and 
the conservation objectives ranging from conservation to restoration (LNV 2006; LNV 
2009), see Figure 3.2.
 The permit authority should decide whether the initiator has provided an au-
thoritative and comprehensive assessment report (Opdam et al. 2009). A permit can be 
granted if there is an assessment of no significant effects, possibly supported by mitiga-
tion measures to counteract possible adverse effects. As extra risk reduction measure-
ment, the obligation of monitoring under the hand-on-the-tap principle can be part of 
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the permit. Originating from the case of gas mining in the Wadden Sea, this adaptive 
management approach implies stopping an activity when adverse effects are measured 
(Raad van State 2007). Legally, activities with significant effects can be allowed, however, 
under strict conditions and with compensatory measures. Within the Dutch permit sys-
tem, there are formalised moments to protest against a permit. Firstly, stakeholders have 
the right to see the permit before it is given, and react on it. The reactions are collected 
and taken into consideration by the permit authority. Ultimately, stakeholders can protest 
at the ‘Raad van State’, which is the supreme court of Justice (Beunen 2006).
Impact prediction 
planned activity
Conservation 
objectives of the site
Assessment of 
significance
Figure 3.2. Representation of the three main steps in the assessment of significant effect, based on 
Opdam et. al (2009).
3.4. Interpretations of significant effect in two controversies
In this section the conflicts over the assessment of significant effects in the cases of the 
mussel seed fishery 2006-permit and the powerboat race 2011-permit are described and 
analysed. These two cases are shortly characterised in Table 3.1.
3.4.1 The mussel seed fishery controversy 
In March 2006, the producer organisation for the mussel sector requested a permit for the 
spring mussel seed fishery (Mytilus edulis). This type of fishery is part of a production 
cycle from mussel seed towards consumption mussels. The mussel seed, which are ju-
venile mussels, are brought from wild mussel banks to cultivation plots in the Wadden 
Sea. This fishing practice, which is regulated since 1993, takes place two times a year 
on areas that are constantly covered with water (Ens et al. 2004). In autumn, fishery 
is only allowed on newly formed ‘unstable’ mussel banks, which are expected to dis-
appear in winter through storms or star fish predation. By restricting fishery to these 
unstable banks, sufficient mussels should be left as food for birds in winter. In spring, 
the remaining mussels may be fished (Van Stralen and Sas 2006). However, this fishing 
practice is highly controversial, especially since the nature organisations blamed fish-
ermen for the high mortality of eider ducks in the 1990s, resulting in several juridical 
procedures against shellfish fishery by nature organisations (ECJ 2004; Raad van State 
2005). From 2005 on, the fishermen were obliged to demonstrate that there is no signif-
icant effect before they can obtain a permit. For the autumn-2005 permit, the ministry 
of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (in Dutch ‘LNV’) commissioned research in-
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stitute Alterra to make an appropriate assessment. Their conclusion of ‘no significant 
effect’ was mainly based on their interpretation that significance means stable mussel 
banks would be affected. Since in the autumn period fishing was only allowed for un-
stable mussel banks, there could be no significant adverse effect. Fishing these mussels 
and transporting them to culture plots could even increase the biomass of mussels and 
food availability for birds in the Wadden Sea. By the same argumentation, however, mus-
sel seed fishing in spring, on mussel banks that by definition have the potential to be-
come stable mussel banks, could potentially generate significant effects (Alterra 2005). 
 In 2006, the producer organisation commissioned the consultancy MarinX 
instead of Alterra for the appropriate assessment. In this period, meetings took place 
between mussel fishery organisations, nature organisations and scientists. However, the 
nature organisations were afraid the fishing practice would not change, and therefore 
contested the permit to put more pressure on the process towards sustainable fishing. 
The juridical procedure took 2 years and resulted in a nullification of the permit by the 
Dutch supreme court of Justice, the ‘Raad van State’, in February 2008. For an overview of 
the process, see Figure 3.3.
  Mussel case Powerboat case 
Activity Spring mussel seed fishing, two 
weeks in May 2006, part of the 
long term activity of mussel 
cultivation. 
 
World Championship, planned for 
5-7 August 2011 
Permit authority Ministry LNV (Ministry of 
Agriculture, Nature and Food 
Quality) 
 
Province of Noord-Holland 
Permit process February-May 2006 
 
November 2010-July 2011 
Juridical process May 2006-February 2008 
 
8-25 July 2011 
Main issue Sufficient food for birds  Disturbance and noise of the 
powerboat race 
 
Political support Yes, national support since the 
activity started in the Wadden 
Sea in the 1950s 
Mixed, supported by the 
municipality Den Helder, criticised 
by the municipality Texel, position 
Province only on legal framework 
   
Consensus within 
scientific community 
No, historical disagreement on 
long-term effects 
Yes, new short activity that was 
assessed as having no significant 
effect on the conservation 
objectives, based on expert 
judgement 
 
Table 3.1. Characteristics of the two case studies. 
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 We identified two discourse coalitions in the discussion over ‘significant effect’ 
of the mussel seed fishery in spring 2006: “Mussel fishery belongs in the Wadden Sea” and 
“No damage to the seabed”. The discourse coalition of “Mussel fishery belongs in the Wad-
den Sea”, was constituted by the mussel farmers, the ministry LNV and parliamentary 
members. The activities of the mussel sector in the Wadden Sea have been supported 
by the ministry since the start of mussel farming in the Wadden Sea in 1950 (Van Gin-
kel 2007). In 2004, when mechanical cockle fishery was banned, the Dutch government 
continued supporting the mussel sector. The ministry LNV stated in their new policy 
towards sustainable fishing: “there is a future for the mussel culture” (LNV 2004, p.6). 
  This vision of a future for the mussel sector in the Wadden Sea was questioned 
by some nature organisations that were part of the discourse coalition “No damage to the 
seabed”. This coalition consisted of several nature organisations (the Wadden Society, 
Bird Protection NL, Wad foundation, and Fauna protection), whereas some wished to 
ban mussel fishery completely from the Wadden Sea, others wanted to secure a sustaina-
ble practice. However, they shared concerns for the bird populations in the Wadden Sea 
and concerns about negative effects on the ecosystem by disturbance of the seabed.  
To some extent scientists can also be placed within these discourse coalitions. Historical-
ly, research institutes have been leaning to the fishery perspective or the nature conser-
vation perspective (Turnhout et al. 2008). Research findings on effects were interpreted 
differently by scientists from different institutes. For example within the large evaluation 
research EVA II (1999-2003) on the effects of shellfish fishery there was a debate on what 
was causing the decline of cockles, natural fluctuations or fishery (Ens et al. 2004; Hans-
sen et al. 2009). Another outcome of this research was a realisation of a lack of ecological 
knowledge on wild mussel banks and mussels on culture plots. For this reason the PRODUS 
research-project was set up. In the debate on the 2006-spring permit this research-pro-
ject was put forward  as an adaptive management approach by the discourse coalition 
“Mussel fishery belongs in the Wadden Sea”. Whereas scientists from other institutes were 
commissioned by nature organisations for an audit of the MarinX assessment report. 
  During the permit process (February-May 2006) significance of effects were in-
terpreted at three moments: within the appropriate assessment-report of MarinX, within 
the consultation of the nature organisations, and within the argumentation of the min-
istry for the permit. MarinX assessed ‘no significant effects’, based on the calculation 
that mussel seed fishery has a positive effect on the amount of mussels in the Wadden 
Sea and the adaptive management approach of the PRODUS-project that addressed the 
uncertainty of incomplete knowledge on constantly covered mussel banks. The nature 
organisations disagreed and claimed that significant effects were possible on two bird 
species with a restoration objective, based on their interpretation that significance means 
certainty of no effects on protected birds. They addressed uncertainties in the form of 
ambiguity: on how to interpret the precautionary principle, on how much food should 
be reserved for birds and on the hypothesis that mussel cultivation would increase mus-
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Figure 3.3. Overview of the crucial moments in the conflict over the spring-2006 permit.
sel biomass. In the argumentation for the permit, the ministry made clear they had the 
expert judgement to make an assessment of significant effects. They concluded that the 
monitoring of PRODUS as part of an adaptive management approach was sufficient to 
address uncertainties, resulting in the conclusion of no significant effects. They interpret 
significance as permanent effects, which according to their assessments were prevented 
through an adaptive management approach (LNV 2005). For more details see Table 3.2.
The juridical process (May 2006-February 2008) was started by the nature organisations. 
In May 2006 the Raad van State made the preliminary decision to only allow 2/3 of the 
fishing, stating that the appropriate assessment could be insufficient (Raad van State 
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2006). To support their position against the permit, the nature organisations commis-
sioned an audit report to ecological researchers (Ens et al. 2007). In this report, the re-
searchers claim there could be significant effects through the disturbance of the seabed. 
They explicated uncertainties of incomplete knowledge on constantly covered sandbanks, 
unpredictability of effects caused by the complexity of sedimentation in the Wadden Sea, 
and ambiguity on the assumption that culture plots have a similar nature value as wild 
mussel banks. Using the appropriate assessment and the audit report the two discourse 
coalitions explained their positions towards the Raad van State, as summarized in Table 
3.3. On 27 February 2008 the Raad van State made its final ruling on the spring-2006 per-
mit, stating that the permit was not properly based on the best scientific knowledge avail-
able and was therefore not valid (Raad van State 2008). This ruling resulted in a crisis for 
the mussel sector because the minister concluded this had consequences for the future 
permits for the mussel sector. After an intense media protest of mussel farmers against 
nature organisations and scientists, a covenant was made for a transition to sustainable 
mussel fishery between nature organisations, the mussel sector and the ministry LNV in 
October 2008 (Van der Molen et al. 2015). 
 The two crucial decisions in this case, the ministry granting the permit and the 
Raad van State’s nullification, can be explained with the different interpretations of sig-
nificant effect and its uncertainties. The ministry was part of the same discourse co-
alition as the fisherman and had the same interpretation of the ecological knowledge 
to conclude no significant effect, even though they acknowledged a large uncertainty 
caused by incomplete knowledge. However, the nature organisations were powerful in 
their interpretation of possible significant effects. They could claim scientific doubt be-
cause the scientific community disagreed on the possibility of harmful long-term effects. 
This ambiguity was convincing for the Raad van State, who judged there was too much 
uncertainty to claim no significant effect.
3.4.2 The powerboat race controversy
In November 2010, the organisation the Grand Prix of the Sea announced that it would 
organise the World Championship powerboat racing. This race was planned for 5, 6 and 
7 August 2011 near the harbour of Den Helder, which is situated at the border of the 
Wadden Sea. The plan was to have high speed races for 15 m long boats with speeds 
over 200 km/h, and an accompanying event for the public such as a fireworks show. The 
race organisation needed a permit under the nature protection law from the province of 
Noord-Holland. To acquire the permit, the race organisation contracted the ecological 
research institute IMARES  Wageningen UR to assess significant effects of the planned 
activity. The permit process started with the screening phase of significant effects and 
lasted half a year because the province of Noord-Holland was not content with the appro-
priate assessment. The debate ended with the announcement the race was cancelled due 
to organisational problems, even though the Raad van State judged the permit as valid. 
See Figure 3.4 for an overview.
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 Interpretation of  
significant effect  
Addressing uncertainty 
March 2006 
Permit request, 
supported with 
appropriate 
assessment by 
MarinX (Van 
Stralen and Sas 
2006) 
No significant negative effects: 
-The adaptive management 
approach of simultaneous research 
in the form of the PRODUS 
research-project will prevent 
permanent effects. 
-Mussel seed fishery has a positive 
effect on the amount of mussels in 
the Wadden Sea. 
-Not all mussels are fished away 
(only feasible above 0.15 kg/m2). 
 
Incomplete knowledge 
-Insufficient knowledge on the nature 
values of mussel banks and habitat 
type 1110, and on the effect of 
fishing on these nature values. 
→ To deal with this the research 
project PRODUS has been set up. 
 
Ambiguity 
Nature protection of mussel banks in 
the form of reefs (habitat type 1170) 
are not protected. 
 
April 2006 
Consultation as 
part of permit 
process of nature 
organisations 
(Bird Protection 
NL, Wadden 
Society and Wad 
foundation) 
Possible significant effects: 
On two duck species with a 
restoration goal: 
-On common eider  (Somateria 
mollissima), they have a preference 
for grown mussels  
-On scaups (Aythya marila), there is 
no research on how they are 
affected. 
 
 
Ambiguity  
-On the interpretation of the 
precautionary principle and dealing 
with uncertainty. In case the research 
has not been conducted the project 
should not be granted. 
-On how much food should be 
reserved for birds, more food is 
necessary based on restoration 
values. 
-On the hypothesis that mussel 
cultivation increases biomass of 
mussels in the Wadden Sea.  
 
May 2006 
Permit granted by 
ministry 
No significant negative effects: 
Based on best available knowledge 
and an adaptive management 
approach (monitoring by PRODUS) 
that will prevent permanent effects. 
Incomplete knowledge 
-Impact of fishery on future mussel 
seeds. 
-Insufficient knowledge on the nature 
values of mussel banks and habitat 
type 1110, and on the effect of 
fishing on these nature values.  
→ To deal with the uncertainty the 
research project PRODUS has been 
set up. 
 
Ambiguity 
No scientific consensus if mussel 
cultivation increases food supply for 
shellfish eating birds. 
Table 3.2. Interpretations of significant effect in the permit process of the mussel seed fishing 
controversy
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 We identified two discourse coalitions in the dispute over the planned pow-
erboat race: “The Wadden Sea is not only for birdwatchers” and “Power boat races 
don’t belong in the Wadden Sea”. Besides these coalitions the province of Noord-Hol-
land played a crucial role, not as part of one of these coalitions, but by setting the 
stage for the discussion. They actively expressed that human activities without sig-
nificant effect are allowed and limited the decision-making to the legal framework. 
 The controversy started with the race organisation planning the World 
Championship. Supported by the municipality of Den Helder, they formed the dis-
course coalition, “The Wadden Sea is not only for birdwatchers”. Our naming of the 
coalition is almost literally from a newspaper statement by the initiator: “The Wad-
den Sea is not only for nature and 15 birdwatchers” (Leeuwarder Courant 2011). The 
race organisation commissioned IMARES for a short assessment and used the as-
sessments of IMARES to support their claim of no significant effects (Baptist 2011). 
 The initiative of a World championship of powerboat races provoked as-
tonishment by people cherishing the Wadden Sea as an open and quiet nature area. 
 Mussel seed fishery, Spring 2006      
  
Pro 
 
 
Against 
Discourse coalition Mussel fishery belongs in the 
Wadden Sea 
 
No damage to the seabed 
Interpretation of 
significant effect 
No significant negative effects: 
-Adaptive management 
approach will prevent 
permanent effects. 
 
-Mussel seed fishery has a 
positive effect on the amount of 
mussels in the Wadden Sea. 
There can be a significant effect: 
-There is inadequate 
understanding on the effects of 
mussel seed fishery on the seabed. 
-Mussel seed fishery can have a 
negative effect on the amount of 
mussels in bad years: not enough 
food for birds. 
 
Main Uncertainty issue Incomplete knowledge 
On effects on seabed ecosystem. 
→ Addressed through adaptive 
management. 
Incomplete knowledge 
On effects on seabed nature 
values. 
Ambiguity 
Different perspective on long-
term effects. 
 
Raad van State decision Permit not valid: Inadequate understanding of the effects on  
the seabed nature values to asses no significant effect without 
reasonable scientific doubt. 
Table 3.3. Summary of interpretation and uncertainties in mussel seed fishery conflict.
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Their point of view was expressed by the discourse coalition “Power boat races don’t 
belong in the Wadden Sea”, which consisted of nature organisations (the Wadden So-
ciety and ‘Landschap Noord-Holland’), the municipality of Texel, and some provin-
cial and national parliament members. They perceived the planned powerboat race 
as “noisy activities that don’t belong in a nature area” (Noordhollands Dagblad 2011). 
Because the debate options were limited by the province to arguments over signifi-
cant effects, the nature organisations criticised the assessment of significant effects and 
protested at the Raad van State. They used an external ecological consultancy as sci-
ence-based expert to support their claim that the assessment was insufficient. In ad-
dition to the provincial procedures, the Wadden Society used several other strategies 
to stop the races. For example, they had a public campaign against the powerboat race 
on their website and in the media, with strong metaphors as “a blender in an aquari-
um” to describe the disturbing effects of a power boat race (Leeuwarder Courant 2011). 
Figure 3.4. Crucial events in the powerboat case.
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 During the permit process (November 2010-July 2011), the most important 
interpretations of significant effect were expressed within the appropriate assessments 
of IMARES and within the critique of the province of Noord-Holland on these assess-
ments. According to the pre-test and appropriate assessment of IMARES there was no 
significant effect on the site’s conservation objectives, based on their interpretation that 
significance means long-term effects on population sizes. The uncertainty of  incomplete 
knowledge on the effects of power boat races was acknowledged, especially the effects of 
underwater sound on seals. However, the expert judgement of IMARES was that species 
would move away, protecting themselves from long-term effects. Initially the province of 
Noord-Holland was not content with this assessment. According to the province there 
was no certainty there would be no significant effect, because of incomplete knowledge 
through a lack of data to support conclusions and ambiguity in how to judge very small 
effects on species with a restoration goal. This type of ambiguity to judge very small ef-
fects is also acknowledged by scientists: 
“There is an effect, but whether you can call this significant, there are different sides to it. If you are 
very strict, you have to conclude it is significant, there is a negative effect on a restoration objective. 
However you can also reason the effect is so small you will not be able to measure it in practice, so 
no significant effect” (ecological researcher). 
To improve the assessment the province demanded more details: expert judgement alone 
did not suffice and data support was necessary to come with valid and authoritative 
claims in a potential court process. The province even commissioned an evaluation by 
an external ecological consultancy. These consultants concluded that the IMARES report 
would be insufficient in a juridical procedure (Strijkstra and Bruinzeel 2011). The prov-
ince gave the initiator a second chance to improve the report. Based on a more elaborate 
report in June, the province granted the permit in July. This permit was granted for 5 
years, with a monitoring obligation to assess potential effects to deal with the uncertainty 
of incomplete knowledge. For more detail see Table 3.4.
 During the juridical process (8-25 July 2011), different interpretations of sig-
nificant effect were brought forward by the province of Noord-Holland and the nature 
organisations. The nature organisations used the critique that the province had expressed 
during the permit process and an evaluation of an external ecological company to crit-
icise procedural and content aspects of the appropriate assessment (Gyimesi and Kri-
jgsveld 2011). The uncertainty of incomplete knowledge over the effect of underwater 
sounds caused by the powerboats was expressed by all actors involved. Uncertainty in 
the form of ambiguity was also expressed. Firstly, in how to judge miniscule effect of 
NOx deposition on species in dune areas with a restoration goal. Secondly, in how to 
judge the reference situation for the assessment of the powerboat race. According to the 
appropriate assessment within the activity area there are already 45000 ship movements 
a year. Compared to this disturbance the short-term event of a powerboat race would not 
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give significant effects. According to the nature organisations, the already existing dis-
turbance of the area implied that accumulation of effects can take place. Even when the 
effects of the powerboat race on its own were not significant, all activities together could 
have a significant effect. For more detail see Table 3.5. 
   The debate on significant effects ended on 25 July 2011 with the decision of 
the initiator of the powerboat to cancel the power boat race, stating they had in-
sufficient time left for the organisation. On the same day the Raad van State stat-
ed its preliminary conclusion that the permit of the power boat race was valid un-
der the nature conservation law. In the Raad van State hearing the judgement of no 
significant effect was discussed in detail with ecological experts. The need for data 
and not just expert judgement was stressed by the Raad van State judge in her rul-
ing that the nature organisations had not provided “concrete objective data” that 
contradicted the statements of the appropriate assessment (Raad van State 2011). 
 The two crucial decisions in this case, the province granting the permit and the 
Raad van State judging the permit as valid, can be explained with the different interpre-
tations of significant effect and its uncertainties. Although the province was very critical 
towards the assessment of no significant effect, after the inclusion of more data they did 
grant the permit. The province did not take a position with one of the discourse coali-
tions, but stated that they based their judgement only on ecological judgement, and that 
the conclusion of ecological science-based experts was no significant effect on the con-
servation objectives. The ambiguity on how to interpret a small effect of NOx, was even-
tually dismissed as immeasurable. Also the Raad van State was not convinced there was 
scientific doubt, resulting in the preliminary decision that the permit was valid. However, 
the debate over the permit augmented the organisational problems for the race initiator 
to such an extent that the race was cancelled.   
3.5. Reflection 
Our case studies showed the analytical use of a boundary object in controversies, 
even though boundary objects are commonly used for analysing more co-operative 
situations. The approach of a boundary object enabled us to analyse the mechanisms 
of inclusion and exclusion. Specifically the way the interpretation of significant effect 
limited the debate to ecological arguments and science-based experts, focusing on un-
certainties of incomplete knowledge and ambiguity, while excluding unpredictability. A 
boundary object can facilitate constructive interactions during a conflict through facil-
itating learning processes. Resulting in a constructive conflict in which learning takes 
place because different perspectives are made explicit (Cuppen 2012). However, in the 
analysed cases the relations between the actors became so distorted and expressions of 
value differences supressed by the legal procedure, resulting in no constructive effort. 
In these cases the permit procedures and assessment of significant effect only pacified 
the conflict into professional disagreement on scientific arguments, excluding explicit 
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 Powerboat race 2011 
  
Pro 
 
 
Against 
Discourse coalitions The Wadden Sea is not only for 
bird watchers 
 
Power boat races don’t belong in 
the Wadden Sea 
Interpretation of 
significant effect 
No significant negative effects: 
-The activity takes place in an 
already largely disturbed area. 
-The possibility of the animals 
to move away from the activity 
prevents long-term effects. 
There can be a significant effect: 
-Procedural: the appropriate 
assessment is unclear and missing  
information. 
-Possible cumulation of effects, 
this activity ads up to other 
disturbing activities in the area. 
-Insufficient knowledge on the 
possible effects of the underwater 
noise of power boat races on 
seals. 
 
Main Uncertainty issue Incomplete knowledge 
On underwater sound effects.  
→ Addressed through 
assessment vulnerable species 
would move away. 
 
→ Addressed through 
monitoring obligation. 
 
Incomplete knowledge  
On effects underwater noise  
Ambiguity  
-On relevance small NOx effects 
and cumulation of effects. 
-On effects on individuals instead 
of populations. 
-On the assessment of the 
reference situation. 
 
Raad van State decision Preliminary decision: permit valid, no objective information  
that the assessment of potential effects is not correct. 
Table 3.5. Summary of interpretation and uncertainties in powerboat race conflict. 
normative debates (Hanssen et al. 2009). The absence of such a constructive influence 
explains why the significant effect procedures did not contribute much to the closure of 
the controversies. In the mussel case, this closure was achieved in the negotiations lead-
ing to the covenant; in the power boat case, it was forced by the cancelling of the race. 
   The science-policy boundary in our case studies was perceived as a clear demar-
cation. Based on this demarcation science-based experts had the authority to give advice, 
both in the permit procedure and the juridical procedure. The boundary of the science 
world and the policy world was perceived concrete in the sense that most science-based 
experts were involved through contract research, formalising their role as scientific ex-
perts. However, this aspect of contract research also formed questions of independency, 
as expressed by a nature organisation: “the payer decides”, a clear questioning of the cred-
ibility and legitimacy of the knowledge. This remark contrast the ideal of a clear bound-
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ary between facts and values, science and policy. Still, the importance and authority of 
science-based experts to assess significant effects was supported by all actors involved. 
For example, by the use of contra-expertise in the legal procedures by the nature organ-
isations. However, the task division of responsibility to make the judgement of signif-
icance was less clear: scientists or the governmental permit authority. In practice this 
responsibility was shared and was formed by the specific context. In the mussel case the 
government stated in their permit argumentation they have the authority and sufficient 
expertise to make their own expert judgement on the effects of mussel seed fishery. In the 
powerboat case the government focused more on the quality of the appropriate assess-
ment and pushed the responsibility of a good judgement on significant effects towards 
the science-based experts. According to a marine ecologist: “the governmental authority 
wants us to make the judgement”. In this technocratic perspective “politics is replaced by 
a scientifically rationalised administration” (Weingart 1999, p.154). A contrasting per-
spective is that the governmental authority has the formal responsibility to make this 
judgement: “based on the report, the authority will decide whether the predicted impact 
is significant” (Opdam et al. 2009, p.916). Our findings suggest that in cases where the 
government was in favour of the activity they take the responsibility to judge significance, 
while in other situations governments push the responsibility to science-based experts. 
3.6 Conclusions
The mussel case and the powerboat case were selected to show the interpretative flexibil-
ity of significant effect as boundary object in different contexts. In this section we draw 
our conclusions.
3.6.1 How science-policy interactions shape the assessment of significant effect
The interpretations of significant effect within science-policy interactions took place in 
the permit and juridical processes. In the permit process, the benchmark for the inter-
pretation of significant effect was formed by the science-based experts that wrote the 
assessment report. In the assessment report the scope of significant effect was set by 
the selection of relevant effects and relevant species and habitats. These selections were 
shaped by existing research on the activity, the conservation objectives that were set by 
the government, and jurisprudence on significant effect. The appropriate assessment re-
port was also influenced by practical factors, such as time limitations for the researcher 
resulting from the contract with the initiator. Secondly, interactions with the permit au-
thority could influence the assessment of significant effect. In the mussel case, the Minis-
try agreed with the assessment based on its own expert judgement, thus precluding other 
interpretations of significant effect. However, in the powerboat case the province initially 
disagreed and by asking critical questions during the writing of the assessment-report, 
the province expanded the scope of significant effect to more activities of the race event 
and more detailed argumentations. Thirdly, lower governments and nature organisations 
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could influence the assessment of significant effects, particularly during consultations for 
the permit. Within our analysed cases these consultations did not result in changing the 
significant effect assessment, however, uncertainties in the form of incomplete knowl-
edge and ambiguity were made explicit and different interpretations had to be addressed 
by the permit authority. 
  In the juridical process which is more focused on procedural aspects, the differ-
ent interpretations of significant effect became the focal point of debate. The significance 
interpretation of the nature organisations was strategically supported by counter-exper-
tise, influencing the perception of the significant effect assessment. Eventually the Raad 
van State judge had to decide if the interpretation of no significant effect from the gov-
ernment was sufficiently supported. Due to the emphasis on scientific doubt in this phase 
science-based experts became core actors. They were the first to make incomplete knowl-
edge explicit, although the government and nature organisations were the actors that 
could put scientific ambiguity forward to mark a different interpretation of significance 
and acceptability of uncertainty. The mussel case showed the Court draw a different line 
then the government in how much incomplete knowledge as uncertainty is acceptable.
3.6.2 How significant effect shapes the decision-making process 
Significant effect as a boundary object structured both the decision of the government 
to grant the permit and the decision of the Raad van State to judge the validity of this 
permit. In both decisions the technocratic view on the assessment of significant effect as 
science-based dominated the process. This precluded a wider normative debate on the 
activity; the only option was to discuss the assessment of significant effect with scientific 
arguments. 
  This limitation caused frustration, for example for the nature organisations, who 
preferred discussions on the terms for a permit, when and where an activity could take 
place, instead of restricting the debate to “a black-and-white framework” of significant 
effects (interview nature organisation). The strict legal framework excluded the norma-
tive arguments of the nature organisations on which activities belong in the Wadden Sea 
from the debate. Legally, the distinction of significance marks the boundary for what is 
allowed. The socio-economic arguments of parties were also excluded, for example the 
economic revenues of the powerboat race, or the need for mussel seed to sustain mussel 
enterprises. Even though these arguments were expressed in the media and were the 
driving forces to contribute in the debate, officially these normative aspects were irrel-
evant. The province of Noord-Holland was very clear on this aspect, their only official 
framework of reference were scientific arguments, not political considerations. Not ac-
knowledging the valuation aspect of an appropriate assessment. 
 This focus on scientific arguments also excluded actors without ecological ex-
pertise to directly contribute in the permit process. The initiators were only involved 
through the science-based experts that they contracted to write the assessment reports. 
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And even though, the government and nature organisations had themselves ecological 
expertise, they also contracted external expertise because external experts were seen as 
having more authority in the legal procedure. This made science-based experts highly 
influential players in the debate. Especially in the mussel case, where ambiguity in inter-
pretating the incomplete knowledge of effects on the seabed divided the scientific com-
munity.
  The assessment of significant effect based on the ‘best available knowledge’ also 
excluded unpredictability. In the two analysed cases we saw that uncertainty in the form 
of incomplete knowledge and ambiguity were frequently expressed, however unpredict-
ability was only mentioned ones in the mussel case. Apparently the element of not being 
able to know something does not fit within the framework of significant effect, even 
though the dynamic nature of the Wadden Sea ecosystem is very unpredictable.
  Although the specific interpretation of significant effects limited the discussion 
options, the interpretative flexibility of this boundary object and the inherent uncertain-
ties in the assessment also created options to protest. Through the consultation process 
and the juridical procedure the nature organisations were able to express their alternative 
interpretation of significant effect with the aim to stop the activity. The juridical frame-
work of “no scientific doubt” based on the precautionary principle created the powerful 
option for nature organisations to protest against the permits, claiming there was too 
much uncertainty. This is a strong way to uphold the aim of nature protection, because 
the initiator is responsible to show it is not planning an harmful activity instead of the 
nature organisations showing it is harmful. 
3.6.3 Dealing with uncertainty
Within the two controversies over significant effect uncertainties played a crucial role. 
In the juridical debates, the Raad van State decided if there was scientific doubt, limiting 
uncertainties to incomplete knowledge. In the permit process uncertainty of incomplete 
knowledge and ambiguity were expressed, however, only incomplete knowledge was in-
corporated by suggesting monitoring measurements. Consequently, ambiguity was not 
addressed. Monitoring and more research is not sufficient to address ambiguity, because 
more information can be interpreted differently based on different value-perspectives. 
So with more knowledge, the debate on the credibility and legitimacy of the knowledge 
would not disappear, because the different value-perspectives were the drivers of the con-
flict. And the strict focus on scientific arguments within the assessment of significant 
effect does not mean that value differences disappear, instead these differences become 
absorbed in scientific discussions over uncertainties (Linke and Jentoft 2014; Sarewitz 
2004). 
  Together with Opdam et al. (2009) we conclude that uncertainty caused by dif-
ferent valuation frameworks is a structural element of the assessment of significant effect. 
We propose to acknowledge this value-laden aspect of the Natura 2000 regulations that 
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should be discussed as part of a political process. We also suggest that a broader approach 
for permits is necessary to effectively deal with ambiguities over impacts and their assess-
ment. An option is to broaden the debate on permits to include more elements than only 
the assessment of significant effects. For example for the mussel case, with the transition 
covenant the discussion was transformed in how and where the fishing could take place 
instead on what the exact effect would be (Van der Molen et al. 2015). This form of co-
operation between initiators, nature organisations and the government can be effective 
to deal with activities with debated uncertainties, because it opens up more options on 
which actors can agree. 
  Nonetheless, the legal option to stop activities based on uncertainties continues 
to be a powerful tool for opponents. Through the EU legislation and its implementation 
with significant effect assessments the limit for activities is made clear, no activities that 
harm the conservation objectives. Even though it is an improvement for nature protec-
tion that initiators are obliged to show they will not unacceptably affect conservation ob-
jectives, this paper has shown that with the technocratic approach of significant effect the 
value-differences have not disappeared. Instead of a political debate the value differences 
became expressed in legal settings.  

Chapter 4
Knowledge uncertainties in environmental conflicts:
how the mussel fishery controversy in the Dutch Wadden Sea 
became depoliticised
This chapter is re-submitted:
Floor, J. R., van Koppen, C. S. A., & van Tatenhove, J. P. M. Knowledge uncertainties in envi-
ronmental conflicts: how the mussel fishery controversy in the Dutch Wadden Sea became 
depoliticised. Environmental Politics.
Floor, J. R., van Koppen, C. S. A., & van Tatenhove, J. P. M.
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Abstract 
Policy-makers and scientists often expect that controversies in public policy can be 
solved by gathering more knowledge, even though  this linear model of expertise is wide-
ly criticised in social studies of science. To shed more light on this, the role of scientific 
uncertainties in the controversies on mussel fishery in the Dutch Wadden Sea (1990-
2016) is investigated. The analysis shows that mussel fishery regulation decisions were 
primarily based on government authority, not on scientific knowledge. Expectations of 
policy-makers and scientists on conflict resolution by more research were not met, be-
cause the knowledge debate was politicised over ambiguous knowledge claims. The con-
troversy was depoliticised by a political covenant between the conflicting parties. The 
case study confirms that science-based knowledge fails to guide policy-making as ex-
pected in the linear model, but also demonstrates how science plays important strategic, 
procedural and instrumental roles in structuring interactions between stakeholders in 
nature protection conflicts.
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4.1 Introduction
Policy-makers and scientists often expect that scientific knowledge will conclusively solve 
conflicts in public debates. The underlying assumption is that, with the right knowl-
edge, the decision to take should be clear. This linear model of expertise has become a 
dominant perception among scientists, policy-makers and advisors (Hanssen et al. 2009; 
Pielke 2007; Sutherland et al. 2017). In the field of protected nature areas, science-based 
knowledge has become essential for decision-making (Beunen and Duineveld 2010; 
Floor et al. 2016; Turnhout et al. 2015). By analysing the debates concerning the mussel 
fishery in the Dutch Wadden Sea (1990-2016), this article critically assesses the linear 
expectation that additional knowledge will solve conflicts in public debates. The mussel 
fishery case is an exemplary case of high expectations of scientific knowledge and simul-
taneously contested expertise. Several scholars have analysed the role of expertise and 
knowledge in the governance process of shellfish fisheries in the Wadden Sea region (see 
for an overview Floor et al. 2013; Van der Molen et al. 2015). Our research builds upon 
this work and focuses on the expected depoliticising role of knowledge from 1990-2016. 
  This article contributes to the existing literature on knowledge use in environ-
mental decision-making (Huitema and Turnhout 2009; Jasanoff 1994; Weingart 1999; 
Wesselink et al. 2013). We contribute to the existing critique on the linear model of ex-
pertise by specifically focusing on the expectations of knowledge production for deci-
sion-making processes. The assumption of the linear model of expertise is that science 
will provide policy actors with the knowledge required to solve controversies (Beck 
2011). The main criticism towards this dominant model is that there is not a clear bound-
ary between science and policy (Beck 2011; Carter 2013; Wesselink et al. 2013). This has 
resulted in a conceptualisation of science-policy interactions as “multiple, two-way and 
dynamic interactions between processes of knowledge production and decision-making” 
(Wesselink et al. 2013, p.2). The aim of this article is to critically reflect on the assump-
tion of the linear model that  knowledge can reduce and end controversies, by using the 
concepts of politicisation and depoliticisation. Politicisation refers to the confrontation of 
different positions about a human activity in the public debate (Mouffe 2000; Pellizzoni 
2011). With politicisation, a shift takes place from a situation in which a human activity 
was perceived as necessary, private, and requiring no regulation toward a situation in 
which the human activity is a topic of public debate. This process of politicisation can 
be triggered by claims of interest groups and knowledge claims of science-based experts. 
In the words of Pellizzoni, politicisation is: “the opening, broadening or restoring of a 
public space of discussion. An issue (or part of it) is politicised to the extent that it is 
released from necessity and duty: different positions can be confronted in the public 
arena” (Pellizzoni 2011, p.711). Depoliticisation refers to the process of ending contro-
versies, by removing these conflicting issues out of the public debate and defining them 
as non-controversial. The controversial issue is then taken out of the public domain and, 
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for example, into the domain of scientific or bureaucratic expertise (Behagel 2012).   
Furthermore, controversy can exist within several debates simultaneously. Therefore, 
we distinguish two interconnected and parallel debates: the regulation debate and the 
knowledge debate. In the case of nature protection, the regulation debate is about which 
human activities are allowed in a nature area and under what conditions. Whereas, the 
knowledge debate is about what is known and whether there is sufficient knowledge to 
make decisions. In this paper, we study the expectations based on the linear model of 
expertise that assumes first the knowledge debate needs to be closed to end the regu-
lation debate (Beck 2011; Hoppe 2005). In the next section, we present our conceptual 
framework of depoliticisation mechanisms and different types of uncertainties. We use 
this framework to describe and analyse the mussel fishery controversy and draw our 
conclusions.  
4.2 Analytical framework
4.2.1 Depoliticisation mechanisms 
Several decision-making mechanisms can reduce the public debate on a controversial 
issue. In this paper, we distinguish four depoliticisation mechanisms based on Van Kop-
pen (2002), see Table 4.1. This typology includes the traditional demarcation between the 
decisionist and technocratic models, based on the primacy for political power or the pri-
macy for science-based expertise (Hoppe 2005; Weingart 1999). To highlight the current 
role of the civil society and the market in governance process, the participatory and mar-
ket models of political reasoning are also included in the typology. We approach these de-
cision-making mechanisms as ideal types. In decision-making processes these types are 
often combined. To function as depoliticisation mechanism, the type of decision-making 
should be accepted as legitimate by the actors involved to reduce the scope of the public 
debate. Furthermore, decision-maker(s) should also reach consensus on the decision. 
 Depoliticisation mechanism 
Decisionist ‘Let the authority handle it’, transfer to political hierarchy. 
Decisions are justified by the political position of the decision-maker. 
 
Technocratic ‘Let the experts handle it’, transfer to the science-based expertise domain. 
Decisions are justified by scientific consensus. 
 
Participatory ‘Let the stakeholders decide’, transfer to the semi-private stakeholder domain. 
Decisions are justified by an agreement between all relevant actors.   
 
Market ‘Leave it to the market’, transfer to the private domain. 
Decisions are justified by the perception that market forces serve the common 
good. 
Table 4.1. Decisionist, technocratic, participatory and market depoliticisation mechanisms 
(Based on Van Koppen 2002).
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  These depoliticisation mechanisms are based on different types of legitimacy 
and knowledge use. The decisionist mechanism is based on the legitimacy of the govern-
mental authority to make decisions. Within a democracy, this authority can be elected 
politicians or appointed officials. Knowledge can play a supporting role, through knowl-
edge workers in bureaucratic state institutions or through advise from research institutes 
(Hoppe 2005). The technocratic mechanism relies on the legitimacy of experts and their 
scientific arguments to justify decisions (Weingart 1999). Knowledge is the main fac-
tor to guide decisions. In radical technocratic decision-making, scientists replace pol-
iticians, in a less radical version: “experts hold de facto power in the day-to-day busi-
ness of administration and politics because scientific knowledge and its corresponding 
technical-practical tools have colonized the administrative and political worlds” (Hoppe 
2005, p.209). The participatory approach is based on the premise that affected actors 
should make decisions. The perception that all relevant stakeholders are included is cru-
cial. Knowledge can play a supportive role, both specific stakeholder knowledge and sci-
ence-based knowledge, depending on the stakeholders’ perceptions. The market mech-
anism is based on the ideology that market forces serve the common good, transferring 
the issue of decision-making to individuals collectively (Van Koppen 2002). Knowledge 
that informs market players can play a role, such as the information on product labels. 
  In our analysis of the mussel fishery decision-making, we focus on the legitima-
tion of decisions and the role of knowledge production in these decisions. We consider 
that knowledge has a role in all depoliticisation mechanisms but is most prominent in the 
technocratic approach.
4.2.2 Knowledge uncertainties 
In all depoliticisation mechanisms, the role of knowledge is complicated when knowl-
edge uncertainties are considered. According to the linear model, experts have or can 
obtain the knowledge required, which would contribute to depoliticisation. Howev-
er, when the certainty of a knowledge claim becomes disputed, this knowledge claim 
can become controversial within a knowledge debate. We analytically distinguish three 
types of uncertainty perceptions: incomplete knowledge, unpredictability and ambiguity, 
see Figure 4.1 (Floor et al. 2016; Van den Hoek 2014). The uncertainty of incomplete 
knowledge addresses expressions of knowledge imperfection: what is currently unknown 
but could be available with additional research. The uncertainty of unpredictability ad-
dresses unknowable knowledge, and this uncertainty cannot be reduced by the current 
state of science. The uncertainty of ambiguity concerns actors’ knowing differently rath-
er than not knowing enough. We use the definition of ambiguity as “the existence of 
two or more equally plausible interpretation possibilities” (Dewulf et al. 2005, p.116). 
  These different types of uncertainties mark different knowledge debates: on 
sufficient knowledge or on correct knowledge. Disputes that question if there is suffi-
cient knowledge to support decision-making are triggered by perceptions of not knowing 
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enough, either incomplete knowledge or unpredictability. Whereas disputes that ques-
tion knowledge claims are triggered by knowing differently, the uncertainty of ambiguity. 
Ambiguity is frequently not recognised and is often perceived as a lack of the correct 
knowledge. The desire of coalitions to strengthen their position with better knowledge 
arguments, imply high expectations for research. Although additional research will not 
change the underlying value differences (Sarewitz 2004). We use our classification of un-
certainties to understand the knowledge debates and the extent that knowledge produc-
tion can resolve them. 
Figure 4.1. Schematisation of types of uncertainties based on Van den Hoek (2014).
4.2.3 Linear model of expertise
We use our concepts of depoliticisation mechanisms and knowledge uncertainties to 
characterise the linear model of expertise. The linear model of expertise is based on the 
assumption that with sufficient and appropriate knowledge, uncertainties are reduced 
and decisions can be made (Beck 2011; Hoppe 2005; Wesselink et al. 2013). These ele-
ments correlate with the technocratic depoliticisation approach and the view of uncer-
tainty as incomplete knowledge. These elements led to the following expectations of the 
regulation and knowledge debate. First, when a human activity is politicised, the regu-
lation debate should be depoliticised in a technocratic manner, with experts providing 
the required knowledge for policy-making. This is the simple model of ‘Speaking truth 
to Power’ (Beck 2011). This model is however complicated when uncertainties result 
in politicisation of knowledge. At that moment, also the knowledge debate should be 
addressed. Based on the linear science-policy expectation, a second step of depolitici-
sation in a technocratic manner is required. When uncertainty is perceived as incom-
plete knowledge, research should provide the necessary knowledge to end the knowledge 
debate. Lastly, the linear model prescribed the expectation that with the ending of the 
knowledge debate it should become clear how to regulate the human activity. In this way, 
ending the knowledge debate becomes a condition for ending the regulation debate. This 
linear expectation from research for decision-making is summarized in Figure 4.2. Our 
mussel fishery case study will show a different relation between the knowledge and regu-
lation debates that contrasts this linear expectation.
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4.3 Methodological approach
We use an interpretative approach to understand the mussel fishery controversy (Yanow 
and Schwartz-Shea 2006). Interpretative approaches focus on different constructions of 
meaning as ‘people will interpret the social and material world in various and sometimes 
conflicting ways’ (Beunen and Duineveld 2010, p.325). These differences between people 
form the basis of regulation and knowledge debates. Following Mouffe (2000), we view 
these debates as a result of conflicting positions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that have differ-
ent perspectives. We describe these different positions as discourse coalitions: ‘a group of 
actors that, in the context of an identifiable set of practices, shares the usage of a particu-
lar set of story lines over a particular period of time’ (Hajer 2006, p.70). These coalitions 
can be viewed as having their own way of knowing (Janssen 2015). In the mussel fishery 
case, nature and fishery discourse coalitions can be identified (Van der Molen 2015).
  In our analysis, we distinguish four periods in the mussel fishery case (1990-
2016) that are separated by crucial decisions that depoliticised the public debate to a 
certain extent and changed the regulation of mussel fisheries. The starting point of 1990 
is based on the first politicisation of mussel fisheries in reaction to high bird mortalities. 
The analysis ends in 2016, corresponding to the end of our data collection. Our case 
study is empirically informed by interviews, participatory observations, field trips and 
document analysis of the role of science-policy interactions in the Dutch Wadden Sea3. 
Figure 4.2. Visualisation of the linear expectations of research for closing knowledge and regula-
tion debates, based on the perceptions of technocratic depoliticisation and uncertainty as incom-
plete knowledge.
3 The 28 semi-structured interviews were conducted in January 2011 to July 2016 as part of a PhD pro-
ject on the role of science-policy interactions in the Dutch Wadden Sea. In the same period, observa-
tions and informal interactions with actors took place during symposia, field trips and workshops. For 
the full list of interviews, see Appendix I. Quotes from the interviews have been translated to English 
by the authors.
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Twenty-eight semi-structured interviews on science-policy interactions in the Wadden 
Sea were conducted, nine of which specifically focused on the mussel fishery case with 
persons from scientific institutes, nature organisations, the mussel fishery sector and 
the government. We analysed case-related research reports, governmental documents, 
stakeholder documents, court rulings, parliamentary proceedings, stakeholder websites, 
meeting notes and newspaper articles (using the Lexis Nexis database). For each period, 
we analysed the data on articulations of uncertainties and legitimations of decisions to 
identify depoliticisation mechanisms and knowledge expectations.   
4.4 Mussel cultivation and fishery in the Dutch Wadden Sea 
The Wadden Sea is a shallow estuarine sea, renowned as a feeding ground for birds. 
The high tidal dynamics of the system are characteristic of the Wadden Sea. During low 
tide, large portions of the Wadden Sea fall dry, which are called the littoral areas. The 
areas of the Wadden Sea that are constantly covered by seawater are the sublittoral ar-
eas. Another characteristic of the Wadden Sea is the occurrence of mussel beds, which 
are clusters of blue mussels (Mytilus edulis) attached to each other that are perceived as 
biodiversity hotspots (Dankers and Zuidema 1995). There are naturally growing mussel 
banks and mussels on mussel cultivation plots. This human activity of mussel cultivation 
in the Dutch Wadden Sea began in the 1950s, with mussel farmers renting seabed areas 
from the national government to cultivate mussels. The mussel cultivation practice in the 
Netherlands originated in the Eastern Scheldt in the Zeeland province. In the 1950s, the 
mussels in Zeeland declined severely due to a parasite infection, which was the reason 
that cultivation in the Dutch Wadden Sea was initiated by fishermen from Zeeland (Van 
Ginkel 2007). The mussel fishermen describe their cultivation practice as farming in the 
water (Van der Molen et al. 2015). As input for their cultivation practice they need ‘seeds’, 
the spat fall of juvenile mussels. These juvenile mussels form banks on the seabed by at-
taching themselves to old shelves and to each other. The main input for cultivation are the 
juvenile sublittoral mussels, which are fished in autumn and in spring and relocated to 
cultivation plots. Littoral mussel banks can also be used for harvest of juvenile and grown 
mussels. The cultivation plots are in the sublittoral area of the Wadden Sea and are not 
visible because they are constantly covered by water. The mussels grow to consumption 
size in two to three years, after which they are brought to the mussel auction in Yerseke 
in Zeeland for sale.
  In the mussel fishery controversy, two stable discourse coalitions can be iden-
tified based on a mussel fishery perspective or a nature conservation perspective (Van 
der Molen et al. 2015). The fishery discourse coalition can be characterised as Mussel 
fishery belongs in the Wadden Sea, articulating the historical and future place of mussel 
fisheries and cultivation in the Wadden Sea (Floor et al. 2016). The main actors in this 
coalition are the mussel farmers, represented since 1992 by the Producers Organisation 
(PO) Mussel Culture (Verbeeten 1999). For them, mussel fishing and cultivation is not 
in conflict with nature protection. Instead, they perceive mussel cultivation as enriching 
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nature. The mussel sectors position has largely been supported by the ministry responsi-
ble for fishery and nature protection. This ministry is known under the acronym LNV4 
in Dutch. Science-based experts are also part of the fishery discourse coalition (Imeson 
and van den Bergh 2006; Turnhout et al. 2008). Historically, fishery biologists have taken 
the mussel fishery activity as a starting point, for example within research on improving 
fishing efficiency. During debates, scientists were explicitly placed in the fishery coali-
tion, for example researchers from the RIVO research institute that is currently part of 
Wageningen Marine Science (Floor et al. 2016; Turnhout et al. 2008).
 In opposition to the fishery coalition, the nature discourse coalition can be char-
acterised as The Wadden Sea is first and foremost a nature area, articulating that human 
activities should not harm this unique nature area (Floor et al. 2016; Van der Molen et al. 
2015). Several nature organisations have expressed this nature perspective and criticised 
the potential harmful role of mussel fisheries in the Dutch Wadden Sea since the 1990s. 
The main actors have been the Wadden Sea Society, the Society for the Protection of 
Birds, Fauna Protection and the WAD foundation. Although these nature organisations 
have different perspectives on the extent that fisheries should take place in the nature 
area, they share concerns for bird populations and seabed disturbance in the Wadden Sea. 
Their position is strongly rooted in ecosystem ecology and the interrelations of species in 
the Wadden Sea. Many employees of nature organisations have science-based ecological 
expertise (Van der Molen et al. 2015). Science-based experts from research institutes are 
also placed within this discourse coalition, such as researchers from NIOZ, the Royal 
Netherlands Institute for Sea Research. The Dutch government is also aligned with this 
discourse coalition, with increased recognition of the nature value of the Wadden Sea in 
international and national policy documents.   
4.5 The mussel fishery controversy (1990-2016) 
This section describes the politicisation and depoliticisation process and the role of 
knowledge in four periods that distinguish different regulations of mussel fisheries. For 
an overview of the main events and a summary of the analysis, see Figure 4.3 and Table 
4.2.
4.5.1 Debate on restricting mussel fishery areas (1990-1993) 
The high mortality of birds and disappearance of all littoral mussel banks triggered the 
politicisation of mussel fishery in the 1990s. In 1990, nature organisations supported 
by scientists attempted to limit cockle fishery5. However, governmental regulation was 
4 LNV represents the ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Fishery, which was renamed the Agricul-
ture, Nature and Food Quality in 2003. Between 2010-2017, this ministry was part of the ministry of 
Economic Affairs.
5 In this period, the fishery debate included cockle and mussel fisheries. This article focuses on the 
mussel fishery debate; for an overview of the cockle fishery debate, see Floor et al. (2013).
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stopped by the Council of State (‘Raad van State’ in Dutch) because there was no legal 
basis for limiting shellfish fisheries. This triggered a regulation debate between nature 
and fishery coalitions, which can be characterised by the positions of Reduce fishery 
areas! versus No limitations of fishery areas!. The main topics were if and where areas 
should be closed to fisheries, predominantly littoral areas to leave enough food for birds. 
Fishermen emphasized that they had also difficulties in the early 1990s due to limited 
mussel spat and intensified eider duck predation on their cultivation plots. The nature 
organisations stated that nature needed to be protected from fisheries, blaming fisheries 
for the disappearance of the littoral mussel banks and eider duck mortality. In response, 
fishermen stressed the role of natural fluctuations on mussel banks and bird populations. 
According to a fishermen: ‘natural mortality of birds caused by cold, ice, storms and oth-
er catastrophes has much more impact than our activities’ (Den Hollander 1991). These 
differences resulted in a knowledge debate: Harmful fishery versus Natural fluctuations. 
In 1993, the Ministry formulated a compromise between the nature and fishery positions. 
Mussel fishery regulation became part of the Sea and Coastal Fisheries Policy: restricting 
26% of the Dutch Wadden Sea area from shell fish fisheries, limiting fishing to leave suf-
ficient cockles and mussels to satisfy 60% of the food requirement of the bird populations 
and restricting fishing of littoral mussel banks if their surface coverage is below 2000 ha. 
Furthermore, a science-based evaluation was planned to be ready in 1998, on which the 
policy was to be adjusted to restrict additional areas or re-open them for fisheries (LNV 
1993). 
 During this period (1990-1993), observations of bird mortality and contestation 
of fishery effects politicised mussel fisheries. Knowledge played an important role in po-
liticisation of the issue, and scientific experts could not depoliticise the issue as expected 
from the linear model of expertise. Both the nature and fishery coalitions acknowledged 
that knowledge of the fishery effects should be the basis for mussel fishery regulation. 
However, there was ambiguity on the fishery effects, especially about the causes of the 
high bird mortality and loss of the mussel banks. The ministry acknowledged this uncer-
tainty by formulating a compromise to keep areas open for fisheries and simultaneously 
protecting nature with food availability limitations. Although knowledge topics influ-
enced the crucial decision in 1993, this decision was not legitimised by expertise. Instead, 
this decision was legitimised through the governmental authority of the ministry, a deci-
sionist mechanism to depoliticise the debate. A technocratic approach was proposed to 
guide further decision making. Research was perceived as necessary to evaluate the ef-
fects of restricting areas for fisheries and to reduce the uncertainty on fishery effects. Ex-
pert knowledge was viewed as a requirement for future legitimate decisions, expressing 
high expectations for research results in future decision-making processes (LNV 1993). 
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Main events and decisions                                  Research projects 
No restriction of cockle and mussel fishery 
1990 
 
 Almost all littoral mussel banks 
disappeared  
 
High bird mortality in winter 
 
 1991  
 1992  
Crucial decision: Sea and Coastal Fisheries Policy 
(SCFP): 26% of the Wadden Sea restricted from fishery 
and 60% food reservation for birds 
1993  
  1994 
EVA I (1994-1998): evaluation 
of fishery regulation 
  1995 
  1996 
  1997 
Adaptation SCFP: additional littoral areas closed 1998 
 
High bird mortality in winter 
1999 
EVA II (1999-2003): evaluation 
of fishery regulations and 
fishery effect research 
 2000 
Shellfish sector vision on sustainable fishery (ODUS) 2001 
  2002 
  2003 
European Court of Justice ruling: shellfish fishery as a 
project under the Habitat Directive 
2004 
 
Government decision: ban on cockle fishery and permit 
for gas mining  
Crucial decision: Support sustainable mussel fishery, no 
more food reservations for birds instead autumn fishery 
restricted to instable mussel banks 
 
Workshops and meetings between fishermen and nature 
organisations until spring 2006 
2005  
2006 
PRODUS project (2006-2013): 
fishery effect research on 
sublittoral nature values 
Council of State procedure against mussel seed fishery 
spring 2006 permit 
2007 Heldoorn informer began to bring nature organisations, 
fishermen and ministry together 
Council of State ruling: spring 2006 permit invalid 
2008 Crucial decision: Transition covenant between nature 
organisations, fishermen and the ministry 
Permanently closing 140 ha sublittoral mussel seed banks 2009 
Additional closing of 70 ha sublittoral mussel seed banks 2010 
 2011 
  2012 
  2013 
Additional closing of 9090 ha sublittoral mussel seed 
banks 2014  
  2015  
  2016  
 
Figure 4.3. Overview of important events, research projects and crucial decisions in the mussel 
fishery controversy (1990-2016).
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4.5.2 Continuation of debate on sufficient bird protection (1993-2004)
The Sea and Coastal Fisheries Policy of 1993 and the slow restoration of littoral mus-
sel banks restricted the mussel fishery practice to only sublittoral mussels. In 1998, the 
EVA I evaluation research showed that the restoration of littoral mussel banks was very 
limited (Ens 2004). However, there were insufficient data to make strong conclusions 
on fishery effects, and the Ministry of LNV initiated the EVA II evaluation project. Al-
though this technocratic approach using evaluation research to guide decision-making 
restricted the debate to knowledge arguments, the regulation debate on shellfish fisheries 
continued. Nature organisations contested cockle and mussel fishery permits in court, 
claiming that the fishery regulation was insufficient to protect nature. The littoral mussel 
bank restoration was very slow, and high bird mortality occurred in the winters of 1999-
2001 (Floor et al. 2013; Raad van State 2005). Fishermen claimed that the regulation 
to restrict fishery areas hampered sustainable fishery innovations. In 2001, the shellfish 
fishery sector published a sustainable fishery vision, which included an alternative meth-
od of juvenile mussel collection to innovate mussel fishery and cultivation. These mussel 
seed collectors should reduce seabed disturbance and create a more stable mussel seed 
input using ropes in the water column on which juvenile mussels can attach themselves 
(ODUS 2001). However, in 2002, mussel fishermen also requested a permit to fish on 
natural littoral mussel banks, which was unmentionable for nature organisations and 
was not granted by the Ministry (Raad van State 2004). This mussel fishery regulation 
debate can be characterised by the positions of More regulation! versus Less regulation! 
  The positions of the nature and fishery coalitions were supported by knowledge 
claims on fishery effects. The main concern of the nature coalitions was bird protection. 
The removal of mussels would effectively reduce food availability for birds, especially in 
years with low numbers of juvenile mussels. In contrast, the fishery coalition claimed that 
the overall effect of mussel fishery and cultivation was positive for nature. The transpor-
tation of juvenile mussels to cultivation plots would increase the number of mussels in the 
Wadden Sea because of the better surviving conditions for mussels on cultivation plots, 
increasing also the number of mussels available for birds. The coalitions had their own in-
terpretations of the research results of EVA I and II, and science-based experts contested 
different fishery effect interpretations. For example, model calculations in the EVA II pro-
ject showed that the cultivation practice increased the number of mussels in the Wadden 
Sea. The fishery coalition perceived this as a confirmation of their position. The nature 
coalition, however, emphasized that, in years with low numbers of juvenile mussels, the 
actual effects for bird populations could still be negative. Furthermore, the nature coali-
tion proposed changing the norm of food availability to reach bird restoration goals. This 
knowledge debate triggered by ambiguity on fishery effects can be characterised by the po-
sitions of Potentially harmful fishery versus Positive effects of mussel fishery and cultivation. 
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  Although the EVA II research project was undertaken to guide decision-making 
on shellfish fisheries, other processes became more influential. First, the debate on gas 
mining in the Wadden Sea had begun to influence the shellfish fishery debate (Floor et al. 
2013). In addition, the ruling of the European Court of Justice in 2004 that the European 
Habitat Directive permit procedures also applied to shellfish fisheries was a very influen-
tial change in the legal setting (EuropeanCourtofJustice 2004). This decision implied that 
the burden of proof was on the fishermen to show that there were no negative significant 
effects on the Wadden Sea’s nature value (Raad van State 2005). Against this background, 
in 2004, the Dutch government decided to support sustainable mussel fishery and sup-
port alternative mussel seed collection experiments, whereas mechanical cockle fishery 
was banned from the Wadden Sea (LNV 2004).
 In this period (1993-2004), knowledge did not contribute to depoliticising the 
controversy. Even though knowledge arguments structured the regulation debate, ambi-
guity on fishery effects amplified the knowledge debate. The high expectation that the 
EVA I and II evaluation projects could reduce the debate on fishery effects was not met. 
In contrast, science-based expertise became part of the debate on fishery effects as con-
tested expertise. Again, the main uncertainty was the ambiguity on fishery effects. The 
fishermen also noted the unpredictability of the natural dynamics of the Wadden Sea: 
“not everything can be described or explained” (ODUS 2001, p.14). Still, the fishermen 
were actively involved in the EVA II project. This project structured the debate on mus-
sel fisheries. For example, the debate on eider duck protection occurred with ecological 
arguments on food availability calculations. However, the ambiguity on the EVA II re-
search results enhanced the debate instead of the expected depoliticisation. Furthermore, 
the acknowledgement of incomplete knowledge on sublittoral nature effects triggered 
new research: the PRODUS project (‘PRoject Onderzoek DUurzame Schelpdiercultuur’ 
in Dutch). This project aimed to support sustainable fishery and included research on 
the effects on sublittoral nature by comparing the biodiversity of fished and unfished 
plots. The ministry expressed high expectations for this research: “Knowledge and facts 
are seen as an opportunity to bridge the divide of standpoints and visions” (LNV 2004, 
p.8). Again, a technocratic approach was proposed for future decision-making. How-
ever, the crucial decision to support sustainable mussel fishery (and not cockle fishery) 
in 2004 was based on a decisionist approach, legitimised through the authority of the 
government. Although the ministry legitimated this decision with their interpretation of 
the EVA II results and advise commissions, it was not technocratic in the sense of being 
prescribed by science-based experts.  
4.5.3 Debate on mussel seed fishery permits (2004-2008)
In 2004, the Ministry of LNV decided to support mussel fishery and cultivation in the 
Dutch Wadden Sea, whereas mechanical cockle fishery was banned from the Wadden 
Sea (LNV 2004). As a result, the fishery practice on sublittoral mussel seed banks could 
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continue in spring and autumn6, although fishermen now needed a permit under the 
European Habitat Directive (92/42/EEC). After a period of low spat fall and no fish-
ing, the first fishing activity under this obligation was in autumn 2005. For this per-
mit, the ministry of LNV commissioned research institute Alterra to write an appro-
priate assessment (Alterra 2005). They concluded that there were no significant effects 
based on the condition that only instable mussel banks were fished. For the spring 2006 
permit to fish mussel banks that survived the winter7, the Producer Organisation (PO) 
Mussel Culture commissioned the consultancy MarinX, who assessed that there were 
no significant effects (Floor et al. 2016; Van Stralen and Sas 2006). In 2005 and 2006, 
several workshops and meetings took place between nature organisations, the PO Mus-
sel Culture and science-based experts, organised by the Ministry of LNV, which had an 
aspiration of co-management. Although they agreed that fishermen needed transition 
time to adopt new practices, they disagreed on the meaning of sustainable fishery and 
how quickly innovations should be realised. These differences between the fishery and 
nature coalitions’ positions characterise the regulation debate: Mussel fishery and cul-
tivation is already sustainable versus Only mussel fishery without damage to the seabed. 
  In March 2006, these differences led to discontinuation of the regular meetings. 
Instead, nature organisations began legal procedures against the spring 2006 fishing per-
mit from the Dutch government. These legal procedures redirected their differences to-
ward a debate on the assessment of significant effects and the certainty of knowledge 
claims, triggered by the European Court of Justice condition of “no reasonable scien-
tific doubt” (EJC, 2004. Paragraph 61). This knowledge debate can be characterised as 
Too much incomplete knowledge to assess effects versus Sufficient knowledge to assess no 
significant effects. The nature coalition questioned if the assessment of no significant ef-
fects could be made. Based on the precautionary principle, they claimed that there was 
insufficient knowledge to grant a permit. The incomplete knowledge of the effects of 
fisheries on sublittoral nature values implied that there could possibly be significant ef-
fects. In addition, they challenged the knowledge claims on mussel cultivation effects 
in bad years and food availability for birds with a restoration goal, whereas the fishery 
coalition claimed that an assessment of no significant effects could be made. The ef-
fect uncertainties on sublittoral nature values were addressed with an adaptive man-
agement approach; if the PRODUS results showed negative effects, the fishery practice 
would be changed. Furthermore, they stressed the positive effect of an increase of mussel 
6 Regulation on bird protection changed in 2004. Instead of yearly food availability assessments, fish-
eries were restricted to instable mussel seed banks in autumn and an administrative requirement was 
introduced to record mussel transports to keep 85% of the fished juvenile mussels in the Wadden Sea 
for the winter.
7 These mussel banks have the potential to become multiple-year-old wild mussel banks, see Floor et 
al. (2016) and Alterra (2005) for details.
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biomass by relocating mussels to cultivation plots. In 2007, in parallel with this legal 
conflict, the ministry commissioned an independent facilitator to initiate meetings be-
tween nature organisations, the mussel sector and the ministry to support co-operation. 
  In February 2008, the Council of State ruled that the spring 2006 permit was 
invalid, stating that there was inadequate understanding of effects to assess no signifi-
cant effect without reasonable scientific doubt (Raad van State 2008). This triggered a 
mussel crisis. Fishermen feared for their future, according to them without new permits 
the Dutch mussel sector would be finished. In response, the fishermen began an inten-
sive media campaign, ‘stop the green lie’, against nature organisations and scientists that 
claimed mussel fishery was not sustainable. Initially, the minister expected that the PRO-
DUS research could be accelerated to provide the required scientific basis for new fish-
ery permits. However, a scientific audit revealed that this was impossible. The ecological 
research needed much more time to make valid conclusions on effects, and the auditors 
remarked that it would be unlikely that the results could reduce the controversy (Herman 
2008; Van der Molen et al. 2015). In response, the Ministry intensified the process seek-
ing co-operation using an independent facilitator (Heldoorn 2008). In October 2008, this 
resulted in the Transition Mussel Sector and Nature Restoration Wadden Sea Covenant, 
signed by nature organisations8, the PO Mussel Culture and the Ministry. This covenant 
implied a step-by-step replacement of traditional mussel seed fishery with alternative 
mussel seed collection in 2020 and a nature restoration program for the Wadden Sea9. 
This covenant is in line with a broader trend in Dutch governance, in which covenants 
between NGOs and market parties are used to pacify conflicting issues. 
 In this period (2004-2008), knowledge production did not depoliticise the de-
bate, instead the legal decision on the knowledge debate of significant effect assessment 
even triggered intensification of the debate. The knowledge dispute on whether there 
was sufficient knowledge to grant a permit was decided upon by the Council of State in 
2008, who stated that there was incomplete understanding to assess no significant effects. 
This can be viewed as a legal decisionist mechanism to close the knowledge debate in 
which the court judged between different expert interpretations. However, this decision 
triggered further politicisation of the regulation debate. After the Council of State’s ruling 
in 2008, the public debate on the mussel sector increased, with intensive discussions in 
the media and the Dutch parliament. The relations became very tense between fishermen 
and nature organisations. It became clear that the technocratic mechanism based on the 
PRODUS research results would not provide a timely answer. Instead, the ministry em-
8 The covenant (Convenant Transitie Mosselsector en Natuurherstel Waddenzee in Dutch) was signed 
by the following nature organisations: the Society for the Protection of Birds, the Wadden Sea Society, 
the WAD Foundation and the Society for the Preservation of Nature Monuments in the Netherlands.
9 The nature restoration ‘Program towards a Rich Wadden Sea’ (PRW, Programma naar een Rijke Wad-
denzee in Dutch) was established to facilitate the mussel fishery transition and nature restoration.
99
Depoliticisation of the mussel fishery controversy
4
phasized co-operation. This ‘forced marriage’ between the nature organisations and fish-
ermen in the transition covenant aimed to prevent further court cases on fishery permits 
and guarantee a transition process to innovative and more sustainable fishery practice. 
The mussel transition covenant was legitimised by the involvement of the most relevant 
stakeholders, a participatory mechanism.
4.5.4 Co-operation within the mussel transition covenant (2008-2016)
The mussel transition covenant made it possible for the fishermen to obtain a per-
mit to fish in spring 2009, excepting the newly closed sublittoral areas. Investments in 
mussel seed collectors were also made, up-scaling the technical innovation to gradu-
ally increase the intake of juvenile mussels from the water column. Additional are-
as were permanently closed for mussel seed fishery in 2010 and 2014 (PRW 2015). 
The impact of mussel seed collectors and natural development in the closed areas 
are monitored. In addition, research on the restoration of mussel banks was initiated. 
   The covenant depoliticised the debate on mussel fishery regulation by trans-
ferring the issue from the public domain of government to the semi-private domain 
of the covenant partners. Although the differences between the stakeholders did 
not disappear, the regulation debate became pacified. The permits are no longer op-
posed by nature organisations in court. According to a nature organisation: “all the is-
sues that were first debated, are now documented, so the permit procedure is differ-
ent”. Moreover, interactions between the actors changed; instead of enforcing their 
own perspectives and using knowledge to enhance their positions, they must work 
together to shape the transition process. For example, nature organisation and mussel 
fishermen had to work together to formulate a policy for juvinale mussel transportan-
tion. This is a controversial issue for nature organisations because of the invasive ex-
otic species risk when transport takes place from the south of the Netherlands to the 
Wadden Sea (Van der Molen et al. 2015). Through shared fact-finding, a monitoring 
program was set up in a participatory manner by a workgroup of fishermen and na-
ture organisations, based on the input of science-based experts on species inventories. 
  With the depoliticisation of the regulation debate, the transition covenant pac-
ified the knowledge debate on fishery effects. The co-operation between the covenant 
partners depoliticised this dispute because the covenant partners decided that their con-
testing knowledge claims on fishery effects are not relevant for the co-operative process. 
This is very clear in the reaction to the PRODUS results in 2013, this research indicated 
both temporarily negative effects of mussel seed fishery in spring and high biodiversity 
of mussel cultivation plots (Smaal et al. 2013). After the covenant was signed, interest in 
the PRODUS research declined. According to a researcher: “the agenda of the covenant 
partners was dominated by other issues than what we could address with PRODUS”. 
Contrasting the initial high expectations of the government and fishermen for this re-
search, the PRODUS results had no impact on mussel fishery management in the cove-
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nant. To avoid a new debate on knowledge uncertainties, the covenant partners decided 
to ignore the results. An interviewee from the mussel sector remarked: “We did not dis-
cuss it properly, nobody was interested”. Nevertheless, the release of the PRODUS results 
in 2013 triggered scientific disagreement on the correct interpretation of the results. The 
original press release was criticised for being too positive to mussel fishery by scien-
tists from the NIOZ research institute, resulting in a new press release that emphasized 
the limitations of the research (IMARES 2013a; IMARES 2013b). However, this ambi-
guity was not used or expressed by stakeholders to change mussel fishery regulations. 
 The debate on knowledge uncertainties of fishery effects was pacified in this 
period (2008-2016). Instead, knowledge was instrumentally used to support decisions to 
implement the transition of mussel fishery practice based on an adaptive management 
approach of ‘learning by doing’. There was no resolution within the knowledge debate 
on fishery effect uncertainties, however, the public debate on knowledge uncertainties of 
fishery effects disappeared because the regulation debate was depoliticised; decisions on 
mussel fishery management were made between covenant partners. To give legitimacy to 
their decisions as covenant partners, they continue to rely heavily on science-based ex-
pertise. The transition is based on ‘learning by doing’, expressing incomplete knowledge 
and unpredictability, which should be addressed with monitoring and research projects. 
Furthermore, the interactions between the nature organisations, mussel fishermen and 
science-based experts changed. Instead of coalitions enforcing their own perspective and 
using knowledge to enhance their position, they began to work together to shape the 
transition process. However, this could be a temporary end to the controversy. First, the 
legitimacy of the covenant can be questioned by excluded actors. Some important out-
siders to the covenant such as shrimpers and recreational organisations10 have criticised 
the covenant, even though without repoliticising the issue. Second, the covenant partners 
themselves can withdraw from the co-operation. The current consensus is threatened 
by the continuation of opposing views, the limited feasibility of a complete transition 
to mussel seed collectors and the formal end date of the covenant in 2020. However, all 
actors still perceive collaboration as mutually beneficial.
4.6 Conclusions
4.6.1 No linear relation of knowledge and policy in the mussel case
Our research was triggered by the persistent belief in the linear model of expertise 
which assumes that appropriate knowledge results in legitimate decisions. In the case 
of knowledge uncertainties, the linear model states that the knowledge debate must first 
10 Shrimp fisheries have experienced a decrease in their fishing grounds due to increases in mussel 
seed collectors and restricted areas. Recreational organisations are primarily concerned with the 
aesthetics of the open Wadden Sea landscape that is disturbed by mussel seed collectors that are in the 
Wadden Sea for several months.
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be resolved to end the regulation debate, see Figure 4.2. However, our mussel fishery 
case study showed a different relation between the knowledge and regulation debates. 
Mussel fishery regulation decisions were primarily based on government authority, with 
knowledge as a requirement for future decisions. The large EVA I, EVA II and PRODUS 
research projects were planned with the expectation that their results would prescribe 
future decisions on mussel fishery. But these technocratic expectations were hampered 
by knowledge ambiguity. Also the legal process at the Council of State did not end the 
knowledge debate on fishery effects. The ruling stated there was inadequate understand-
ing of effects, which initially increased the expectations research should solve the contro-
versy. However, research could not provide timely knowledge to address the incomplete 
knowledge on effects. Instead, the mussel fishermen politicised the issue even further 
by attacking what they called the ‘green lie’ of nature organisations and scientists that 
mussel fishery was harmful. It was the 2008 covenant between the conflicting parties, 
made under high political pressure from the government, which pacified the controversy 
and enforced a participatory approach. Thus, the pacification of the regulation debate 
circumvented knowledge controversies. Although the covenant partners still diverged in 
opinion, they set aside the knowledge ambiguity on fishery effects, see Figure 4.4, which 
made the knowledge debate on fishery effects irrelevant. We conclude that knowledge 
consensus was not a prerequisite for decision-making in the case of mussel fishery in the 
Wadden Sea. Instead, decisions were justified through the decisionist and participatory 
depoliticisation mechanism. In spite of  the high expectations that future decisions could 
be based on research results, a scientific consensus on fishery effects was not reached. 
Therefore, we criticise the assumption of the linear model of expertise that knowledge 
will resolve environmental controversies. Rather than scientific clarity putting an end to 
policy controversy, we found that a political closure of the regulation debate ended the 
knowledge debate.
4.6.2 High expectations of scientific knowledge explained   
Even though we criticise the linear model of expertise to describe the role of sci-
ence in policy-making processes, we conclude that the linear model of expertise 
is essential to understand the high expectations of research in the decision-mak-
ing process. Our distinction of a knowledge debate and a regulation debate, and 
the analytical concepts of knowledge uncertainty and depoliticisation mechanisms 
help explain the high expectations of scientific knowledge to resolve controversies. 
  First of all, knowledge uncertainties were predominantly perceived as incom-
plete knowledge, indicating that the uncertainty should be tackled with research. This 
assumption that more knowledge can resolve a knowledge debate is a key aspect of the 
linear model of expertise. It is widely found in our case study, even though our anal-
ysis of the mussel case showed that ambiguity on fishery effects was the main knowl-
edge uncertainty in the decision-making process. Instead of acknowledging ambigu-
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ity on fishery effects, research projects were conducted with the expectation that the 
results would provide clarity on effects. This expectation for research was enforced 
by the technocratic conditions in the European Habitat Directive. Also the Coun-
cil of State ruling in 2008, while not ending the knowledge debate on fishery effects, 
did enforce the perception of uncertainty as incomplete knowledge. Thus, even when 
the research projects did not result in consensus among science-based experts, knowl-
edge uncertainties were predominantly interpreted in terms of incomplete knowledge. 
           Secondly, we observed a firm belief in the linear model of expertise among 
the conflicting parties in the mussel fishery case. Both camps acknowledged scientif-
ic knowledge as condition to make legitimate arguments in the debate. Furthermore, 
there were high expectations that new research projects would support their posi-
tion in the controversy. Only during the mussel crisis in 2008, it became clear to the 
stakeholders involved that they are mutually dependent upon each other and that the 
strategic use of scientific arguments was no longer an option to strengthen their po-
sition. This crisis resulted in sufficient political pressure to depoliticise the regulation 
debate through a participatory approach that resulted in the mussel transition cov-
enant. This pacification of the regulation debate stopped the knowledge debate be-
cause the knowledge uncertainties on fishery effects addressed by different discourse 
coalitions became irrelevant to the policy-making process. Still, the belief in knowl-
edge for decision-making processes continued in the ‘learning by doing’ approach. 
  Thirdly, our analysis of the mussel fishery case showed that expectations in line 
with the linear model can reinforce depoliticisation through regulatory mechanisms. For 
example, the legitimacy of the participatory mechanism was enforced by a proposed tech-
nocratic approach for further decisions. The legitimacy of the covenant was based on the 
participation of the relevant stakeholders and on their proposal to base their decisions 
on an adaptive management approach of ‘learning by doing’. In a similar manner, the 
legitimacy of the governmental decisions in 1993 and 2004 were supported by research 
projects. This shows that the technocratic mechanism played an important role in the 
legitimation of decisions by indicating that future decisions will be based on new infor-
mation. Actors involved anticipated that new research results would resolve the knowl-
edge debate, and by consequence also soften the controversies in the regulation debate. 
Even though the actual research projects did not provide this clarity, the expectations for 
future research persisted.
These findings have a broader relevance, as it is likely that the three processes observed 
- a dominant perception of uncertainty as incomplete knowledge; the belief of actors in 
the controversy that more knowledge will support their position; and the expectation 
that future policy decisions can be based on research results - also occur in other nature 
conservation controversies. Simply criticizing the linear model of expertise will not have 
an impact on controversies of such kind. Instead, we propose, there should be better ac-
knowledgement of ambiguity and more reflection on the expected outcome of research 
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projects. Indicating there is a social problem and not just a technical problem can redirect 
the controversy to the regulation debate where political choices need to be made.  
4.6.3 The role of knowledge production in decision-making processes
The mussel fishery case study has shown that knowledge played an important role in the 
decision-making processes, although knowledge development did not lead to the end 
of the mussel controversy. Research projects played a strategic role by postponing fi-
nal decisions, a procedural role as an arena for interaction between different actors and 
an instrumental role by providing increased understanding of specific topics. All actors 
used research as a strategic tool. The nature organisations and mussel fishermen expected 
that additional knowledge would support their positions, resulting in research projects 
to find ‘better’ knowledge. Although additional knowledge could not reduce their ambi-
guity, research results increased the complexity of their scientific arguments. In addition, 
the Ministry used research in a strategic manner. Instead of supporting either fishery or 
nature interests, they made scientists jointly responsible for permit decisions support-
ed by the expert-driven European Habitat Directive regulations. Furthermore, research 
projects served a procedural role as an important meeting ground for the discourse co-
alitions. Especially in the EVA II project, those with different perspectives had to work 
together. In the covenant, workgroups based on the ‘learning by doing’ approach facil-
itated interactions between different perspectives. Finally, not all knowledge produced 
in the research projects was contested. For example, the raw data of mussel calculations 
Figure 4.4. Visualisation of the depoliticisation of the regulation debate in 2008 with the transition 
covenant that triggered closure of the knowledge debate.
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and bird counts were not disputed and were used instrumentally. These uncontested data 
formed the basis of the co-operation within the covenant setting. To conclude, knowl-
edge structured the decision-making process though it did not solve the controversy. 
Knowledge and research can play crucial strategic, procedural and instrumental roles in 
decision-making processes, but to resolve controversies that are characterised  by knowl-
edge ambiguity other depoliticisation processes are required. 
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The case of seagrass restoration in the Dutch 
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Abstract 
Marine areas have been heavily affected by human activities, resulting in current attempts 
to both conserve and restore nature. In decisions about nature restoration, ecological 
knowledge plays a crucial role and is closely linked to nature preferences and political 
views. In this study, the empirical case of seagrass (Zostera marina) restoration in the 
Dutch Wadden Sea (1989-2017) is analysed. The impact of storylines and uncertainty 
perceptions, together with socio-political context factors, on decisions concerning resto-
ration action and research are investigated. This case illustrates the difficulties of estab-
lishing seagrass fields and the dynamic process in which meaning is attributed to nature 
restoration. Two basic storylines – authenticity and the ecological function of ecosystem 
engineers – supported the restoration efforts. Three different episodes are distinguished 
based on different views of research in restoration efforts. The dominant perception of 
uncertainty was incomplete knowledge, and this perception resulted in research projects. 
Furthermore, the unpredictability of the success of restoration efforts and the ambiguity 
regarding the feasibility of restoration also influenced decisions. Two concepts – ecosys-
tem engineer and pilot project – facilitated collaboration among science-based experts, 
NGOs and governmental organizations.
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5.1 Introduction 
Over the past few decades, nature restoration – in addition to nature preservation – has 
become an important component of nature protection. At the moment, increasing efforts 
are being made to restore marine and coastal areas, which involve more ‘invisible’ nature 
compared with terrestrial areas. In the face of on-going degradation of marine areas and 
loss of biodiversity, attempts are being made to restore species or even to develop new 
natural habitats. While nature preservation mainly aims at safeguarding existing nature 
values, the aim of nature restoration is to change a particular natural environment, tran-
sitioning it towards an envisioned restored state (France 2016; Light and Higgs 1996). In 
many respects, this makes restoration an even more complex process than preservation. 
Ecological knowledge is crucial in guiding this process, and scientists play a key role 
in restoration activities, from initiating restoration projects to operationalizing restora-
tion techniques. The emergence of restoration ecology as a new subdiscipline of biology 
reflects this development (Choi 2007; Gross 2010; Higgs 2005; Light and Higgs 1996). 
Science alone, however, is not sufficient to cope with the challenges of restoration. As 
several authors have noted, restoration is intertwined with political choices and cultural 
preferences, which significantly influence the potential aims and outcomes of restoration 
projects (Baker and Eckerberg 2013; France 2016; Light and Higgs 1996). In addition, the 
complexities of restoration entail persistent uncertainties about interventions and their 
consequences to the ecosystem. In combination with the urgency of making ecological 
improvements and the limits of available funding, these uncertainties may lead to con-
flicts between taking immediate action versus gathering more knowledge through eco-
logical research (Allison 2007; McDonald-Madden et al. 2010).
  Restoration, in sum, is subject to a dynamic interplay of different factors: socio-po-
litical context, ecological knowledge, uncertainties, and action-research dilemmas. While 
several studies (Baker and Eckerberg 2013; France 2016; Gross 2010; Light and Higgs 1996) 
have identified and investigated these factors, few have analysed how they interact with one 
another in restoration projects. This article contributes to the literature on the social and 
political aspects of nature restoration (Baker and Eckerberg 2013; France 2016) and the 
literature on science-policy interactions in environmental issues (Wesselink et al. 2013). 
  We aim to shed more light on these issues by analysing efforts to restore seagrass 
in the Dutch Wadden Sea during the period 1989-2017. Globally, there is a long history 
of efforts to restore seagrass fields in response to a plant disease in the 1930s and declines 
caused by fishing and dredging (Cunha et al. 2012; Van Katwijk et al. 2016). Moreover, 
the global importance of seagrass fields is well recognised as they provide several func-
tions, ranging from fish breeding grounds to carbon sequestration (Duarte et al. 2013). 
Currently, there are large-scale restoration projects underway in the US, Australia, China 
and Europe (Van Katwijk et al. 2016). As we will demonstrate, the case of seagrass in the 
Dutch Wadden Sea is particularly interesting because it entails a relatively long-term and 
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continuing effort that is directed at a specific type of vegetation in a political and ecolog-
ical environment characterised by change and uncertainty. Adding to these dynamics is 
the fact that the restoration is situated in a marine environment where many vital pro-
cesses are hidden from view. Another noteworthy feature of this case is that the restora-
tion efforts have not, so far, been successful in establishing long-term seagrass fields.
  This article is structured as follows. First, we elaborate on our conceptual frame-
work, present conceptually refined research questions, and specify our methods. Then, 
we describe and analyse the Dutch case of seagrass restoration. Finally, we discuss note-
worthy outcomes and draw conclusions.
5.2 Storylines and dealing with uncertainties 
Decisions concerning nature restoration are based on why certain actions are required 
and to what extent there is sufficient and accurate knowledge to support taking these 
actions. Two key concepts we use to analyse the case of sea grass restoration and to ad-
dress these issues are storylines and uncertainties. Storylines are used to characterize how 
the restoration of seagrass is framed by the actors involved. In our use of storylines, we 
build on Wesselink et al. (2013, p.4), who state that “the multiple, dynamic interactions 
between processes of knowledge production and decision-making result in stories where 
both elements are intimately interwoven”. These storylines are narratives that give mean-
ing to specific phenomena, in our case seagrass restoration. Through such storylines, 
“ideas of ‘blame’ and ‘responsibility’ and ‘urgency’ and ‘responsible behavior’ are attribut-
ed” (Hajer 1995, p.65). In storylines, actors frame problems and their preferred solutions 
in a convincing way, using facts, interests and metaphors to persuade others (Stone 2012; 
Wesselink et al. 2013). For example, a storyline that is frequently found in restoration 
efforts runs as follows: historically, there existed a rich and well-functioning ecosystem, 
but vital components were lost and should be reintroduced to restore the full, authentic 
ecosystem (Baker and Eckerberg 2013). As we will show, this storyline is found in our 
seagrass case.
  To deepen our understanding of the science-policy debates, we analyse how ac-
tors address uncertainties. In doing so, we take a relational perspective on uncertainties, 
seeing them as constructed in particular settings (Shackley and Wynne 1996; Van den 
Hoek 2014). As Brugnach et al. (2008, p. 5) observe: “the definition of a problem and what 
is uncertain about it depends not only on scientific or expert understanding, but on the 
knowledge, views, and preferences of the decision-maker in relation to those of other actors 
with whom the decision-maker interacts to make sense of the situation” (Brugnach et al. 
2008, p.5). In this study, we examine perceptions of uncertainty among the actors involved 
in making decisions about nature restoration. Among all potential uncertainties, which 
ones are acknowledged and addressed as meaningful in the decision-making process? 
  Building on (Dewulf et al. 2009; Floor et al. 2016; Van den Hoek et al. 2014), we 
distinguish three types of perceptions of uncertainty: incomplete knowledge, unpredict-
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ability and ambiguity; see also Figure 5.1. Uncertainty can be characterised as incomplete 
knowledge when actors expect that certainty can be obtained by additional research. 
When uncertainty is perceived as unpredictability, the issue at stake is deemed to be un-
knowable because it is beyond the grasp of research given the present state of science 
and the complexity of the issue. We characterize uncertainty as ambiguity when actors 
present diverging knowledge claims rather than thinking that they do not know enough. 
Thus, ambiguity can be defined as “the existence of two or more equally plausible inter-
pretation possibilities” (Dewulf et al. 2005, p.116).
Figure 5.1. Schematisation of types of uncertainties based on Van den Hoek (2014).
Related to these different perceptions of uncertainty, there are different strategies of deal-
ing with uncertainties in decision-making processes. When uncertainty is posited as in-
complete knowledge, a strategy to address this uncertainty could be investing in more re-
search, for example through additional data collection, either alongside or before making 
a decision. It is worth noting that such a strategy is not, per se, effective: more research 
may also result in the acknowledgement of more uncertainties, as observed by Turn-
hout et al. (2008). When uncertainty is perceived as resulting from unpredictability, more 
research makes no sense, and the strategies of decision-makers instead revolve around 
accepting the unpredictability and acknowledging the risks implied. At the same time, 
risks can be reduced by anticipating several possible scenarios, diversifying the meas-
ures taken, and increasing society’s capacity to respond to different potential outcomes, 
for instance through adaptive management (Brugnach et al. 2008). The perception of 
uncertainty as ambiguity implies that there are multiple, conflicting interpretations of a 
situation, each with its own plausible knowledge base. In a cold conflict, actors distance 
themselves from each other and avoid confrontation; in a hot conflict, the issue is polit-
icised and actors explicitly criticise the opposite camp (Brugnach et al. 2008; Floor et al. 
2016).  Decision-makers’ strategies to address this uncertainty can range from supporting 
one of the camps against the other to pushing for consensus by stimulating the exchange 
of views and mutual learning. As we will demonstrate in our case study, these perceptions 
of uncertainty play a central role in disputes on research and intervention. 
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Building on these key concepts, we can organize the aims of our study into the following 
research questions. 
1. Which storylines about seagrass restoration emerge in the Wadden Sea case?
2. Which perceptions prevail regarding knowledge uncertainties?
3. What is the impact of storylines and uncertainties, together with socio-political con-
textual factors, on decisions concerning restoration action and research?
5.3 Methodological approach
We used an interpretative research approach (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006) because 
it is particularly suitable for our conceptual framework. As Wesselink et al. (2013, p.4) 
note, “a core tenet of interpretative approaches is the likelihood of multiple meanings, or 
interpretations, of problem definitions and policy texts, and also of the expertise relating 
to the policy issues”. Following this interpretative tradition, we analysed the different 
understandings that were expressed in our case study. 
First, we analysed the reasons for active restoration efforts. Second, we analysed the per-
ceived role of research in the restoration efforts. Third, we analysed how uncertainties 
were interpreted by the actors involved, both in the legitimation for restoration projects 
and in the interpretation of research and project results. Based on these three types of un-
derstanding in the restoration efforts, we distinguished the three episodes that structure 
our description of the case study: 1989-2005, 2006-2013, and 2014-2017. The starting 
point of 1989 is based on the governmental decision for active restoration of seagrass 
plants, even though it was decided that research was required first. A new episode started 
in 2006 when a non-governmental actor initiated restoration efforts, accompanied by a 
new storyline to support active restoration and a reduced role for scientific research. We 
distinguished a new episode that begins in 2014, when both the role of scientific research 
and the storyline to support the restoration efforts changed. The analysis ends in 2017, 
corresponding to the end of our data collection.
 We draw on data collected during the period 2014-2017. Data were gathered 
from research reports, governmental documents, project plans, organisations’ web-
sites, blogs and newspaper articles (using the LexisNexis database). Additionally, nine 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants from scientific insti-
tutes, nature organisations and the government, with the purpose of reconstructing the 
restoration efforts and perceptions of the actors involved. In autumn 2015, participatory 
observations were conducted during the restoration efforts at Uithuizen and Schiermon-
nikoog. In addition, we used insights on the role of science-policy interactions in the 
protection of the Dutch Wadden Sea, obtained from a larger research project of which 
this study is part11. 
11 In the period 2011-2017, observations, informal interactions during symposia and workshops, and 
twenty-eight semi-structured interviews with key actors in the Dutch Wadden Sea were conducted as 
part of a PhD project. For the full list of interviews, see Appendix I. 
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5.4 Seagrass restoration in the Dutch Wadden Sea
5.4.1 Background to the case
The Wadden Sea is a shallow estuarine sea, stretching from the Netherlands to Denmark. 
It is recognized as a World Heritage site and is protected under the European Bird and 
Habitat Directive and the European Water Framework Directive. Seagrass restoration 
efforts in the Dutch Wadden Sea have been targeted at eelgrass (Zostera marina)12. Before 
the 1930s, two plant types of eelgrass grew in the Wadden Sea: sublittoral and littoral eel-
grass. The sublittoral eelgrass plant type is always submerged and lives for multiple years; 
the littoral type grows in intertidal zones and is usually an annual plant that grows from 
seeds every year. In the 1930s, most sublittoral eelgrass fields in the Dutch Wadden Sea, 
covering an area of 65-150 km2, disappeared. Probable causes were the building of a dam 
(the ‘Afsluitdijk’) that increased turbidity and water dynamics and the ‘wasting’ disease that 
diminished seagrass fields all around the Atlantic area (De Jonge et al. 1997). The littoral 
eelgrass growing on the edges of the waterline also declined in the 1930s but partly recov-
ered. In the early 1970s, however, these fields were again declining, probably because of 
eutrophication and toxins (De Jonge et al. 1997; Den Hartog and Polderman 1975). Sim-
ilar processes took place in the German Wadden Sea, but most littoral eelgrass fields in 
that area recovered after improved water quality measures, whereas in the Dutch Wadden 
Sea, only a few small fields remained (Folmer 2015). The extent to which intense fishing 
has played a role in reducing habitat suitability for eelgrass in the Netherlands is disputed. 
  A first restoration effort took place in the 1950s, when scientists made some un-
successful attempts to restore eelgrass (Den Hartog and Polderman 1975). Initially, most 
attention came from ecological scientists. For a long time, the main policy goals for the 
Wadden Sea were economic. Indeed, until the 1960s, the option of embanking the Wad-
den Sea was seriously debated. The 1970s saw a radical shift in attitude, as the Wadden 
Sea became a major target of Dutch conservation efforts. The Wadden Society was estab-
lished as an NGO that lobbied and campaigned to protect the natural environment of the 
Wadden Sea. In a trilateral agreement among the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark, 
the Wadden Sea’s main function was declared to be ecological. Within this trilateral co-
operation, targets were formulated for the protection of nature. One such target was to 
improve the state of seagrass fields (Wanink and Van der Graaf 2008). Rijkswaterstaat 
(the Dutch implementation agency of the Ministry of Transport and Waterways) was re-
sponsible for the implementation of these targets and thus became interested in seagrass 
restoration.
12 In the Dutch Wadden Sea, there are two seagrass species: eelgrass (Zostera marina) and dwarf 
eelgrass (Zostera noltii). The main target species in restoration efforts is eelgrass (Zostera marina). In 
most policy procedures, the more commonly used term is seagrass.
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5.4.2 Episode 1: “Research first” (1989-2005)
In 1989, the Dutch national government decided that active re-introduction of seagrass 
was required. In a policy document of the Ministry of Transport and Waterways, the 
government stated “Reestablishment of seagrass fields is possible by a combination of 
emission- and management measurements. Active planting of seagrass on a small scale 
will enhance this process” (V&W 1989, p.205). Although the governmental decision pro-
posed active planting, this measurement was postponed because experts thought it was 
better to first research the possibilities and limitations of seagrass transplantation be-
fore starting a large-scale restoration project (Philippart et al. 1992; De Jonge & De Jong 
2002). Over the following 10 years, several research projects investigated why seagrass 
fields had disappeared and not recovered, whether the water quality had sufficiently im-
proved, whether there were suitable donor locations, and which aspects influenced the 
survival of plants in field experiments. These projects involved desk studies, the model-
ling of a habitat suitability map, and both lab and field experiments, including re-planting 
seagrass to analyse the conditions of its survival (for an overview of this research, see De 
Jonge et al. (1997) and Van Katwijk et al. (2002)). The research was commissioned by Ri-
jkswaterstaat, which was responsible for the implementation of the national policy goals. 
Based on the findings, Rijkswaterstaat concluded in its policy vision of 1997 that changed 
hydrodynamic conditions made the restoration of sublittoral seagrass impossible. Active 
restoration of littoral seagrass, however, had potential even when it was expected to be 
difficult (De Jonge et al. 1996; De Jonge et al. 1997). In 1998, after a workshop in which 
managers, fishery organisations and nature organisations were consulted, Rijkwaterstaat 
concluded that it was time for a restoration project focusing on littoral eelgrass (Van 
Katwijk et al. 2002). 
 
The restoration project of 2002-2005: Rijkswaterstaat commissioned two research insti-
tutes – RIKZ and Alterra – as well as the University of Nijmegen to execute the restora-
tion project, which had an experimental set-up. In this project, seagrass was conceptual-
ised as an ‘ecosystem engineer’ (in Dutch: ‘bio-bouwer’, literally bio-builder). Plants from 
the seagrass field in the Eems-Dollard area (Eastern Dutch Wadden Sea) were replanted 
at two locations, and plant growth was also promoted with seed depositions; see Figure 
5.2. The plants were placed in two different densities, and several techniques were applied 
to increase the stability and protection of the plants (Van Katwijk et al. 2002). Artificial 
mussel banks were also constructed but disappeared after several months. The project re-
ceived very little public attention, except from the Wadden Society, who criticised the in-
terventions and artefacts of the project as ‘gardening’ and maintained that human impact 
on the ecosystem should be minimal. Their critique did not affect the restoration project. 
As a restoration effort, the project largely failed: after a few years there were hardly any 
eelgrass plants. However, the project did improve scientific understanding of the factors 
playing a role in seagrass survival (Bos et al. 2007; Van Katwijk et al. 2009). 
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 After the project, Rijkswaterstaat organised an expert meeting to discuss sea-
grass restoration possibilities on the basis of the results of the restoration project of 2002-
2005 and a new habitat suitability map. The potential for more re-planting of eelgrass was 
perceived to be low: “More [restoration] activities are not perceived as very productive 
and have to be carefully assessed” (Doeglas et al. 2006, p.6). While Rijkwaterstaat took 
a negative stance towards further restoration efforts, some scientists showed more op-
timism. As one of them stated, “Still, it should be possible, because it has been there in 
the past”. Other scientists, however, interpreted the changed water quality and sediment 
dynamics of the Dutch Wadden Sea as unsuitable for new seagrass fields.
  Even though the actual restoration of seagrass was perceived as difficult, and 
no concrete decision to continue was made in 2006, the claim that seagrass should be 
restored began to gain momentum. One factor bolstering this claim was the advocacy of 
nature organisations who framed seagrass as ‘the missing pillar’ of the Wadden Sea eco-
system and suggested that the replanting of seagrass could be combined with reductions 
in fishing to minimalize disturbances (Leeuwarder Courant 2005; Van der Eijk 2005). 
Another influential factor was the qualification of the Wadden Sea as a natural water 
body under the European Water Framework Directive, with seagrass fields as a quality 
status indicator. Combined, these two factors kept seagrass on the agenda, even though 
there remained much scepticism among science-based experts regarding the potential of 
restoration.
Figure 5.2. Restoration effort locations (based on Van Katwijk et al. 2009).
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In this episode, there were two dominant storylines. One was that seagrass should be 
restored because it is a valuable and historically authentic component of the ecosystem. 
The other was that seagrass is important as a functional component of the ecosystem 
and that it positively interacts with other components. The latter was summarized in the 
concept of ‘ecosystem engineer’. Both storylines were combined in the idea of seagrass as 
a missing pillar, addressing both its authenticity and its ecological function, see Table 5.1. 
These storylines remained powerful in societal debates, even though the restoration out-
comes from the experiments were disappointing in the sense of establishing long-term 
seagrass fields.
 At the beginning of this episode, the uncertainties of seagrass restoration were 
prevailingly interpreted as incomplete knowledge that should be addressed with scientific 
research. This interpretation clearly coincided with the initiation of research projects. 
During the restoration experiments, some ambiguity emerged when the Wadden Sea So-
ciety criticised the extent of human intervention, but this hardly influenced the course of 
events. At the end of the period, however, a more powerful type of ambiguity arose when 
the findings from the research projects were interpreted in different ways: some scientists 
remained optimistic about the potential of restoration, but many became highly sceptical. 
  The balance between scientific research and restoration action in this period 
clearly tilted towards research, as shown in Table 5.1. The aim was to restore seagrass 
fields, and re-planting activities were undertaken, but only in a setting of scientific exper-
imentation. This fits in well with the storylines on the importance of seagrass and with 
the prevailing interpretation of incomplete knowledge. However, the experiments did not 
result in stable seagrass fields. This was perceived as disappointing by those expecting re-
stored seagrass fields, but from a scientific experiment perspective it was successful in the 
sense that knowledge was produced. Still, scientific experts were divided on the feasibility 
of seagrass restoration. 
5.4.3 Episode 2: “Let’s try” (2006-2013)
This episode entailed a new role for the Wadden Society in initiating restoration efforts. 
To increase their understanding of the Wadden system, staff members of the NGO were 
in contact with researchers. One NGO staff member became part of a working group on 
ecosystem engineers in the Wadden Sea. And at the aforementioned expert workshop of 
Rijkswaterstaat in 2006, she became inspired by a seagrass expert that presented a suc-
cessful US example of seagrass restoration– the so-called Buoy-method – where seeds 
were introduced in small bags (Pickerell et al. 2005). As this was regarded as a more 
‘natural’ approach to restoration, it better matched the Wadden Society’s view that the 
Wadden Sea should not become a ‘testing ground’ for scientists. To secure adequate fund-
ing for a restoration initiative, the Wadden Society articulated a link with climate change 
and positioned seagrass restoration as a ‘Climate Buffer’ project. ‘Climate Buffer’ was a 
government-funded climate change adaptation program in which several environmental 
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NGOs took part. In line with the conceptualisation of seagrass fields as ecosystem engi-
neers, seagrass was presented as a climate buffer that would help increase sedimentation 
and stabilise sediments as an adaptation to sea level rise. A seagrass restoration project 
was also perceived as a good educational opportunity regarding climate change and as a 
contribution to providing positive experiences in nature through the involvement of vol-
unteers (Wadden Society 2010). This positioning of seagrass as a climate buffer resulted 
in funding for a new restoration project. However, the Wadden Society needed co-fund-
ing, which Rijkswaterstaat could provide.
  After the restoration project of 2002-2005, Rijkswaterstaat had serious doubts 
about new restoration efforts. They also doubted the merits of seagrass as a climate buff-
er. However, they had another motive for restoration: the European Water Framework 
Directive obliged them to improve the status of seagrass in the Wadden Sea (Wanink 
and Van der Graaf 2008). This put pressure on Rijkswaterstaat to take action. Thus, even 
though the perception of seagrass as a climate buffer was irrelevant for them, Rijkswa-
terstaat worked together with the Wadden Society. While the two organisations had dif-
ferent reasons for participating in the restoration project, they shared the perception that 
seagrass fields should be restored based on both ecological and historical arguments and 
that the role of research should be limited. They agreed that the emphasis should be on 
the execution of the restoration effort. In the words of a respondent from the Wadden 
Society, “As the Wadden Society we made a clear choice: we want to try this. We choose 
to spend the money we have as much as possible on the actual execution, not too much 
on research”.
The restoration project of 2011-2015: Rijkswaterstaat was the project leader, the Wad-
den Society was responsible for communication and volunteers, the research institute 
Deltares lead the execution of the project, and the Fieldwork Company executed the 
practical work, supported by Wadden Society volunteers. The project was based on 
scientific advise that proposed to restore on a large scale and to spread risks in time 
and space to address fluctuations in growth conditions (Erftemeijer and Van Kat-
wijk 2010). This project was perceived as a pilot, with the aim of demonstrating that 
restoration was feasible. It included concrete restoration activities and monitoring. At 
the end of the summers of 2011 and 2012, volunteers collected seagrass seeds at Sylt 
(German Wadden Sea) and released them at three locations in the Dutch Wadden Sea 
using an adapted version of the US seed-bag method; see Figure 5.2. The actual res-
toration activities were not intensively measured, as the standard monitoring that was 
already in place was thought to suffice. In public media, the project was positioned as 
very successful. In 2011 and 2012, it was reported that seagrass plants were growing 
and that seagrass restoration was possible. As one newspaper article put it, “Seagrass 
is back!” (Trouw 2013). At the same time, however, experts involved in the project re-
ported their concerns about the low density of the seagrass fields (Van Duren and Van 
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Katwijk 2013). In our interviews, experts also voiced these concerns and criticised the 
poor learning outcomes of the project, particularly because of the limited monitoring. 
  In 2013, even before the monitoring period of the restoration project was fin-
ished, the Wadden Society decided they wanted to continue with the restoration efforts. 
This decision was motivated by a positive interpretation of the results until that point 
and also by the fact that in 2013, no new seeding could be conducted because of limited 
funding, while the original expert advice had been that seeds should be introduced for 3 
years. Thus, the Wadden Society began to pursue new project plans. 
In this episode, the two storylines of the previous period were extended and adapted. The 
storyline of seagrass as an ecosystem engineer laid the foundation for the new storyline 
of seagrass as a climate buffer. The storyline of seagrass as an essential component of the 
authentic system was legally reinforced by the European Water Framework Directive. 
While the storylines were different, they both implied a need for restoration, and in this 
way they could be combined within the restoration project. Also helpful was that the 
Wadden Society, which had criticised intervention in the Wadden Sea, became interested 
in ecosystem engineering and found a more ‘natural’ method of intervention in the use 
of seed bags. 
These different storylines also fed into debates about uncertainties. There was ambiguity 
among scientists, with some being optimistic about restoration but many being scepti-
cal. This ambiguity, however, did not result in controversy but rather remained a ‘cold 
conflict’. It was downplayed by a restoration project that emphasized action rather than 
acquisition of knowledge. In this way, the uncertainty of habitat suitability was de facto 
perceived as unpredictable by research, thus ignoring the general expert advice that more 
research was necessary and neglecting those scientists who contended that establishing 
seagrass fields in the Netherlands was not possible at that time. Furthermore, unpredicta-
bility was addressed in the project set-up by spreading risks in the selection of restoration 
locations.
  This development was strongly influenced by contextual factors. There was the 
legal pressure on Rijkswaterstaat from the European Water Framework Directive, and for 
the Wadden Society, there was the opportunity for government funding and volunteer 
engagement. Last but not least, there was a modest degree of temporary success, which 
the NGO could use for publicity. It is plausible that the two latter factors contributed 
significantly to the NGO’s decision to continue even before the results were fully clear.
5.4.4 Episode 3: “Better understanding is necessary” (2014-2017)
In making its new plans, the Wadden Society asked the Dutch Society for the Preser-
vation of Nature, (commonly called ‘Natuurmonumenten’ in Dutch) to become pro-
ject leader. For Rijkswaterstaat, a new seagrass restoration project did not fit with-
in the planning of the European Water Framework Directive. Moreover, the Wadden 
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Society thought that Natuurmonumenten would be more suitable for supporting a 
long-term nature management project. To obtain funding, the Wadden Society and 
Natuurmonumenten submitted a project plan for 2014 to the Wadden Fund (a fund 
established from gas mining revenues and aimed at improving the Wadden area). 
  With Natuurmonumenten as the new project leader, the character of the resto-
ration project changed. Although Natuurmonumenten was also involved in the national 
Climate Buffer project, they perceived seagrass primarily as a missing pillar of the ecosys-
tem. In another restoration project, Natuurmonumenten had worked together with sci-
entists, and this collaboration was continued in the seagrass project13. This also changed 
the focus of the project. Rather than demonstrating that restoration was possible, the 
project aimed at understanding the potential of restoration, not only for littoral seagrass 
but also for sublittoral seagrass (Natuurmonumenten 2013). As an involved researcher 
stated in an interview, “I am surprised all the attention goes to littoral seagrass ... from an 
ecological perspective the former sublittoral seagrass fields were much more important”. 
Now that scientists were more prominently involved, research became more central. For 
example, the monitoring of the plants was intensified to obtain more detailed data, and 
new experiments were introduced to learn which factors influenced the survival rate of 
seeds. Additionally, after the fungus Phytophtera was discovered in 2013 on seeds from 
Sylt, Germany, extra funding was obtained for research to study the influence of marine 
Phytophtera14 on the germinating power of seagrass seeds (Govers et al. 2016; Govers et 
al. 2017). 
The restoration projects of 2014 and 2015-2017: two new restoration projects, financial-
ly supported by the Wadden Fund. The restoration project of 2014 was a collaboration 
among Natuurmonumenten, the Wadden Society and the University of Nijmegen. This 
project sought to reinforce the seagrass fields that were established in 2011 and to start 
experimenting with sublittoral seagrass restoration (Natuurmonumenten 2013). How-
ever, before the execution of the new project, the perspective on the performance of the 
seagrass plants changed. Although there were substantial seagrass fields in 2013, expecta-
tions for 2014 were low. This triggered a discussion about whether the new project should 
introduce seeds at the same location as the previous project or at a slightly different spot. 
With the first option, the restoration effort would be strengthened; with the second op-
tion, it would be possible to measure the initial effect of the 2011-2015 project with higher 
scientific validity. The clear decline in seagrass field area in the spring of 2014 supported 
the decision to strengthen previous efforts. In September 2014, new seeds were collected 
in Sylt (Germany) and placed at the same locations as in previous years, as well as at an 
13 Natuurmonumenten was the project leader of Waddensleutels, a research project on mussel bank 
restoration.
14 The species Phytophthora gemini and Halophytophthora sp. Zostera (Govers et al. 2016).
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additional experimental location on Texel under sublittoral conditions; see Figure 5.2.
The restoration project of 2015-2017 was a project of Natuurmonumenten supported by 
the University of Nijmegen.  It aimed to continue  seagrass restoration efforts, but with 
more emphasis on scientific learning (Natuurmonumenten 2015). In 2015, seeds were 
again collected from Sylt by volunteers and introduced at the same locations; however, 
a slightly different method was used, with the aim of increasing plant density. At the 
Texel location, an experimental set-up was used to determine which factors influence 
seagrass growth and survival. In spring 2016, a new method was used, experimentally, to 
introduce seeds near the uninhabited island of Griend. Furthermore, seeds were stored 
in winter 2016 to improve seed efficiency in spring. In 2017, again a new seed deposition 
method was used. Seegrass seeds were directly injected into the seafloor at the location of 
Griend and Uithuizen (Govers 2017; Natuurmonumenten 2017). 
Although the restoration project overseen by Natuurmonumenten was scheduled to con-
tinue until 2017, the question of whether and how restoration efforts should continue was 
already being intensively discussed in 2015. This discussion was facilitated by PRW15, the 
nature restoration ‘Program towards a Rich Wadden Sea’ (in Dutch ‘Programma naar een 
Rijke Waddenzee’). Rijkswaterstaat, nature organisations and the funding organisation 
Waddenfonds shared the aim of restoring seagrass in the Wadden Sea, based on the per-
ception of seagrass as a missing pillar of the ecosystem. The established seagrass fields, 
however, were small and vulnerable, and experts remained divided on the issue of habitat 
suitability. In 2015, PRW contributed with a new habitat suitability map (Folmer 2015) 
and organised expert meetings with the aim of a long-term vision of seagrass in the Wad-
den Sea. The main conclusion of the expert meeting was that “new restoration efforts are 
only meaningful if they are accompanied by research on the failure and success factors” 
(Oterdoom 2015, p.3). This perception – that more research was required – also domi-
nated the advice that Rijkswaterstaat should uphold the EU Water Framework Directive 
goals and continue restoration efforts (Van Duren and Van Katwijk 2015). 
  In 2015, there were also some unexpected seagrass discoveries, reflecting the 
uncertainties and lack of knowledge with regard to the growth of seagrass in the Dutch 
Wadden Sea. In March 2015, researchers claimed the observation of a sublittoral seagrass 
plant that was thought to be completely extinct (Trouw 2015). And in October 2015, a 21 
ha eelgrass field was discovered (Leeuwarder Courant 2015; Van Duren and Van Katwijk 
2015). This spontaneous growth supported the viability of seagrass in the Dutch Wad-
den Sea, but the extent to which human actions could increase the area of seagrass fields 
remained unclear. The perception that more research was first required before deciding 
whether – and at how large a scale – seagrass restoration was obtainable was expressed in 
15 The nature restoration program PRW is a collaboration between nature organisations and the gov-
ernment to enhance nature restoration of the Wadden Sea.
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PRW’s vision of collective effort for seagrass restoration in the Wadden Sea (Korporaal 
et al. 2016). The seagrass restoration project (2015-2017) contributed to new insights on 
restoration methods. First of all, a treatment with copper sulphur was developed to treat 
Phytophthora contamination. Secondly, a new method to store seagrass seeds in winter. 
Thirdly, new methods were developed to directly inject seagrass seeds in the seafloor 
as alternative for the inefficient seed-bag method. These insights are used in the new 
research project on Griend (Natuurmonumenten 2017). 
In this episode, the dominant storyline shifted back to seagrass as a ‘missing pillar,’ but 
with a stronger emphasis on authenticity. This focus on authenticity was also expressed 
in the renewed attention to sublittoral seagrass, emphasizing the historical dominance 
of this type and the perception that this plant type would have a larger ecosystem engi-
neering effect.
   The ambiguity regarding habitat suitability and the feasibility of seagrass resto-
ration continued in this period but did not lead to conflicts. Instead, the uncertainty of 
the habitat suitability for seagrass - including sublittoral seagrass - was again defined as 
incomplete knowledge that needed to be addressed with experiments. New and unfore-
seen discoveries added to the perception that there might be undiscovered factors that 
influenced the success of littoral and sublittoral seagrass. In a sense, these discoveries 
could also be interpreted as evidencing the unpredictability of seagrass restoration, but 
this would go against the aims of both the NGOs and the scientists involved in the pro-
jects.
  Contextual factors at play in this period were the shift to Natuurmonumenten 
as the main director and the termination of Climate Buffer funding. Both contributed 
to a revitalization of the missing pillar storyline. The increased involvement of scientists 
in the restoration projects reinvigorated the perception of uncertainties as incomplete 
knowledge. 
5.5 Discussion
The description and analysis of the three episodes is summarized in Table 5.1, which 
presents the most important storylines, and in Table 5.2, which maps the debates on 
uncertainty. In this section, we will discuss some remarkable outcomes of our analysis. 
5.5.1 Overcoming conflicts between storylines and research-action dilemmas
A salient feature across all three episodes is that despite divergent storylines and re-
search-action dilemmas, collaboration has prevailed among science-based experts, 
NGOs and governmental organizations. In bringing together the different storylines, 
the conceptualization of seagrass as an ecosystem engineer has been very influential. 
Furthermore, the framing of the 2011-2015 restoration project as a pilot project helped 
to overcome differences. Both concepts – seagrass as ecosystem engineer and the pilot 
project – can be interpreted as boundary objects. A boundary object is “plastic enough 
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to adapt the local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet 
robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites” (Star and Griesemer 1989, 
p.393). The interpretative flexibility of a boundary objects makes it possible for people 
from different social worlds, with different understandings of the world, to work together 
(Floor et al. 2016; Star 2010; Star and Griesemer 1989). In our case study, it is plausible 
that the concept of an ecosystem engineer and the concept of a pilot project have per-
formed in this way.
  The scientific concept of ecosystem engineer defines the seagrass plant by its 
ecosystem function: “physical ecosystem engineers are organisms that directly or in-
directly control the availability of resources to other organisms by causing physical 
state changes in biotic or abiotic materials” (Jones et al. 1997, p.1947). Nature restora-
tion within the Wadden Sea has been focused on restoring ecosystem engineers, es-
pecially seagrass fields and mussel banks, based on the assumption that this will sup-
port other species as well (Van Duren et al. 2009). This is the basis for the storyline 
of seagrass as a missing pillar that is bringing together scientists, nature organizations 
and the government. Moreover, the storyline of seagrass as climate buffer was based 
on the conceptualization of seagrass as ecosystem engineer, inspired by the involve-
ment of the Wadden Society in the workgroup on ecosystem engineers in the Wad-
den Sea. Although not everybody agreed with this interpretation, the different parties 
could work together through the shared concept of an ecosystem engineer. The shared 
perception of seagrass as an ecosystem engineer was so strong that even a sceptical ex-
pert hoped restoration efforts would succeed, saying “I would like to be proven wrong”. 
  Another concept that helped to overcome dilemmas was the concept of the pilot 
project, thanks to this concept’s interpretative flexibility. A pilot can be seen not only as 
a practical measure but also as a scientific experiment, and thus it can mitigate research 
dilemmas. The framing of the 2011-2015 project as a pilot project facilitated coopera-
tion. The Wadden Society could see the pilot project of seagrass restoration as a concrete 
measure to support climate adaptation, and Rijkswaterstaat could see it as a measure to 
fulfil their obligations under the European Water Framework Directive. However, for 
scientists, this project was perceived as an experiment. As one respondent said about the 
activities in retrospect: “they are experiments rather than restoration measures, because if 
you look at them frankly, you simply cannot see them like that - but they provide essential 
knowledge about ecosystem management”. By defining the project as a pilot, both soci-
etal and scientific actors could see their views expressed in the restoration efforts. The 
latter could regard the pilot as a first step in an experiment that required follow-up with 
more detailed monitoring.
   The co-operation facilitated by the concepts of ecosystem engineer and pilot 
projects supported the suppression of knowledge ambiguity regarding the feasibility of 
restoration. All actors could perceive seagrass as a necessary ecosystem engineer in the 
Wadden Sea and could perceive restoration projects as pilots. These overlapping percep-
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tions reduced the need to oppose restoration projects based on a sceptical view of the 
feasibility of seagrass restoration.   
5.5.2 Scientification of nature restoration
Our case study showed a strong dominance of the scientific perception of nature resto-
ration, with a focus on increasing ecological understanding. This fits within the trend 
of the scientification of nature restoration, in which scientists and scientific knowledge 
dominate restoration efforts. However, the differences between the three episodes de-
scribed have also showed that this scientific hegemony can be challenged based on the 
constellation of actors initiating restoration. 
 In contrast to the science-driven, depoliticised view of nature restoration, nature 
restoration can also be perceived as driven by political decisions, which may be based 
on public debates about why and how active nature restoration should take place (Pelliz-
zoni 2011). Non-scientific actors can be substantially involved in restoration efforts, as 
described by Higgs when he writes about the “community-engaged” road of restoration 
(Higgs, 2005, p.161). The trend of scientification is enhanced by the discipline of resto-
ration ecology, which has grown considerably in the past decades, contributing to a bet-
ter understanding of ecological processes (Choi 2007). However, also within restoration 
ecology, the appropriate role of scientists in nature restoration choices is disputed in view 
of the value-laden aspects of nature restoration and the authority of scientists (Davis and 
Slobodkin 2004; Higgs 2005; Winterhalder et al. 2004). The practice of experimental set-
ups with scientific rigor has been criticised as potentially overshadowing the multiplicity 
of restoration practices (Higgs 2005).
 Our case study showed that the scientification of nature restoration is an active 
process shaped by the science and policy actors involved. Scientists have a dominant 
and powerful position, but to act with authority, they need to be acknowledged by the 
other actors involved. In the first episode, the emphasis was on research, with the goal 
of reducing incomplete knowledge. This perspective was supported by the participating 
civil servants of Rijkswaterstaat, who, at that moment, were predominantly ecological 
experts. An important change took place with regard to the increased role of nature or-
ganisations in the restoration projects. In the second episode, the Wadden Society re-
duced the emphasis on research and increased the emphasis on public communication 
and the involvement of volunteers, leading to a pilot project with only limited monitor-
ing. In the third episode, Natuurmonumenten reinforced the scientific perception that 
incomplete knowledge must be addressed with research. These differences show that an 
increased role of nature organisations does not necessarily lead to de-scientification and 
more community-engagement, as the reinforcement of research by Natuurmonumenten 
has shown.
  This scientification of nature restoration limits expressions of uncertainty to fo-
cus on the incomplete state of knowledge and the need to do more research. Nonetheless, 
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political choices are still made. To reveal these political aspects, the analytical concept of 
ambiguity has been very useful, even when – in practice – ambiguity can be ignored and 
normative conflicts can remain ‘cold’. Increased scientification will not eliminate the po-
litical questions of “why, whether and how” with regard to nature restoration. Consistent 
with the view that “politics is not an unfortunate obstacle that complicates or distorts 
clear-headed, rational decision-making but a valuable and creative process” (Wesselink 
et al. 2013, p.3), we recommend explicitly acknowledging these political aspects of nature 
restoration.
5.6 Conclusions
In presenting our conclusions, we respond to our research questions regarding storylines, 
perceptions of knowledge uncertainty, and the influence of both on decisions concerning 
restoration actions and research.
5.6.1 Storylines supporting seagrass restoration
Two basic storylines have guided the argumentation for active seagrass restoration in the 
Dutch Wadden Sea: seagrass as historically missing and seagrass as ecosystem engineer 
(Table 5.1). These storylines resonate with the concepts of historical fidelity and ecolog-
ical functions (Baker and Eckerberg 2013). These basic storylines were reshaped to sup-
port seagrass restoration projects in the Dutch Wadden Sea. In the first episode (1989-
2006), the basic storylines were combined into the storyline of seagrass as a missing pillar. 
This notion expressed both the historical connotation and the ecological function of sea-
grass plants in terms of creating a habitat for other species. In the second episode (2006-
2013), the new storyline of seagrass as Climate Buffer supported the restoration project, 
based on the impact seagrass – as an ecosystem engineer – can have on sedimentation. In 
parallel, the storyline of seagrass as obligation emerged, which reflected the requirement 
of the European Water Framework Directive to establish a good status of seagrass fields 
based on the Wadden Sea’s historical reference situation. This storyline was essential to 
Rijkswaterstaat’s support for restoration. In the third episode (2014-2017), the storyline 
of seagrass as a missing pillar was again dominant in argumentation for the restoration 
projects; it served as a common denominator for nature organisations, government and 
researchers.
5.6.2 Perceptions of knowledge uncertainty 
The main uncertainty perception in decisions about seagrass restoration and research in 
the Dutch Wadden Sea has been that of incomplete knowledge, consistent with the dom-
inant role of scientific expertise (Table 5.2). This perception of incomplete knowledge has 
triggered several research projects, experiments and models. In addition, the perception 
of unpredictability played a role in the episode of 2006-2013, which was characterised as 
“Let’s try”. This perception was reflected in the decision to take the risk of allocating most 
of the money to the execution of restoration rather than to additional research. Further-
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more, ambiguity regarding the current habitat suitability of littoral and sublittoral sea-
grass fields triggered debates on whether to continue active seagrass restoration efforts. 
When efforts to establish long-term seagrass recovery failed again and again, some of 
the actors involved adhered to the position that restoration was possible but knowledge 
about the vital growth factors was still insufficient, while other actors concluded that, 
apparently, the current Dutch Wadden Sea situation had changed too much to support 
seagrass fields. While this ambiguity was confirmed in the interviews, it did not lead to 
open disputes and was not perceived as a salient problem. In this sense, the ambiguity is 
an analytical observation rather than an actual debate. The differences in views could be 
ignored because there were limited incentives for a hot conflict: the projects were seen as 
relatively small, with no impact on current economic activities, and both the NGOs and 
the scientists involved had no interest in halting the restoration efforts.  
5.6.3 Restoration action-research dilemma
During the period 1989-2017, several decisions were made concerning seagrass restora-
tion action and research. First, there was the decision in 1989 to conduct research before 
implementing active restoration; this was followed by an experimental research project 
in 2002, a pilot project in 2011 with limited monitoring, and new restoration projects 
in 2014 and 2015 with a more experimental set-up and additional research. The per-
ception of incomplete knowledge and the involvement of science-based experts led to 
the decisions to pursue more research. Only in the second episode (2006-2013) were 
there challenges to the dominant perception of incomplete knowledge and the need for 
research. Instead, restoration was perceived as a risk worth taking in a largely unpredict-
able situation. The Wadden Society and Rijkswaterstaat decided that most effort should 
go into the actual restoration activities. The return, in 2014, to a stronger research fo-
cus can be explained by the involvement of the new actor Natuurmonumenten, which 
had  a good working experience with scientists on nature restoration. Furthermore, the 
decision to pursue more research was also influenced by the observation that restora-
tion activities had not resulted in new stable seagrass fields. The lack of success in cre-
ating stable seagrass fields was interpreted differently, from arguments that knowledge 
of growth factors was incomplete to knowledge claims that questioned the feasibility of 
seagrass restoration in the Wadden Sea. This ambiguity, however, did not prevent restora-
tion actions from continuing. The storylines in favour of active seagrass restoration were 
very persuasive, and the need to continue restoration efforts outweighed the potential 
failure of these efforts. Furthermore, the boundary objects (seagrass as ecosystem engi-
neer, as well as pilot projects) helped to overcome these differences. In this way, actors 
with different storylines regarding seagrass restoration – and different perceptions of the 
feasibility of restoration – could support the continued efforts of seagrass restoration. 
  In sum, our analysis of restoration action and research in the Wadden Sea 
demonstrates the relational nature of perceptions and debates on uncertainties, as well 
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as the interplay of different factors in decisions on restoration. Our analysis makes clear 
that knowledge uncertainties are not just connected to scientific expertise about a set of 
objects. Uncertainty perceptions are a result of interactions among different actors, in 
this case nature organisations, government and scientists. These interactions influence 
which uncertainty perceptions – incomplete knowledge, unpredictability or ambiguity 
– prevail. How these uncertainties play out in decisions on action and research is also 
influenced by dominant restoration storylines and socio-political context factors, such as 
legal regulations and funding opportunities. 
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6.1 Brief recapitulation
This thesis examined knowledge uncertainties in decision-making processes about the 
use and restoration of the Dutch Wadden Sea. Knowledge uncertainties are an important 
challenge for coastal nature conservation governance. To date, knowledge plays a key 
role in the legitimisation of decisions that impact nature protection. However, the deci-
sion-making process is complicated when the certainty of the knowledge base is ques-
tioned and knowledge claims are contested. Still, the dominant role of scientific expertise 
in coastal nature conservation governance is not challenged. This situation is described 
as the paradox of the simultaneous scientification of politics and the politicisation of 
science. Scientification of politics indicates the increased role of science-based expertise 
in decision-making processes, whereas politicisation of science indicates the contestation 
of scientific knowledge in public debates. Although knowledge claims are questioned in 
decision-making processes, the claim that decisions should be based on scientific knowl-
edge is not. To explain this paradox and understand the role of knowledge uncertain-
ties in decision-making, an in-depth analysis of decision-making processes regarding 
the use and restoration of the Dutch Wadden Sea is presented in this PhD thesis. The 
Dutch Wadden Sea is a very dynamic ecosystem; it is used by a diverse group of stake-
holders and analysed by different research fields. These elements have contributed to 
the prominent role of knowledge uncertainties in the governance processes of the Dutch 
Wadden Sea. To understand the role of uncertainties, an analytical distinction is made 
among three types of knowledge uncertainties: incomplete knowledge, unpredictability 
and ambiguity. Incomplete knowledge refers to expressions of knowledge imperfections; 
unpredictability refers to what is seen as unknowable; and ambiguity refers to situations 
of diverging knowledge claims. This PhD thesis aims to explain the role of knowledge 
uncertainties in Dutch Wadden Sea governance and to contribute to more general theo-
retical insights on knowledge uncertainties in decision-making processes. 
Accordingly, three research questions were formulated:  
1. How to understand science-policy interactions in the governance of Dutch Wadden Sea 
nature?
2. How do knowledge uncertainties play a role in decision-making about the use and the 
restoration of Dutch Wadden Sea nature? 
3. What does this analysis of knowledge uncertainties in decision-making processes in the 
Dutch Wadden Sea reveal that can explain the role of science-based expertise in nature 
conservation governance?
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In chapter 2, a review of science-policy interactions in the Dutch Wadden Sea provided 
initial insight into the diverse understandings of science-policy interactions. The empir-
ical case studies in chapters 3-5 provided insights into science-policy interactions in dif-
ferent settings and insights into the role of knowledge uncertainties in decision-making 
processes. In this final chapter, those insights on knowledge uncertainties are combined 
to explain the dominance of science-based expertise in nature conservation governance. 
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I synthesize the findings of my empirical case 
studies and answer my research questions. Then, I reflect on the politics of knowledge 
uncertainties and the contribution of this PhD thesis.
6.2 Knowledge uncertainties in three empirical case studies
In this section, I synthesize my findings on knowledge uncertainties in the cases of a 
planned powerboat race (chapter 3), mussel fishery (chapter 3 and 4) and seagrass res-
toration (chapter 5) in the Dutch Wadden Sea. In Table 6.1, the characteristics of these 
cases are summarized.
6.2.1 The powerboat race controversy (2010-2011)
The governance process on the powerboat race started in 2010, when a controversial plan 
was presented for hosting the World Championship powerboat race in August 2011 near 
the Wadden Sea harbour of Den Helder. In the powerboat race controversy, the main 
role of knowledge uncertainties was to question whether the decision of ‘no significant 
effect’ could be made. As described in more detail in chapter 3, in the case of the planned 
powerboat race, there were two decision-making processes: the permit process and the 
juridical process. In both processes, the validity of the assessment of no significant ef-
fect was questioned by expressing knowledge uncertainties. In the permit process, the 
province of Noord-Holland stressed that the first version of the appropriate assessment 
 Powerboat case Mussel fishery case Seagrass 
restoration case 
 
Activity A planned World 
Championship 
powerboat race in 
August 2011 at Den 
Helder.  
Mussel seed fishery and 
mussel cultivation in the 
Dutch Wadden Sea 
(1990-2016). 
Research and 
restoration efforts to 
restore seagrass fields 
in the Dutch Wadden 
Sea (1989-2017). 
 
Main knowledge 
uncertainty issue 
Disturbance and noise 
from the powerboat 
race that could affect 
the nature of the 
Wadden Sea. 
Fishery effects on the 
Wadden Sea’s nature, 
predominantly the food 
availability of birds. 
Feasibility of 
seagrass restoration 
in relation to 
continuation of 
restoration activities. 
Table 6.1. Characteristics of the three case studies.
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contained too much incomplete knowledge, more data was required to support its conclu-
sion. Also, the province expressed the ambiguity of assessing very small effects. Based on 
a precautionary approach, the decision on the permit was postponed until an improved 
assessment was made. The second version of the appropriate assessment report included 
more data and was judged by the province as sufficient to grant the permit in July 2011. 
A monitoring obligation was included in the permit to address the remaining knowl-
edge uncertainties in an adaptive way. In response to this permit, nature organisations 
protested at the Council of State (‘Raad van State’ in Dutch). In this juridical process, the 
nature organisations claimed there was too much uncertainty to make the decision of no 
significant effect. Their main concern was the incomplete knowledge on the effects of un-
derwater noise. Furthermore, they expressed ambiguity through their different interpre-
tations of the role of very small negative effects and in their judgement that the reference 
situation of 45,000 ship movements per year showed the risk of cumulative effects instead 
of indicating a negligible extra effect. The juridical process narrowed valid expressions 
of knowledge uncertainty to expressions of incomplete knowledge. The points addressed 
by the nature organisations were insufficient to make the Council of State see scientific 
doubt in the assessment of no significant effect. Instead, the Council of State judge con-
cluded that the permit was valid. However, for practical reasons, the race was cancelled. 
  In the powerboat race controversy, knowledge uncertainties were used by ac-
tors to support their position regarding the significant effect assessment. The province 
expressed its initial critical position towards the assessment through knowledge uncer-
tainties, which led to more data gathering supporting the assessment. The nature organ-
isations expressed knowledge uncertainties as a strategic move to oppose the permit for 
the powerboat race. These expressions of knowledge uncertainty by the province and 
nature organisations did not directly change the decisions, but they certainly prolonged 
the decision-making process. 
6.2.2 The mussel fishery controversy (1990-2016) 
The controversy on mussel fishery started in 1990 as a reaction to high bird mortalities. 
The influence of mussel seed fishery and mussel cultivation on bird food availability also 
became a topic of debate among science-based experts. In the mussel fishery controversy, 
expressions of knowledge uncertainties triggered knowledge debates around the questions 
of whether there was sufficient and correct knowledge to support mussel fishery regula-
tions. Four different periods can be distinguished in which knowledge uncertainties on 
effect claims played different roles. In the first period (1990-1993), the main knowledge 
uncertainty was ambiguity about the cause of the high bird mortality of eider ducks. In 
the debate, nature organisations blamed harmful fishery, whereas fishermen emphasized 
natural fluctuations. The incomplete knowledge on the effects of fishery contributed to 
the set-up of evaluation research alongside the decision to partly close areas to fishery. 
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  In the second period (1993-2004), the research projects EVA I and II did not 
reduce uncertainty. Instead, the different interpretations of research results amplified the 
ambiguity about fishery effects. The fishery coalition emphasized the positive effects of 
mussel cultivation on the average food available for birds, whereas the nature coalition 
emphasized the potential harmful contribution of fishery in years with low numbers of 
juvenile mussels. Furthermore, a new gap in the knowledge on effects was acknowledged: 
incomplete knowledge on sublittoral effects. Not only effects on birds but also effects 
on other natural values needed to be addressed in the new PRODUS research project. 
  In the third period (2004-2008), knowledge uncertainties played a crucial role in 
the juridical processes at the Court of State. From 2005 onward, an appropriate assessment 
of significant effect was required to obtain mussel seed fishery permits under the nature 
legislation law. Furthermore, the European litigation on cockle fishery had emphasized 
that there should be ‘no reasonable scientific doubt’. This created a legal opportunity for 
nature organisations to claim, based on the precautionary principle, that there was too 
much incomplete knowledge to make the assessment of no significant effect. However, the 
Dutch ministry stated there was sufficient knowledge to make such an assessment. The 
government acknowledged there was incomplete knowledge on sublittoral effects; how-
ever, this was addressed through an adaptive management approach with the PRODUS 
research project. In this way, the ambiguity about fishery effects was transformed into a 
legal debate on the assessment of significant effect. This conflict was resolved with the 
court ruling in 2008 stating that the permit was invalid based on the judgement that there 
was too much scientific uncertainty. The initial expectation of the government that the 
PRODUS research project could resolve the issue of incomplete knowledge appeared un-
tenable. Instead, efforts were directed towards a political solution, resulting in a covenant. 
  In the last analysed period (2008-2016), the Mussel transition covenant depo-
liticised the conflict, and the contested knowledge claims on fishery effects lost their 
relevance. Instead, an adaptive management approach was adopted by the covenant 
partners to address incomplete knowledge and unpredictability in the transition pro-
cess. This resulted, for example, in shared fact finding on the issue of invasive species. 
  In the mussel fishery case, there were high expectations that research results 
could be used for regulation decisions. At the same time, the expectation was that the 
EVA II process would bring stakeholders closer together. However, the differences were 
persistent, and ambiguity about research results limited the role of research in making 
legitimate decisions. In the legal process, knowledge uncertainties were used strategically 
by nature organisations to stop the permit. As the scientific doubt was convincing for 
the Court of State, knowledge uncertainty played a crucial role in the decision-making 
process. After the resulting mussel crisis was resolved with the agreement of a covenant, 
incomplete knowledge triggered research that informed decisions within that covenant.  
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6.2.3 Seagrass restoration (1989-2017)
Seagrass restoration as a governance process started in 1989 with the governmental de-
cision that there should be active restoration of seagrass plants. In the seagrass resto-
ration process, expressions of knowledge uncertainties mainly correlated with the role 
that research should play in restoration projects. Furthermore, knowledge uncertainties 
played a role in the debates over the continuation of restoration efforts. In the govern-
ance process of seagrass restoration, three episodes can be distinguished in which dif-
ferent knowledge uncertainties played a role. In the first episode (1989-2005), incom-
plete knowledge regarding seagrass plant growth conditions was addressed with several 
research projects, and the restoration project also included experiments on plant growth 
conditions. However, the results of this restoration project were interpreted differently 
by science-based experts, leading to ambiguity between optimistic and sceptical views 
about the possibility of restoration. This ambiguity about the habitat feasibility of the 
Wadden Sea for new seagrass fields was, however, ignored in the second episode (2006-
2013). Instead, restoration impacts were perceived as unpredictable, and a pilot project 
of seagrass restoration was initiated. To address some of the unpredictable factors, risk 
reduction measures were taken within the restoration project in terms of the spread of 
restoration locations. In the last episode (2014-2017), incomplete knowledge again be-
came the dominant perception of uncertainty, to be addressed with research. Both hab-
itat suitability and the method of restoration were perceived as knowledge challenges 
that should be addressed with experimental set-ups that could enable learning processes. 
  In the seagrass case, incomplete knowledge expressions led to several research 
projects. The shared knowledge uncertainty perceptions of unpredictable restoration 
success enabled the Wadden Society and Rijkswaterstaat to work together even though 
they had different reasons to support restoration activities. Strategically ignoring the am-
biguity of habitat suitability excluded critical scientists from the restoration projects. 
6.3 Science-policy interactions in the Dutch Wadden Sea
In this section, I will answer my first research question: How to understand science-policy 
interactions in the Dutch Wadden Sea?
As indicated in the introduction, in this PhD thesis, science-policy interactions are per-
ceived as interactions between knowledge producers and knowledge users in the context 
of policy-making. The study of science-policy interactions indicates a focus on the rela-
tion between knowledge processes and decision-making processes, including knowledge 
production, exchange, transformation and use. To understand the science-policy interac-
tions in the Dutch Wadden Sea, the starting point for this PhD thesis was a review of stud-
ies on science-policy interactions within the cockle fishery and gas exploitation contro-
versies (chapter 2). This review revealed that there are many analytical tools used to study 
science-policy interactions, ranging from scientific information as a resource for stake-
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holders to science-policy typologies based on the policy problem. Furthermore, differ-
ent ontological positions on science correlate to different science-policy understandings. 
The reviewed studies on the Dutch Wadden Sea showed that the policy setting of who is 
involved – and the types of responsibilities they have – structure science-policy interac-
tions. For example, when scientific knowledge is an established condition for legitimate 
policy argumentation, scientific knowledge itself can become the topic of debate. Further-
more, scientists can willingly and unwillingly become part of coalitions in a controversy. 
  In my empirical studies of science-policy interactions (chapter 3-5), I started from 
a critical constructivist position within an interpretative approach, and I used the analyti-
cal tools of discourse coalitions, storylines and boundary objects to study science-policy 
interactions. The interactions on the planned powerboat race (chapter 3) showed a clear 
demarcation between the science-based experts and the other actors. The ecological ex-
pert from IMARES and the contra-experts from the ecological company were involved 
through contract research. In this way, their role as science-based experts was formalised, 
and a demarcation was made between knowledge producers and knowledge users. In con-
trast, the interactions around the regulations of mussel fishery (chapters 3 and 4) did not 
show such a clear demarcation. During the long time period of the conflict, mussel fisher-
men, governmental civil servants, and some science-based experts moved closer together 
within the fishery coalition. Also, a trusted relationship between nature organisations 
and other science-based experts developed within the nature coalition. Here, the crucial 
demarcation was within the science domain, between science-based experts from differ-
ent research institutes and universities. Even after the mussel covenant was signed and 
the knowledge debate on effects lost its relevance for the regulation of mussel fishery, the 
more than 15 years of contested expertise did not suddenly disappear. Experts and their 
research institutes that had been involved as counter-experts were still seen as connected 
to either the fishery or nature position. Even young scientists were positioned based on 
their work affiliation, described by a young researcher as “being marked on the forehead 
before you say anything”. Still, although there were important differences between the 
perspectives of the two discourse coalitions, interactions took place in meetings, in sym-
posia and through the permit procedures. Another aspect of science-policy interactions 
was articulated in the seagrass restoration process (chapter 5). This case highlighted the 
dynamic of changing roles for science-based experts over time. The science-policy in-
teractions started as close connections between the governmental actor Rijkswaterstaat 
and researchers, but then transformed into a more distant relation with science-based 
experts as only advisors for the restoration project, and finally returned to a close work-
ing relation between researchers and the nature organisation Natuurmonumenten in the 
recent restoration projects. Coalitions between scientists and other actors were not stable, 
and new collaborations were based on shared storylines regarding seagrass restoration. 
  When contrasting the findings with the conceptual models of science-policy 
interactions that were presented in the introduction, I conclude that all three models 
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are relevant for understanding the science-policy interactions in the Dutch Wadden Sea. 
These three science-policy models are summarized in Figure 6.1. The model of Two-Com-
munities emphasizes the differences between the science and policy worlds. The model 
of Intertwinement emphasizes the interconnection between knowledge production and 
knowledge use and the socially constructed division between the science and policy do-
mains. The model of Knowledge Coalitions emphasizes that people see the world in dif-
ferent ways and that coalitions consisting of both knowledge producers and users can be 
distinguished as having their own way of knowing. 
Figure 6.1. Visualisation of three conceptual models of science-policy interactions, 
based on Janssen (2015).
These three conceptual models support the understanding of science-policy interactions 
in the Dutch Wadden Sea. First of all, an important aspect of decisions about the Wadden 
Sea is the high expectation that scientific knowledge is required for decision-making. Par-
ticularly, the study of the mussel fishery controversy (chapter 4) showed a linear expecta-
tion that scientific knowledge would solve regulation conflicts. This perception is based on 
the Two-Communities model of science-policy interactions. Also, the current nature leg-
islation for the Dutch Wadden Sea, which emphasizes there should be no scientific doubt 
on the assessment of significant effect, is based on a separation between knowledge pro-
duction and use in decision-making. Furthermore, the Two-Communities model can help 
explain the role of contracted experts in the powerboat controversy. Although the province 
of Noord-Holland and the nature organisation also had ecological expertise, there was the 
perception that external organisations were required to grant the authority of expertise. 
  Secondly, I want to highlight the intertwined character of the science-poli-
cy domains within the main actor groups of nature organisations, economic entrepre-
neurs, the government, and researchers that I observed in my three case studies. First 
of all, many employees of nature organisations have an ecological science background. 
Moreover, there are important personal relations between people from nature organi-
sations and science-based experts connected to research institutes. Secondly, economic 
entrepreneurs can also have close connections with research. For example, the mussel 
production organisation was not only an important funder of research on production 
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efficiency and effect studies, but mussel fishermen have also facilitated measurements 
with their ships and contributed to the advice boards of research projects. Thirdly, Min-
istries used to have their own internal science-based expert units. For example, in the 
1990s, the ‘water unit’ of the implementation agency Rijkswaterstaat consisted of eco-
logical science-based experts. Although, through privatisation processes, these experts 
have largely become employees of research institutions, based on this historical relation, 
there are still close links between these science-based experts and the government. Lastly, 
researchers have not only been knowledge producers but also stakeholders in the way 
they have promoted their own research. Furthermore, scientists participated as advisors 
in policy-making settings. These scientists were asked to participate based on their sci-
entific expertise, although the advice they gave went well beyond their specific knowl-
edge expertise. Moreover, some scientists expressed their views in public debates. For 
example, in newspaper articles, scientists made clear how they perceived that the cockle 
and mussel fishery should be regulated. These scientists were criticised for crossing the 
boundary between science and policy and labelled ‘political biologists’. However, it was 
only a minority of experts that actively spoke out in public. Most science-based experts 
emphasized the objectivity and validity of their knowledge and saw their role as that of 
knowledge providers, articulating aspects of the Two-Communities model. According to 
their perception, their knowledge claims were used by interest groups; they did not initi-
ate the protest. This shows the dynamic of establishing a clear boundary between science 
and policy, even though aspects of the Intertwinement model are at the same time visible. 
  Thirdly, within the studied controversies, two groups with different ways 
of knowing can clearly be recognised. This observation is in line with the Knowledge 
Coalition model of science-policy interactions. Especially within the mussel fishery 
and powerboat controversies, clearly opposing coalitions – consisting of both knowl-
edge producers and knowledge users – could be distinguished. However, also in the 
seagrass restoration case, different ways of knowing were observed regarding the hab-
itat suitability of seagrass in the Dutch Wadden Sea. Nevertheless, as this ambiguity 
was ignored, it did not lead to knowledge controversies between opposing coalitions. 
 
To conclude, the Two-communities model of science-policy interactions supports the 
understanding of the expectations of scientific knowledge with regard to decision-mak-
ing in the Dutch Wadden Sea. The model of Intertwinement on science-policy interac-
tions supports the understanding of the role of scientific knowledge in decision-making 
processes in the Dutch Wadden Sea for the main actor groups of nature organisations, 
economic entrepreneurs, the government, and researchers. The model of Knowledge Co-
alitions supports the understanding of the knowledge controversies in the Dutch Wad-
den Sea. Hence, science-policy interactions in the Dutch Wadden Sea should be under-
stood in different ways. An important distinction here is between the understanding of 
science-policy by actors and institutions in the Dutch Wadden Sea themselves and the 
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analytical understanding of the science-policy interactions in a research study. Expec-
tations and interpretations of science-policy interactions were implicitly and explicitly 
expressed by actors and institutions in the Dutch Wadden Sea. These expressions were 
predominantly in line with the Two-communities model, although there were also some 
reflexive expressions consistent with the Intertwinement model. This combination of 
both models is explained by Kunseler (2017) as an encapsulation process, in which a 
reflexive logic is incorporated within the dominant modernist logic. In contrast, the ana-
lytical starting point of this study is a constructivist perspective that is more in line with 
the models of Intertwinement and Knowledge Coalitions. As this study follows an inter-
pretative approach, science-policy interactions are understood from the perspectives of 
both the interpretations of the people under study and my interpretation as researcher. 
6.4 Different roles of knowledge uncertainties 
In this section, I will answer my second research question: How do knowledge uncertainties 
play a role in decision-making about the use and the restoration of Dutch Wadden Sea nature? 
 
In this PhD thesis, I analysed the decision-making processes concerning the use of the 
Dutch Wadden Sea by a planned powerboat race and mussel fishery (chapters 3 and 4) 
and the decision-making process concerning the restoration of seagrass fields (chapter 
5). Although the activities of a powerboat race, mussel fishery and seagrass restoration 
are very different, within my analysis, I also observed similar contexts that shaped the 
role of knowledge uncertainties. Based on my three case studies, I distinguish four con-
texts with different roles for knowledge uncertainties: debates on policy change, legal 
procedures, research projects and policy implementation. These different contexts pro-
vided both limitations and opportunities for incomplete knowledge, unpredictability and 
ambiguity to play a role in the decision-making processes, see Table 6.2. Here, incom-
plete knowledge refers to expressions of knowledge imperfections, unpredictability to 
what is seen as unknowable, and ambiguity to situations of diverging knowledge claims. 
  First of all, the powerboat and mussel fishery cases showed that knowledge un-
certainties played a role in the debates about changing the policy that regulates a human 
activity. In both cases, economic entrepreneurs and nature organisations tried to influ-
ence the governmental authority on the regulation of these activities. A clear example is 
the first period in the mussel fishery controversy, in which nature organisations made an 
appeal to the Dutch ministry to develop a new policy framework. Several arguments were 
used to influence this new policy, including knowledge uncertainties. Specifically, the 
perception of incomplete knowledge and ambiguity about fishery’s effects resulted in the 
requirement within the Sea and Coastal Fishery Policy that sufficient food must be left 
for birds. The interpretations of knowledge uncertainties that were used by the fishermen 
and the nature organisations in the debate were based on the information provided by 
science-based experts from research institutes with which they already had good rela-
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tions. An important context factor for the Dutch Wadden Sea debates was that all actors 
involved acknowledged the starting condition that scientific knowledge was required as 
a basis for policies to regulate human activity. In this way, knowledge uncertainty could 
become an important argument in the debate about changing the human activity policy. 
Incomplete knowledge could be used to stress that research was required to guide fur-
ther decisions. Depending on the position regarding the activity, incomplete knowledge 
could be seen as a reason to stop the activity or as a reason not to change the activity 
before research could support this decision. Ambiguity about knowledge claims led to 
discrediting the knowledge arguments of the opponents in the debate. In contrast, unpre-
dictability did not play a role in these debates, probably because not knowing did not fit 
into the assumption that the regulation policy should be based on scientific knowledge. 
  Secondly, the powerboat and mussel fishery cases showed that knowledge un-
certainties played a key role in the legal procedures that were initiated as part of the con-
troversies. Here, an important context factor was the change in the legal setting, which 
took place due to the implementation of the European Bird and Habitat Directive in 
Dutch nature protection legislation. Before 2005, nature organisations that protested 
against the fishery permits at the Council of State had to show that the activity was harm-
ful. However, with the new legislation, the permit authority had to show in court that 
there was no significant effect of the activity on the protected nature area. With the in-
clusion of the requirement of ‘no scientific doubt’ about the significant effect assessment, 
science-based experts acquired a crucial role within this legal setting. This also meant 
that non-scientific arguments were excluded from the legal dispute. As the differenc-
es in responsibility in the powerboat race and mussel fishery cases indicated, the exact 
role of science-based experts was case-specific. The cases show that a more formalized 
role of experts is part of the legal setting, with contracted expert reports and arguments 
between expertise and contra-expertise. These opposing positions of expertise can be 
explained using the concept of ambiguity about knowledge interpretations. However, 
the legal setting assumes the judge has to decide which interpretation is relevant instead 
of accepting a plurality of knowledge claims. For example, the debate on mussel seed 
fishery was based on value differences and ambiguity about different research interpre-
tations, whereas the juridical dispute concentrated around incomplete knowledge. The 
government claimed that an adaptive management approach was sufficient to address 
any incomplete knowledge and unpredictability, whereas nature organisations high-
lighted incomplete knowledge to question the permit based on the precautionary prin-
ciple. This shows that within the legal setting, expressions of knowledge uncertainties 
became limited to incomplete knowledge, even though ambiguity can explain the debate. 
  Thirdly, the seagrass restoration and the mussel fishery cases showed that research 
projects can be seen as a different setting in which knowledge uncertainties play a role. 
Within these research projects, there could be a clear division between the science-based 
experts and the government, nature organisation or economic entrepreneur that com-
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  Incomplete 
knowledge 
Unpredictability Ambiguity 
Debates on 
policy change  
• Mussel fishery 
(1990-2008)  
• Powerboat 
race (2010-
2011) 
Trigger for 
research projects 
that were 
expected to 
guide decisions 
 
Not relevant  Trigger for 
debate and 
provider of 
discrediting 
arguments  
Legal 
procedures 
• Mussel fishery 
(2004-2008) 
• Powerboat 
race (2011) 
Trigger for 
debate on how 
much 
uncertainty is 
accepted 
Part of argument 
for monitoring and 
an adaptive 
management 
approach 
 
Explanation 
for debate on 
effects 
Research 
projects 
• Seagrass 
restoration 
(1989-2005) 
• Seagrass 
restoration 
(2014-2017) 
• Mussel Fishery 
(1993-2008) 
 
Trigger for 
research projects 
but also a 
research result  
Not relevant   As a result 
of a research 
project 
Policy 
implementation  
• Seagrass 
restoration 
(2006-2013) 
• Mussel fishery 
(2008-2016) 
Justification to 
ask for expert 
advice 
Justification for 
taking a risk  
Not relevant 
Table 6.2. Roles of knowledge uncertainties in different contexts
missioned the research. However, I also observed more active roles of these actors in the 
knowledge production process. For example, in the EVA II evaluation process, represent-
atives of fishermen and nature organisations were involved in the research project. More-
over, in the seagrass restoration case in the 1990s, science-based experts from govern-
mental agencies initiated research projects based on the perception that research was first 
required before restoration activities could start. In this setting, perceptions of incomplete 
knowledge are an important start for research projects and are used as justification for the 
focus of the research project. The expectation is that research will provide more certainty 
about the knowledge base. Based on this assumption, unpredictability, which by definition 
cannot be reduced by more research, is not relevant. However, as the case studies demon-
strated, research results can indicate new knowledge uncertainties. Furthermore, new 
research results can cause ambiguity when they are interpreted in different ways.     
  Lastly, the seagrass restoration and mussel fishery cases showed that knowledge 
uncertainties also play a role in policy implementation. In this setting, actors do not de-
bate the decision that should be made but rather how to implement a decision that has 
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already been made. This type of decisions took place within the Mussel fishery covenant 
and within the restoration project initiated by the Wadden Society in 2011. In this setting, 
knowledge uncertainties can play a role as justification for specific actions. Incomplete 
knowledge perceptions can justify the request for advice from science-based experts. The 
perception of unpredictability can justify both risk taking and actions to distribute the 
expected risk. For example, in the pilot project of seagrass restoration with seagrass seeds 
from Germany, the risks of specific location impacts were spread through the selection 
of three different restoration sites. As the policy framework in this setting is not debated, 
ambiguity is not relevant in this context. Instead, ambiguity can trigger the policy setting 
to change into a new debate on policy change in which knowledge uncertainties play a 
different role.   
 To conclude, all three types of knowledge uncertainties that were distinguished 
in the introduction as incomplete knowledge, unpredictability and ambiguity can play 
a role in decision-making processes regarding the use and the restoration of the Dutch 
Wadden Sea. Incomplete knowledge can play a role as the trigger of research and as justi-
fication for research projects. In setting the debate on policy change, incomplete knowl-
edge can be used not only as an argument to delay a decision but also as an argument 
that policy change is required based on the precautionary principle. Within the legal 
procedures of the nature protection law, incomplete knowledge can be used to trigger 
a debate on how much uncertainty is accepted to make the assessment of no signifi-
cant effect. Furthermore, incomplete knowledge can be a reason to ask for expert advice 
about policy implementation. This means that incomplete knowledge can play a role in 
all decision-making contexts. In contrast, unpredictability is often not relevant in a deci-
sion-making process. However, unpredictability can play a role in legal disputes through 
the argument that uncertainty is inevitable and should be addressed with monitoring and 
an adaptive management approach. Furthermore, the perception of unpredictability can 
play a role in the perception that risk reduction measures should be taken within policy 
implementation. Although ambiguity is often not acknowledged and is more of an ana-
lytical concept than an empirical observation, it has played a key role in decision-making 
processes in the Dutch Wadden Sea. Ambiguity can trigger a debate and provide discred-
iting arguments for both opponents and advocates of an activity when there are multiple 
interpretations of research results. Furthermore, ambiguity can be seen as an important 
explanation for the knowledge debates in the Dutch Wadden Sea.   
6.5 Knowledge uncertainties: stimulating and reducing the scientification of 
nature conservation 
In this section, I will answer my research question: What does this analysis of knowl-
edge uncertainties in decision-making processes in the Dutch Wadden Sea reveal that 
can explain the role of science-based expertise in nature conservation governance? 
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As indicated in the introduction, the decision to focus this PhD thesis on knowledge 
uncertainties was triggered by the challenge of the simultaneous scientification of poli-
tics and the politicisation of science. Here, the scientification of politics refers to the in-
creased role of science-based expertise in decision-making processes, whereas the polit-
icisation of science refers to the contestation of science-based expertise in public debates 
(Pellizzoni 2011; Weingart 1999). My expectation was that the dominant roles of scien-
tific knowledge and science-based experts in decision-making processes would be chal-
lenged by knowledge uncertainties. Knowledge uncertainties can reduce the legitimacy 
of science-based decisions and enhance the politicisation of science. However, my empir-
ical case studies showed more complex relations between knowledge uncertainties and 
the role of science-based knowledge in decision-making processes. The powerboat case 
showed the domination of science-based expertise in the decision-making process (chap-
ter 3). The legal setting of the nature protection legislation showed that the dominant role 
of scientific knowledge was institutionalised. In this legal context, nature organisations 
tried to discredit the assessment of no significant effect using arguments of incomplete 
knowledge. However, the positions of the science-based experts were not publicly ques-
tioned. This contrasts with the mussel fishery case, where science-based experts became 
politicised and were perceived as connected to a specific position within the debate on 
mussel fishery regulation (chapter 3 and 4). However, this politicisation of science-based 
experts did not reduce the dominance of science-based experts and research projects 
in the decision-making process. Instead, the conflicting knowledge perceptions led to 
stakeholders supporting more research and debating  knowledge claims about mussel 
fishery effects. Furthermore, another dynamic can be observed in the seagrass restora-
tion case (chapter 5). This case study illustrates the contingency of the dominance of 
science-based experts in the decision-making process. After the initial dominance of sci-
ence-based experts, a new constellation of restoration initiators led to a reduced role of 
science-based experts. The perception of restoration feasibility as unpredictable reduced 
the role of scientists. Whereas, at a later moment, the perception of restoration feasibility 
as incomplete knowledge re-established the dominant role of scientists. These observa-
tions of the scientification of decision-making and the politicisation of science within 
my case studies in the Dutch Wadden Sea have led to the formulation of factors that 
stimulate scientification and factors that reduce scientification in nature conservation, 
which I clarify in the following sections. The combination of these factors that stimulate 
and reduce scientification help to explain the role of science-based expertise in nature 
conservation governance.
6.5.1 Factors that stimulate scientification 
Based on my research, I identify three factors that stimulate scientification: the dominant 
perception of knowledge uncertainty as incomplete knowledge, the linear expectation 
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that scientific expertise can support decisions, and the actual use of scientific knowledge 
in decision-making procedures. First of all, incomplete knowledge implies that research 
is the solution when seeking to reduce uncertainty. The prominent role of science-based 
expertise is enforced in the decision-making process when research is perceived as a re-
quirement to make decisions or to guide future decisions. Crucial in this respect is that 
uncertainty is predominantly perceived as incomplete knowledge, whereas analytical-
ly, the uncertainty can be characterised as ambiguity. For example, in the mussel fish-
ery case, uncertainties about fishery effects were perceived as incomplete knowledge, 
although the different knowledge interpretations indicate that ambiguity is the main 
source of uncertainty. In this way, high expectations are placed on research results for 
decision-making, even though more knowledge cannot resolve the different perspec-
tives that shape ambiguity. Ignoring ambiguity by treating it as incomplete knowledge 
maintains the dominance of science-based experts in policy-making processes. However, 
instead of the role of problem-solver, science-based experts can better be described as 
playing an advocacy role (Turnhout et al. 2008) or as partisan expertise (Pellizzoni 2011). 
  Secondly, scientification is stimulated by the linear model of expertise, which 
implies that objective knowledge is used to support rational decisions (Beck 2011). As 
indicated in chapter 4, this model is based on the perception of incomplete knowledge 
that can be resolved by research. Moreover, the linear model of expertise is institution-
alised in nature legislation. A clear example is the European Habitat Directive. This 
legislation emphasizes that permit decisions should be based on appropriate assess-
ments, indicating a high level of technocratic decision-making (Turnhout et al. 2015). 
  A third factor I would like to add is that scientification is stimulated by the actual 
use of scientific knowledge in decision-making processes. The use of scientific informa-
tion and the advice of science-based experts support the role of science-based expertise 
in decision-making processes. Even in the mussel fishery case, in which scientific knowl-
edge became contested, not all fields of scientific expertise were contested. Specifically, at 
the level of data and concepts, science-based expertise supported decision-making pro-
cesses. For example, the data on the numbers of birds and mussels guided the decisions 
about how much mussel seed could be fished. Furthermore, the conceptualisation of 
mussel banks as ecosystem engineers and biodiversity hotspots influenced the paradigm 
shift of the government from mussels as purely a fishery commodity to mussels as an 
important element of nature. This role of science-based experts was supported by activ-
ities that de-politicised science, for example scientists who emphasized the objectivity 
of their data. The accommodating role of science-based experts in the decision-making 
process also supported the expectations that science-based experts could pacify the con-
flict (Hanssen et al. 2009). However, my case studies showed that the controversies were 
more complicated and research projects did not pacify the conflicts. Still, there was a 
continuation of high expectations that science-based expertise would resolve the contro-
versies. 
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6.5.2 Factors that reduce scientification
Based on my research, I identify three factors that reduce scientification: the per-
ception of unpredictability; the politicisation of scientific expertise as a result of 
ambiguity; and most importantly, the aspect that decision-making is largely not 
shaped by knowledge. First of all, the perception of unpredictability implies that 
the current state of research cannot reduce uncertainty. This perception reduc-
es the role of science-based experts, as the seagrass restoration case has indicated. 
Still, science-based experts can play a role as advisors on risk reduction measures. 
 Secondly, ambiguity as a knowledge problem for decision-making was, in my 
case studies, not acknowledged as the result of value differences that needed to be ad-
dressed in a political way. Instead, it became a technical problem because opposing coa-
litions discredited each other’s knowledge claims. However, this did not reduce the role 
of science-based experts but rather amplified it. Still, the role of science-based experts 
changed into one of advocacy, as they became contra-experts in the debate. Furthermore, 
the politicisation of expertise did complicate the expectations of science-based exper-
tise in the context of decision-making. Here, the impact on personal relations should 
not be underestimated. The politicisation of science is, to a certain extent, a recursive 
process of both politicisation and de-politicisation of science, the authority of experts 
can be re-established through actions that emphasize the objectivity and independence 
of science. Still, the politicisation of expertise has an impact on the relations between 
people. As the mussel fishery case showed, the divide between researchers regarding fish-
ery effects has not disappeared with the mussel fishery transition covenant. Research 
institutes are still coloured politically by their role in the controversy, influencing the 
selection of the science-based experts who played a role in the decisions within the cov-
enant. As indicated by Pellizzoni (2011), there are different roles for experts depending 
on the phase of the conflict. However, I would add that these experts sometimes have to 
be replaced by other persons, as a result of trust relations being disturbed by the con-
troversy. In the mussel case, I observed a shift towards the use of more consultants who 
were trusted by all actors involved. This means that the politicisation of expertise has an 
impact on which science-based experts can play a role in decision-making processes. 
  Last but not least, scientific knowledge is just one of the aspects that play a role in 
decision-making. Often, economic interests and power relations are more influential on 
decision-making processes. Furthermore, within the Netherlands, the democratic deci-
sion-making setting prescribes that governmental authorities are responsible for making 
regulation decisions. This reduces scientification in the sense that it limits radical tech-
nocratic decision-making wherein politicians are replaced by scientists (Hoppe 2005). 
Still, there are different gradations of responsibility that science-based experts can have in 
decision-making processes. For example, the powerboat and mussel fishery cases showed 
that the exact division of responsibilities for making decisions on significant effect were 
context-dependent. Although the Dutch Wadden Sea contexts showed a high level of 
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scientification, decisions continue to be justified by governmental authority. These deci-
sions of governmental authorities can be influenced by science-based expertise, but they 
are not made by scientists. In most nature conservation governance processes, govern-
mental authorities have formal decision-making responsibility.  
6.5.3 Conclusion on the role of science-based expertise in nature conservation govern-
ance
Instead of a general trend of scientification of politics as described by Weingart (1999), I 
conclude that science-based experts have a context-dependent role in nature conserva-
tion governance based on factors that stimulate and reduce scientification. First of all, the 
role of science-based experts in nature conservation should not be overstated; decisions 
continue to be based on governmental authority and stakeholder agreements that are not 
directly prescribed by scientists. However, I also conclude that science-based expertise 
plays a dominant role in decision-making processes and that knowledge uncertainties do 
not reduce this role. A key factor that can explain why knowledge uncertainties have not 
reduced the dominance of science-based expertise in nature conservation governance is 
the dominant perception of uncertainty as incomplete knowledge. Controversies with 
contested expertise do not reduce the role of science-based experts when ambiguity is 
not recognised but rather perceived as incomplete knowledge. This dominant role of sci-
ence-based experts and the perception of incomplete knowledge are also institutionalised 
in the nature legislation framework based on the European Habitat Directive. Still, the 
roles that science-based experts play and the selection of experts involved in the deci-
sion-making process on nature conservation are both affected by knowledge uncertainty 
perceptions and the politicisation of expertise. 
6.6 The politics of knowledge uncertainties
In this section, I discuss the politics of knowledge uncertainties, indicating the political 
choices that are made and the power that is performed through expressions and disre-
gards of knowledge uncertainties. Here, the political is perceived as “contestation and 
decision making in and through power” (Behagel 2012, p.16). My empirical case studies 
showed that choices were made about which uncertainties were expressed, on how much 
uncertainty was accepted, and on how and by whom these uncertainties were addressed 
in decision-making. In this way, power was performed: certain aspects and people were 
included, whereas others were excluded from the decision-making process. To articulate 
the implications of the political aspect of knowledge uncertainties for the study and man-
agement of nature conservation, I distinguish three challenges: the challenge of different 
ways of knowing, the challenge of accepting risk and the challenge of action or research. 
I observed these challenges in relation to the interpretations of incomplete knowledge, 
unpredictability and ambiguity in my empirical chapters. In chapter 3, the challenge of 
ambiguity and discrediting knowledge claims indicated whose knowledge was perceived 
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as relevant and how diversity of knowledge was addressed in the permit and juridical 
processes. In chapter 4, the challenge of deciding how much risk is acceptable within a 
context of knowledge uncertainty regarding the effects of mussel fishery indicated the 
power relations between the actors. In chapter 5, the challenge of deciding between ac-
tion or research on seagrass restoration and the positions on this dilemma indicated the 
power relations of researchers and restoration initiators. The different responses to these 
challenges indicate the political choices that are made, which are discussed in the follow-
ing sections. See Table 6.3 for a summary.
The politics of knowledge uncertainties 
 
 Challenge of different 
ways of knowing 
 
Challenge of  
accepting risk 
Challenge of  
action or research 
Responses: • Ignoring ambiguity 
• Discrediting the other 
way of knowing 
• Facilitating 
interactions 
• Not accepting risk 
(precautionary 
principle) 
• Risk perceived as 
inevitable (adaptive 
management) 
• First research 
• Action instead of 
research 
• Action and 
research combined 
Table 6.3. Summarizing the three challenges that indicate the politics of knowledge uncertainties.
6.6.1 The challenge of different ways of knowing
The challenge of different ways of knowing articulates the choice of how the knowledge 
uncertainty of ambiguity is addressed. I distinguish three different responses to conflict-
ing knowledge interpretations: ignoring ambiguity, discrediting the other way of know-
ing, and facilitating interactions. First of all, when ambiguity is ignored, different knowl-
edge interpretations do not play a role in the decision-making process. This can take 
place when actors with different perspectives are excluded from the governance process. 
For example, experts that were sceptical of the feasibility of seagrass restoration were 
excluded from the seagrass restoration projects. Another instance of ignoring ambiguity 
takes place when different knowledge interpretations are perceived as not relevant to the 
decision-making process. For example, this behaviour is seen in the choice of the cove-
nant partners to ignore the PRODUS research results on mussel fishery effects. Here, dif-
ferent interpretations were strategically ignored in order to facilitate cooperation. In both 
instances, political choices were made about which knowledge claims were perceived 
as relevant and which claims were excluded from the decision-making process. Asym-
metrical power relations prescribe who can decide which knowledge claims are relevant. 
  With the second response – discrediting the other way of knowing – a spe-
cific knowledge claim is challenged. Resistance against a specific way of knowing can 
result in a knowledge debate involving contra-expertise. In this debate, uncertainties 
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are strategically used to emphasize the limitations of the knowledge claims that are 
questioned. Although incomplete knowledge is predominantly expressed as uncer-
tainty, the conflict is triggered by ambiguity. However, the social element of ambiguity 
based on different world views is not acknowledged; instead, the political debate about 
what is normatively allowed transforms into a debate about what is factually right. In 
this way, a social problem is transformed into a technical problem of knowledge, in 
which value disputes are hidden away even though they are the drivers of conflict. Le-
gitimate arguments are limited to scientific claims, excluding normative arguments. 
  With the third response of facilitating interactions, the social element of ambigu-
ity is acknowledged. Interactions can be organised based on the assumption that through 
interactions, the differences will disappear or a constructive conflict can be facilitated, 
with the aim of learning by making different perspectives explicit (Cuppen 2012). Most 
often, merely facilitating interactions to reduce differences is insufficient and can result 
in camps that discredit the other way of knowing. Still, boundary objects can facilitate in-
teractions between actors with different ways of knowing. The seagrass case showed that 
the boundary objects of pilot projects and the concept of ecosystem engineer facilitat-
ed collaboration between actors who expressed different knowledge views. Whereas the 
boundary object of significant effect in the powerboat and mussel fishery cases showed 
that boundary objects can also facilitate and structure conflicts. However, in both situ-
ations of collaboration and conflict, choices are made regarding who is involved in the 
interactions and on which topics interactions take place. In this way, inclusion and ex-
clusion of people and perceptions takes place. Hence, politics takes place in the decisions 
about who can interact within the sphere of knowledge interpretations.
The politics of these responses to ambiguity has different implications. First of all, I would 
like to stress that different ways of knowing should be seen as a social problem. Secondly, 
conflict can also be seen as positive. The response of discrediting a knowledge claim is 
part of a power struggle over who decides and on which grounds. Furthermore, there is a 
learning opportunity in moving towards a more complex understanding of the situation. 
However, when ambiguity is not acknowledged and is instead perceived as incomplete 
knowledge, this knowledge conflict can trigger piles of reports that do not contribute to a 
solution of the problem. It is not the debate about knowledge that is a problem but rather 
the expectation that more knowledge can resolve the conflict. Furthermore, it should be 
recognised that research is also a delay tactic to postpone difficult political decisions. For 
this reason, I suggest that reflection is required on both the knowledge debate and on the 
potential contribution of research to prevent the frustration that results from unrealistic 
expectations. 
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6.6.2 The challenge of accepting risks 
The challenge of accepting risks describes the decision about how much uncertainty is 
acceptable. Here, two different responses can be distinguished within a knowledge-based 
policy-making setting: uncertainty is not accepted based on the precautionary princi-
ple, and uncertainty is perceived as inevitable within an adaptive management approach. 
First of all, the precautionary principle implies that there is a responsibility to prevent 
harm when there is scientific uncertainty; when there is sound evidence of no harm, 
this precaution can be lifted. In this way, the precautionary principle response is directly 
linked to the perception of incomplete knowledge, as it implies the expectation that sci-
entific research can reduce the uncertainty. The European Habitat Directive legislation 
is based on the precautionary principle, in the sense that there should be no scientific 
doubt about the assessment of no significant effect. This approach opened up the possi-
bility for nature organisations to protest against permits with the argument that there was 
too much incomplete knowledge (Beunen & Duineveld 2013; Opdam et al. 2009). This 
protest was justified by the precautionary principle, restricting the debate to knowledge 
arguments instead of value differences. The change in 2005 to the new nature legislation 
framework for mussel fishery regulation clearly changed the power relations among na-
ture organisations, fishermen and the government in the mussel fishery case. With this 
legislation, the fishermen, as initiators of the activity, had to show their activity was not 
harmful, whereas previously, nature organisations needed to show that fishery was harm-
ful. Power relations changed even further with the court decision in 2008 that the fishery 
permit was invalid based on the perception of unacceptable uncertainty.
  Secondly, a different response to accepting risks is seen in the adaptive manage-
ment approach, which starts from the perception that there will always be uncertainties. 
The adaptive management approach is based on learning to adapt to changes in the so-
cio-ecological system. Acknowledging incomplete knowledge and the unpredictability 
of the socio-ecological system is inherent to adaptive management (Holling 2001; Voß 
2011). There are different theoretical and practical applications of the adaptive manage-
ment concept, for example adaptive governance that stresses the inclusion of stakeholder 
perceptions and, in this way, also acknowledges potential ambiguity (Folke et al. 2005). 
However, I want to stress how adaptive management is used as a justification for ac-
cepting uncertainty through the risk reduction measure of monitoring. In this way, an 
activity can be allowed based on the condition that it will be stopped or changed when 
harmful effects are observed. This implies the assumption that the effect is reversible and 
observable within a short time period (Opdam et al. 2009). The justification of adaptive 
management was successfully used to allow gas exploitation in the Dutch Wadden Sea, 
and it was used in a similar way as an argument for the permits for the planned power-
boat and mussel fishery. Although the adaptive management approach is presented as a 
neutral knowledge-oriented strategy, it does reproduce given power relations (Voß 2011). 
For example, the decisions about which data need to be collected and when an observed 
effect is perceived as harmful are both political. 
152
Chapter 6
6
The politics of accepting risk highlight that the precautionary principle and adaptive 
management approach are not politically neutral concepts but are rather used in power 
struggles over the regulation of human activities. The court case on mussel fishery in 
2008 showed that both responses were used in conflict with each other. I would suggest 
that current proponents of adaptive management approaches in theoretical literature and 
management practices acknowledge the political use of the concept as an argument to 
allow human activities. Moreover, how monitoring results are interpreted and acted upon 
when there is ambiguity on the recursive nature of the effect is highly political. Therefore, 
I would suggest that a decision for monitoring in itself is insufficient to address uncer-
tainties. Additionally, it should be clear which type of observation indicates that action is 
required and who is responsible for deciding to alter or stop the activity. 
6.6.3 The challenge of action or research 
The challenge of action or research describes the choice as to whether or not to start 
a research project in response to expressions of knowledge uncertainties. I distinguish 
between three different responses to this dilemma: first research, no research but ac-
tion, and simultaneously action and research. In the first response, knowledge un-
certainty is perceived as incomplete knowledge, and there is a high expectation that 
research will reduce uncertainty. Furthermore, the expectation is that the research re-
sults will support better decision-making. However, when research results are por-
trayed as a precondition to legitimize decisions, this also provides a strategic way to 
delay policy change. The power position of those who oppose action is enforced when 
this response is accepted. Moreover, this perception enforces the dominant role of sci-
ence-based experts in the decision-making process. In addition, within the choice of a 
research project, there are again specific choices to be made in the set-up of the research. 
  In the second response of action instead of research, knowledge uncertain-
ty is ignored or accepted, and a decision for action is made. This choice can be stra-
tegically supported by the knowledge uncertainty perception of unpredictability, re-
ducing the expectation that research results can improve decisions about the action 
in question. Furthermore, this response can be supported by arguments about the fi-
nancial and time costs of research and about the urgency of taking action. With this 
approach, the role of science-based experts is reduced to the potential role of advisor. 
The power position of advocates for action is enforced when this response is accepted. 
  A third response option is the combination of action with simultaneous research 
or monitoring, as in an adaptive management approach. In this response, the need for 
both action and knowledge production are acknowledged. Still, decisions are made about 
how much and which data are to be collected. Furthermore, the expectation is that the 
collected data can inform further decisions about taking new actions. The role of sci-
ence-based experts in the decision-making process is also enforced with this response. 
Important implications of this dilemma between action and research are the role of sci-
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ence-based experts in the decision-making processes and the timing of decision-making. 
Furthermore, there are important implications for the decision about which research is 
to be conducted. Here, the decision-making context plays a crucial role. Especially the 
mussel fishery case has shown that when there is a controversy about effect assessments, 
more research is conducted on fishery effects. However, from a decision-making per-
spective that acknowledges this uncertainty as an ambiguity, research on fishery effects is 
not necessarily the type of knowledge that will contribute to innovative solutions that can 
reduce the controversy. I would recommend more reflection on what type of research is 
required. In this way, piles of reports that are only used to support the positions of advo-
cates or opponents on a human activity can be avoided. Although I recognise that effect 
studies are an established requirement under the current nature legislation, there is room 
in the permit procedure to include conditions for studying alternative options alongside 
the requirement of monitoring effects.
6.7 The contributions of this PhD research
In this last section, I reflect on the contributions of my PhD research to nature conserva-
tion governance processes and to future science-policy research. I start with the reflection 
that the context of my research matters. I studied specific decision-making processes in 
the Dutch Wadden Sea that were shaped by historical and contingent factors, such as the 
domination of high expectations of expert knowledge for decisions on the Dutch Wadden 
Sea and crucial court rulings based on uncertainty interpretations of cockle and mussel 
fishery effects. Furthermore, my research took place in a specific social setting that has 
shaped the focus of my analysis. For example, easy access to ecological researchers was 
facilitated by one of my PhD supervisors, my interpretative approach was guided by dis-
cussions with colleagues, and the use of the term ‘science-based experts’ was triggered by 
debates in literature on scientific and practical knowledge. My specific theoretical inter-
est and social surroundings have contributed to this PhD research that highlights the role 
of knowledge uncertainties in decision-making processes about the Dutch Wadden Sea. 
In this way, I have contributed to the growing and complementary understanding of sci-
ence-policy interactions in the Dutch Wadden Sea, including research on interactive knowl-
edge development (Seijger 2014) and governance arrangements (Van der Molen 2017). 
  With my research, I aim to contribute to decision-making processes in the 
Dutch Wadden Sea. One of my contributions has been a booklet with action strategies 
for a better fit between knowledge and policy. This booklet was developed in collabo-
ration with the NWO-ZKO working group and presented to Wadden Sea profession-
als (Van der Molen et al. 2015). Furthermore, with this PhD thesis, I aim to open up 
new insights that are relevant for economic actors, nature organisations, governments 
and science-based experts in decision-making processes on the Dutch Wadden Sea. 
I would like to specifically stress my insight that ambiguity as knowledge uncertainty 
should be acknowledged and addressed as a social problem and not just as a techni-
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cal problem. This can help prevent frustrations about the non-use of scientific knowl-
edge in decision-making and reshape expectations on research to resolve controversies. 
Furthermore, I would like to highlight that the policy setting structures science-poli-
cy interactions. From this perspective, it is interesting to see how the current plans 
to establish one responsible agent for the Dutch Wadden Sea will change the role of 
science-based experts and knowledge uncertainties in decision-making processes. 
  Furthermore, my conclusions on knowledge uncertainties are relevant not 
only for the Dutch Wadden Sea but also for other nature conservation process-
es. Although my conclusions on the role of knowledge uncertainties for nature con-
servation decisions are based on empirical insights from Dutch Wadden Sea gov-
ernance processes, the general patterns that I have observed are also relevant for 
other nature conservation processes. It is very likely that the dynamics of knowledge 
debates found in this study also occur in policy controversies on other nature ar-
eas.  Particularly my conclusions on ambiguity, on the political use of adaptive man-
agement as justification for decisions, and on the political choices that are made 
about which research is conducted are relevant for all nature conservation processes. 
  Lastly, this research has contributed to new theoretical insights on knowledge 
uncertainties, and these insights can support further research. This research showed 
that knowledge uncertainties do not reduce the role of science-based experts in deci-
sion-making processes; however, they do shape the roles that science-based experts are 
able to play. The dominant perception of knowledge uncertainties as incomplete knowl-
edge increased the role of science-based experts in the context of knowledge uncertain-
ties. Furthermore, there is a recursive process of both the politicisation and de-polit-
icisation of science. For example, appeals to objectivity by scientists have reduced the 
impact of knowledge uncertainties on the scientification of nature conservation govern-
ance. Still, the contestation of experts can have a long-lasting impact on relations with 
and between science-based experts, indicating that a historical understanding is crucial. 
Last but not least, I emphasize the political aspect of knowledge uncertainties. This not 
only has practical implications but also implies that research on knowledge uncertainties 
should recognise the choices and power relations that are performed through expressions 
and disregards of knowledge uncertainties.
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Appendix I: List of interviewees
Date Name Affiliation Topic 
2011-01-24 Pavel Kabat  Wadden Academy Scoping exercise 
2011-01-24 Martin Pastoors, David 
Goldsborough and Francois 
Perrot 
Center for Marine Policy 
(Van Hall Larenstein) 
Scoping exercise 
2011-01-24 Elze Klinkhammer  
and Liesbeth Meijer 
Regiecollege 
Waddengebied 
Scoping exercise 
2011-02-01 Han Lindeboom, Norbert 
Dankers and Kees Dijkema 
IMARES Scoping exercise 
2011-02-01 Cor Smit IMARES Scoping exercise 
2011-02-01 Norbert Dankers IMARES Scoping exercise, 
including Mussel 
fishery case 
2011-02-01 Han Lindeboom IMARES Scoping exercise 
2011-06-09 Hendrik Oosterveld LNV-Noord Scoping exercise 
2011-06-09 Herman Verheij  Wadden Society Scoping exercise 
2011-06-10 Martijn de Jong Programma Rijke 
Waddenzee, St. Wad 
Scoping exercise, 
including Mussel 
fishery case 
2011-06-16 Aante Nicolai Rijkswaterstaat Scoping exercise 
2011-06-17 Paddy Walker and David 
Goldsborough 
Van Hall/Larenstein Scoping exercise, 
including Mussel 
fishery case 
2012-06-06 Paddy Walker Programma Rijke 
Waddenzee, 
Waddenvereniging 
Mussel fishery 
case  
2013-11-28 Martin Baptist IMARES Powerboat case 
2014-02-17 Mariska Veldhoen° 
 
Provincie Noord-Holland Powerboat case 
2014-03-17 Ellen Kuipers Wadden Society Powerboat case 
2014-04-28 Nic Grandiek* 
 
Provincie Noord-Holland Powerboat case 
2014-11-13 Josje Fens Wadden Society Seagrass 
restoration case  
2014-11-20 Marieke van Katwijk Radboud University Seagrass 
restoration case  
2014-12-08 Floris van Bentum Rijkswaterstaat Seagrass 
restoration case  
2014-12-09 Anky Woudstra Wadden Society Seagrass 
restoration case  
2015-02-23 Frans Maas Rijkswaterstaat Seagrass 
restoration case  
2015-02-24 Dick de Jong **  Rijkswaterstaat Seagrass 
restoration case  
2015-03-02 Quirin Smeele Natuurmonumenten Seagrass 
restoration case  
2015-03-03 Tjisse van der Heije Radboud University Seagrass 
restoration case  
2015-04-13 Luca van Duren Deltares Seagrass 
restoration case  
2016-07-13 Hans van Geesbergen PO Mossels Mussel fishery 
case 
2016-07-14 Aad Smaal IMARES Mussel fishery 
case 
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° Short interview by e-mail
* Interview by phone
**Short informal interview, not recorded but detailed notes were taken 
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Date Oral presentations during Wadden Sea related meetings 
2011-10-14 Science-policy interactions in the management of the Dutch Wadden Sea, 
at the International Symposium on the Ecology of the Wadden Sea, Texel  
 
2011-10-14 Governance and adaptive management in the Wadden Sea, 14 October 
2011, together with Diana Giebels, at the International Symposium on the 
Ecology of the Wadden Sea, Texel 
 
2014-12-11 ‘How to deal with science-policy problems in the Wadden Sea? Prospects 
for action’ together with Franke van der Molen, at the 13th 
Waddenacademy symposium, in cooperation with NWO, Leeuwarden 
 
2016-07-01 Which cumulative effects? – Effect assessments at science-policy 
boundaries, at the 16th Waddenacademy symposium in cooperation with 
the NIOZ 
Date Wadden Sea related meetings attended as participant observer  
2010-11-04 Deltaconference, Den Haag 
2010-11-25 Symposium Mosselwad, Leeuwarden 
2010-12-09/10 Towards a trilateral research agenda, 5th Wadden Academy symposium 
2011-02-02 Workshop Adaptive Management at Van Hall Larenstein, Leeuwarden 
2011-03-17 Sandy solutions, symposia van de Wadden Society, Leeuwarden 
2011-03-22 Meet & Greet Wadden professionals, Leeuwarden 
2011-10-10/14 International Symposium on the Ecology of the Wadden Sea, Texel 
2011-12-08 7th Wadden Academy symposium on Wadden governance, Leeuwarden  
2011-12-09 Audit meeting on gas mining effects, Ameland 
2012-11-19/20 International workshop on mussel-related research in the Wadden Sea, 
Leeuwarden 
 
2013-05-30 Tijwisselaar, Programma naar een Rijke Waddenzee, Marrum 
2014-06-11/12 Sense of place, 12th symposium of the Waddenacademy in cooperation 
with Oerol, Terschelling 
 
2015-02-24 Workshop on the future of the nature restoration organisation PRW 
‘Program towards a Rich Sea’, session “Werkwijze herijking Programma 
Rijke Waddenzee”, Leeuwarden 
 
2015-04-16 Symposium of MosselWad en Waddensleutels on mussel restoration and 
research: ‘Over leven in de Waddenzee’,  Leeuwarden 
 
2016-06-08/09 Bird Senses of Places, Oerol seminar in cooperation with MetaWad, 
Terschelling 
 
2016-06-30/07-1 'Cumulative Effects in Marine Ecosystems', 16th Waddenacademy 
symposium in cooperation with the NIOZ 
Appendix II: List of meetings, workshops, presentations and conferences
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Date Presentations of the PhD research   
(at conferences not Wadden Sea related) 
 
2011-11-01 Science-policy interactions in the management of the Dutch Wadden Sea, 
at the WASS Research symposium, Wageningen 
 
2011-11-25 Science-policy interactions in the management of the Dutch Wadden Sea, 
at the IMARES PhD Day, Texel 
 
2012-07-06 The use of knowledge as evidence in determining ‘significant effect’ on the 
Dutch Natura 2000 Wadden Sea site, at the IPA Conference, Tilburg 
 
2014-07-05 Contested meanings in the assessment of ‘significant effect’- The cases of 
mussel seed fishery and powerboat racing in the Dutch Natura 2000 
Wadden Sea site, at the IPA Conference, Wageningen 
 
2015-03-24/26 Protecting nature: Dealing with uncertainty, poster presentation at the 
Student Conference on Conservation Science, Cambridge, UK 
 
2015-06-26 Uncertain seagrass restoration in the Dutch Wadden Sea, at the MARE 
conference, Amsterdam 
 
2015-08-26 Dealing with uncertainty: seagrass restoration in the Wadden Sea, ESA 
conference, Prague, Czech  
 
2017-07-06 (De)politicisation of mussel fishery - Dealing with knowledge 
uncertainties, at the MARE Conference, Amsterdam 
Date Presentations of the PhD research in educational settings 
2012-09/10, 
2013-09/10, 
2014-09/10, 
2015-09/10 
 
Supervision of group work on Wadden Sea case studies of master students 
for the course ‘Principles of Environmental Science’, Wageningen 
University 
2014-09-12/15,  
2016-09-11/15 
Boat excursion on the Dutch Wadden Sea, indicating the tensions between 
human use and nature conservation at master students of the course 
‘Marine Structures’, Wageningen University 
 
2016-11-07, 
2017-11-09 
Guest lecture on the mussel fishery controversy, at the bachelor course 
‘Science and expertise in nature and environment’, Wageningen 
University 
 
2016-11-29, 
2017-11-22 
Guest lecture on significant effect, at the master course ‘Environmental 
Policy: Analysis and Evaluation’, Wageningen University 
 
2017-04-21/05-23 Guest lecture and group supervision on mussel fishery negotiations, the 
stakeholder dialogue of the bachelor course ‘Kwaliteit van Leven’, 
University of Amsterdam  
 
2017-05-20 Guest lecture on Wadden Sea governance and a workshop on significant 
effect assessment, at the theme day ‘Science’ for students of the Open 
University 
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Summary
Knowledge uncertainties are an important challenge for coastal nature conservation gov-
ernance. To date, knowledge plays a key role in the legitimisation of decisions that impact 
nature protection. Although the legitimacy of science-based decisions is questioned by 
knowledge uncertainties, the frequent occurrence of such uncertainties has not reduced 
the dominance of scientific expertise in nature conservation. To explain this paradox and 
understand the role of knowledge uncertainties in decision-making processes, contro-
versies in the coastal area of the Dutch Wadden Sea were selected as case studies. This 
PhD thesis aims to explain the role of knowledge uncertainties in the Dutch Wadden Sea 
governance, and to contribute to theoretical understanding of knowledge uncertainties 
in decision-making processes more generally. Accordingly, this thesis answers three re-
search questions: 
1. How to understand science-policy interactions in the governance of Dutch Wadden Sea 
nature?
2. How do knowledge uncertainties play a role in decision-making about the use and the 
restoration of Dutch Wadden Sea nature? 
3. What does this analysis of knowledge uncertainties in decision-making processes in the 
Dutch Wadden Sea reveal that can explain the role of science-based expertise in nature 
conservation governance?
 
This study takes  a critical constructivist perspective on knowledge uncertainties, and 
uses an interpretative approach. The research consists of a literature review and three case 
studies: a planned power boat race, mussel fishery, and seagrass restoration in the Dutch 
Wadden Sea. To gather empirical data, I analysed documents, conducted interviews and 
made participatory observations. Discourse coalitions and storylines were used to struc-
ture the analysis of different meanings and interpretations of knowledge uncertainties. 
This approach enabled me to identify changes within the decision-making processes.
 The analytical focus of this thesis is on science-policy interactions and knowledge 
processes in the context of decision-making processes and court rulings. Although there 
are different conceptual models to understand science-policy interactions, they all rec-
ognise knowledge uncertainties as a challenge for decision-making processes. To identify 
and study how science-policy interactions take place, the concept of boundary objects 
is introduced as a tool to accommodate interactions between people. To understand the 
role of uncertainties, an analytical distinction is made between three types of knowledge 
uncertainties: incomplete knowledge, unpredictability and ambiguity. Incomplete knowl-
edge refers to expressions of knowledge imperfections, unpredictability refers to what is 
seen as unknowable, and ambiguity refers to situations of diverging knowledge claims. 
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This thesis has been compiled in a publication-based format, which means that the chap-
ters 2 to 5 are written as articles for peer-reviewed journals. Chapter 2 presents a review 
of the social science literature on science-policy interactions in the Dutch Wadden Sea. 
The review is based on articles and PhD publications between 1995 and 2011 that fo-
cused on the cockle fishery and gas exploitation controversies. This review shows that 
there are different analytical perspectives and tools used to study science-policy inter-
actions. Three main perspectives were distinguished, emphasizing the social and eco-
nomic dynamics of resource management, the role of nature views and discourses in 
controversies, and the influence of science dynamics in policy and management debates. 
The review demonstrates that ecological knowledge and ecological scientists have played 
important roles in the controversies on cockle fisheries and gas exploitation. However, 
scientific knowledge was not always the most important factor in the decision-making 
process, and scientific insights were not always used as expected by the scientists. How 
scientific knowledge was used and interpreted by stakeholders was dependent on their 
interests, their nature views and on the dominant policy discourses. Scientists became 
willingly and unwillingly part of conflicting coalitions in the cockle fishery and gas ex-
ploitation controversies.
Chapter 3 contains an analysis of the permit and legal procedures of the mussel seed 
fishery and powerboat race controversies in the Dutch Wadden Sea. To acquire a per-
mit under the Dutch Nature act, an appropriate assessment of significant effects must 
be conducted based on the best available scientific knowledge. In both cases nature or-
ganisations started a court process against the government-granted permits in protest 
to the “no significant effect” claim, stating that there was insufficient certainty for this 
conclusion. The assessment of significant effect became a focal point in the controver-
sies, limiting the debate to ecological arguments and science-based expertise, but also 
creating options for parties to advance their protest by articulating uncertainties. Only 
the uncertainty of incomplete knowledge was explicitly addressed, excluding ambiguity 
of values and unpredictability of the actual ecosystem. This chapter recommends that 
acknowledging the value aspect in disputes on significant effect would leave more space 
for effective solutions of the problems under debate. 
Chapter 4 presents an examination of the mussel fishery case for the period between 
1990 and 2016. The controversy starts with a debate on restricting mussel fishery are-
as (1990-1993). A new fishery policy in 1993 did not stop the controversy; instead, the 
debate about sufficient bird protection continued (1993-2004). In 2004, the new legal 
requirement to make an assessment of negative effects in order to acquire a permit trans-
formed the controversy into a debate about mussel seed fishery permits (2004-2008). 
This legal requirement amplified the knowledge debate about fishery effects. A court 
ruling in 2008 on the fishery permit did not resolve the conflict; instead it triggered a 
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mussel crisis. This mussel crisis increased political pressure on the issue, resulting in 
a mussel transition covenant. This political agreement pacified the debate and enabled 
cooperation (2008-2016). Until 2008, there were high expectations that research projects 
would resolve the knowledge debate on fishery effects. However, the analysis shows that 
mussel fishery regulation decisions were primarily based on government authority, not 
on scientific knowledge. Expectations of policy-makers and scientists on conflict resolu-
tion by more research were not met, because the knowledge debate was politicised over 
ambiguous knowledge claims. The persistent belief that more knowledge would resolve 
the controversy –the linear model of expertise – is explained by the dominant percep-
tion of uncertainty as incomplete knowledge. The case study confirms that science-based 
knowledge fails to guide policy-making as expected in the linear model, but also demon-
strates how science plays important strategic, procedural and instrumental roles in struc-
turing interactions between stakeholders in nature protection conflicts.
Chapter 5 presents an in-depth study of seagrass restoration in the Dutch Wadden Sea 
(1989-2017). This chapter shows the impact of storylines and knowledge uncertainties 
on decisions concerning restoration action and research. Two basic storylines – authen-
ticity and the ecological function of seagrass as an ‘ecosystem engineer’ – supported the 
restoration efforts. In 1989 several research projects on seagrass restoration were initiated 
based on the perception that incomplete knowledge had to be reduced before starting 
restoration actions. The results of the restoration project (2002-2005) were interpreted 
differently by science-based experts, leading to ambiguity between optimistic and scepti-
cal views about the possibility of restoration. However, based on the perception that the 
success of restoration was unpredictable a pilot project of seagrass restoration was initi-
ated (2011-2015) that did not focus on research. The recent restoration projects (2014 
and 2015-2017) emphasized that better understanding was necessary, as no long-term 
restoration of seagrass fields were established. The dominant perception of uncertainty as 
incomplete knowledge resulted in new research projects. However, the unpredictability 
of the success of restoration efforts and the ambiguity regarding the feasibility of resto-
ration complicated the decisions on continuation of restoration efforts. Two concepts 
– ecosystem engineer and pilot project – facilitated collaboration among science-based 
experts, NGOs and governmental organizations.
The final chapter, chapter 6, synthesises the findings of the three empirical case studies, 
answers the research questions, and reflects on the politics of knowledge uncertainties. 
First, I conclude that science-policy interactions in the Dutch Wadden Sea should be 
understood in different ways. The understanding of science-policy interactions as Two 
Communities, with a division between the science and policy worlds help to explain 
the expectations of scientific knowledge for decision-making processes, as they often 
are found with both science-based experts and decision-makers. The understanding of 
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science-policy interactions as Intertwinement between knowledge and policy provides 
insight into the interaction of science-based experts with nature conservationists, eco-
nomic entrepreneurs and policy-makers. Finally, the understanding of Knowledge Coali-
tions as opposing groups of knowledge users and knowledge producers sheds light on the 
conflict dynamics of the knowledge controversies in the Dutch Wadden Sea. 
 Second, I conclude that knowledge uncertainties were predominantly perceived 
as incomplete knowledge in decision-making processes about the Dutch Wadden Sea. 
Incomplete knowledge played an important role as trigger for research projects, as trigger 
for debates on how much uncertainty is accepted, and as justification to ask for expert 
advice. The role of unpredictability was relatively small, yet relevant for decision-making 
processes as argument for monitoring in legal procedures and justification to take risks. 
Although ambiguity was often not acknowledged and is more of an analytical concept 
than an empirical observation, it has played a key role in decision-making processes in 
the Dutch Wadden Sea as trigger for debates. 
 Based on the analyses of knowledge uncertainties, my third conclusion is that 
the role of science-based experts in nature conservation governance depends as much 
on socio-political perceptions as on their actual knowledge input. The knowledge in-
put of science-based experts in nature conservation should not be overstated; decisions 
continue to be based on governmental authority and stakeholder agreements that are 
not directly prescribed by scientists. Still, science-based experts play a dominant role in 
decision-making processes and knowledge uncertainties do not reduce this role. A key 
factor that explains why knowledge uncertainties have not reduced the dominance of 
science-based expertise in nature conservation governance is the dominant perception 
of uncertainty as incomplete knowledge among scientists as well as decision-makers. 
 Furthermore, I reflect on the politics of knowledge uncertainties, indicating the 
political choices that are made and the power that is performed though expressions and 
disregards of knowledge uncertainties. These observations bring me to the recommen-
dation that different ways of knowing should be taken into account when tackling nature 
conservation problems. The political use of nature conservation terms, such as adaptive 
management, should be acknowledged. In addition, it is not productive to only concen-
trate research on the ecological assessment of the effects of economic activities. Studies 
that support innovation and alternative options should also be encouraged.
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Samenvatting
Samenvatting
Kennis onzekerheden zijn een belangrijke uitdaging voor natuurbescherming. Momen-
teel spelen kennisargumenten een grote rol in de onderbouwing van besluiten die effect 
kunnen hebben op beschermde natuur. Kennis onzekerheden kunnen de legitimiteit van 
besluiten ondermijnen. Toch heeft de toenemende aandacht voor kennis onzekerheden 
niet geleid tot een afname van wetenschappelijke expertise in natuurbescherming. Dit 
proefschrift heeft als doel om deze  paradox te ontrafelen en de rol van kennis onze-
kerheden in besluitvormingsprocessen te begrijpen. Hiervoor is de Waddenzee als case 
studie geselecteerd. 
Met dit proefschrift beantwoord ik de volgende drie onderzoeksvragen:
1. Hoe zijn kennis-beleid interacties te begrijpen in het bestuur en beheer van de Wad-
denzee?
2. Hoe spelen kennis onzekerheden een rol in de besluitvorming rond het gebruik en her-
stel van de Waddenzee?
3. Welk inzicht geeft deze analyse van kennis onzekerheden in de besluitvorming rond het 
gebruik en herstel van de Waddenzee over de rol van experts in natuurbeschermings-
beleid?
In het beantwoorden van deze vragen gebruik ik een constructivistisch perspectief op 
kennis onzekerheden, waarmee ik de nadruk leg op de sociale constructie waarbinnen 
kennis onzekerheden betekenis krijgen. Mijn onderzoek bestaat uit een literatuurover-
zicht van kennis-beleid interactie rondom het Waddengebied en drie case studies: een 
geplande powerboot race, mosselvisserij en zeegrasherstel in het Waddengebied. De 
case studies zijn gebaseerd op empirische data bestaande uit documenten, interviews en 
participatieve observaties. Discours coalities en verhaallijnen zijn gebruikt als methodes 
om mijn analyse van verschillende interpretaties van kennis onzekerheden te structur-
eren. Hierdoor kon ik veranderingen in de besluitvormingsprocessen identificeren. Mijn 
methodologie valt in de categorie van interpretatieve benaderingen. 
 De analytische focus van deze studie ligt op kennis-beleid interacties en kennis 
in besluitvormingsprocessen en rechtszaken. Hierbij gebruik ik het concept ‘boundary 
object’, een grensobject dat interacties tussen mensen kan faciliteren, als gereedschap om 
kennis-beleid interacties te lokaliseren en bestuderen. In mijn analyse van kennis onze-
kerheden maak ik het analytische onderscheid tussen drie soorten onzekerheden: incom-
plete kennis, onvoorspelbaarheid en ambiguïteit. Bij incomplete kennis ligt de nadruk 
op kennis imperfectie waarbij de verwachting is dat de kennis via onderzoek aangevuld 
kan worden. Bij onvoorspelbaarheid wordt de ontbrekende kennis, binnen de huidige 
grenzen van de wetenschap, als onbereikbaar beschouwd. Bij ambiguïteit gaat het niet om 
het gebrek aan kennis maar om verschillende manieren van weten, waarbij er meerdere 
plausibele kennis claims zijn. 
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Dit proefschrift is gebaseerd op vier artikelen (hoofdstuk 2-5) die geschreven zijn voor 
wetenschappelijke tijdschriften. In hoofdstuk 2 presenteer ik een literatuuroverzicht van 
kennis-beleid interactie studies tussen 1995 en 2011 die gericht zijn op de controvers-
es rondom kokkelvisserij en gaswinning in het Waddengebied. Deze studies geven een 
variëteit weer aan analytische perspectieven en concepten om kennis-beleid interacties te 
bestuderen. Hierbij maak ik een onderscheid tussen drie hoofdperspectieven: de sociaal 
en economische dynamiek van grondstoffenbeheer, de rol van natuurvisies en discoursen 
in conflicten en de rol van wetenschappers en kennis in beleidsdebatten. In dit hoofd-
stuk laat ik zien dat ecologische kennis en onderzoekers een grote rol hebben gespeeld 
in de controverses rondom kokkelvisserij en gaswinning in het Waddengebied. Echter, 
wetenschappelijke kennis was meestal niet de doorslaggevende factor in de besluitvorm-
ingsprocessen. Ook werd wetenschappelijke kennis vaak niet op de  manier gebruikt 
zoals onderzoekers dat verwachtten. De manier waarop betrokkenen in de besluitvorm-
ing kennis gebruikten en interpreteerden was afhankelijk van hun belangen en natuur-
visies en het dominante politieke discours. Wetenschappers werden gewild en ongewild 
betrokken bij de coalities in de conflicten rondom kokkelvisserij en gaswinning in het 
Waddengebied.
In hoofdstuk 3 presenteer ik een analyse van de vergunnings- en juridische proce-
dure van de mosselzaadvisserij in 2006 en een geplande powerboot race in 2011. Het 
Waddengebied is  een Natura 2000 gebied, beschermd  volgens de  Europese Vogel- en 
Habitatrichtlijn. Om een vergunning te verkrijgen onder de Nederlandse Natuurbescher-
mingswet is daarom een Passende Beoordeling van eventuele ‘significante effecten’ op 
het Natura 2000 gebied noodzakelijk. In mijn analyse benader ik de term ‘significant 
effect’ als een grensobject waarin zowel wetenschappelijke als beleidselementen zijn ver-
weven. De term ‘significant effect’ slaat in de wettelijke context op een inschatting van 
de impact van een activiteit op de bestuurlijk vastgelegde natuurbeschermingsdoelstel-
lingen. Hierbij  moeten de beoordelingen plaatsvinden op basis van de best beschikbare 
kennis. In beide case studies begonnen natuurorganisaties een juridische procedure te-
gen de vergunning die was gebaseerd op de conclusie dat er geen ‘significante effecten’ 
waren op het beschermde Waddengebied. Volgens de natuurorganisaties was er te veel 
onzekerheid om tot de conclusie van geen ‘significante effecten’ te komen. In beide con-
troverses werd het debat beperkt tot ecologische argumenten. Hierbij werd vooral de 
nadruk gelegd op incomplete kennis, terwijl de ambiguïteit van verschillende waarden 
perspectieven en de onvoorspelbaarheid van het ecosysteem werden genegeerd. Op ba-
sis van mijn bevindingen beveel ik aan om in het debat rond significant effect het ver-
schil in waarden meer te erkennen, waardoor er effectievere oplossingen bedacht kun-
nen worden voor conflicten over menselijke activiteiten in een beschermd natuurgebied. 
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In hoofdstuk 4 ga ik dieper in op de mosselvisserij controverse, waarbij ik het debat ana-
liseer tussen 1990 en 2016. In dit debat focus ik op de verwachting dat wetenschappelijke 
kennis de oplossing kan geven voor de controverse rond mosselvisserij. Als beginpunt 
van mijn analyse neem ik 1990, toen door massale eidereendsterfte de mosselvisserij in 
opspraak kwam. Als reactie hierop is er een nieuw visserijbeleid met restricties voor mos-
selvisserij in 1993 ingesteld. Gekoppeld aan dit beleid vond er een wetenschappelijke 
evaluatie plaats. In de periode 1993-2004 zorgde het wetenschappelijke onderzoek niet 
voor een afname van het debat, maar werden wetenschappelijke studies en onderzoekers 
juist onderdeel van het debat. Met de inwerkingstelling van de nieuwe wetgeving geba-
seerd op de Europese Vogel- en Habitatrichtlijn in 2004 kwam de nadruk te liggen op het 
beoordelen van de effecten van mosselvisserij op de natuur.  De uitspraak van de rechter 
in 2008 over een mosselvisserijvergunning verhevigde het politieke debat. Onder poli-
tieke druk kwam er eind 2008 een Mossel transitie convenant tot stand tussen de mos-
selvissers, natuurorganisaties en de overheid. Deze politieke overeenkomst depolitiseerde 
het debat en maakte samenwerking mogelijk. Mijn analyse laat zien dat de besluitvorm-
ing over de regulering van mosselvisserij met name was gebaseerd op de autoriteit van de 
overheid, niet op wetenschappelijke kennis. Door de ambiguïteit over kennis claims rond 
de effecten van mosselvisserij zorgde de toename van kennis niet voor vermindering van 
het debat. De dominante interpretatie van kennis onzekerheden als incomplete kennis 
zorgde voor het in stand blijven van het geloof dat kennis tot de oplossing zal leiden. Met 
andere woorden: het lineaire expertise model bleef dominant. Deze studie laat zien dat 
meer kennis niet de oplossing vormde voor het mosselvisserij conflict. Kennis speelde 
echter wel een belangrijke strategische, procedurele en instrumentele rol in de interacties 
tussen belanghebbenden in een natuurbeschermingsconflict.
In hoofdstuk 5 presenteer ik mijn analyse van het zeegrasherstelproces in de Neder-
landse Waddenzee tussen 1989 en 2017. De focus ligt hier op de rol van verhaallijnen en 
kennis onzekerheden op besluiten rond zeegrasherstelactiviteiten en zeegrasonderzoek. 
Twee perspectieven op zeegras ondersteunde de natuurherstelactiviteiten: de historische 
aanwezigheid van zeegras in het gebied en de ecologische functie als biobouwer voor 
het ecosysteem. In 1989 werden meerdere onderzoeken gestart vanuit de redenatie dat 
eerst incomplete kennis verminderd moest worden voordat herstelactiviteiten konden 
starten. Deze nieuwe inzichten werden gebruikt in het herstelproject (2002-2005). De 
uitkomsten van dit zeegrasherstelproject werden verschillend geïnterpreteerd door 
wetenschappelijke experts, met als resultaat ambiguïteit tussen optimistische en pessi-
mistische visies op zeegrasherstelmogelijkheden. In een nieuw herstelproject (2011-
2015) was het uitgangspunt dat het herstel onvoorspelbaar is en deze activiteit  werd 
gepresenteerd als pilotproject. In de recente natuurherstelprojecten (2014 en 2015-2017) 
ligt de nadruk weer op incomplete kennis en meer onderzoek. Deze studie laat zien dat 
de rol van onderzoek dynamisch is en afhankelijk van de visies van de betrokken actoren. 
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 In hoofdstuk 6 presenteer ik een synthese van mijn drie empirische case studies, beant-
woord ik mijn onderzoeksvragen en reflecteer ik op het politieke van kennis onzekerheden. 
Ten eerste concludeer ik dat kennis-beleid interacties in het Waddengebied op verschil-
lende manieren kan worden begrepen. Om de verwachtingen van kennis in de besluit-
vorming beter te begrijpen is het model van ‘Twee Gemeenschappen’ van nut, waarin een 
onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen een kenniswereld en een beleidswereld. Het model van 
‘Verstrengeling’ helpt in de analyse van interacties tussen wetenschappelijke experts en 
natuurbeschermingsorganisaties, ondernemers en beleidsmakers. Om de dynamiek van 
kennisdebatten beter te begrijpen is het model van ‘Kennis Coalities’ het meest van nut. 
  Ten tweede concludeer ik dat kennisonzekerheden voornamelijk als incom-
plete kennis werden beschouwd in besluitvormingsprocessen in het Waddengebied. 
De perceptie van incomplete kennis vormde het begin van onderzoeksprojecten. 
Incomplete kennis was echter ook het begin van debatten over de mate van onze-
kerheid die acceptabel is. Incomplete kennis werd daarnaast ook gebruikt als argu-
ment om experts advies te vragen. De rol van onvoorspelbaarheid was zeer gering in 
besluitvormingsprocessen; deze werd enkel ingezet als argument voor monitoring 
en als onderbouwing om bepaalde risico’s te nemen. Ambiguïteit als kennisonzeker-
heid werd meestal niet erkend in de besluitvorming. Ambiguïteit kan dus beter bena-
derd worden als analytisch concept dan als een empirische observatie. Echter, de rol 
van ambiguïteit is niet gering, aangezien het gezien kan worden als drijvende kracht 
achter de vele kennisdebatten in besluitvormingsprocessen over de Waddenzee. 
  Mijn laatste conclusie, gebaseerd op de analyse van kennisonzekerheden, is dat 
de rol van wetenschappelijke expertise in natuurbeschermingsbeleid net zoveel afhangt 
van sociaal-politieke perspectieven als van de daadwerkelijke kennisbijdrage. De ken-
nisbijdrage aan besluitvormingsprocessen moet niet worden overschat; besluitvorming 
is met name gebaseerd op de politieke autoriteit van de overheid en de argumenten van 
belanghebbenden. Echter, wetenschappelijke experts spelen een grote rol in besluitvorm-
ingsprocessen rond natuurbescherming. Kennisonzekerheden zorgen niet voor een ver-
mindering van deze rol. Een doorslaggevende factor voor de dominantie van experts 
in natuurbeschermingsprocessen is het heersende idee onder zowel wetenschappers als 
beleidsmakers dat onzekerheden opgelost kunnen worden door meer kennis te vergaren. 
  Als laatste reflecteer ik op het politieke van kennisonzekerheden. Ik stel dat 
politieke keuzes worden gemaakt en machtsverhoudingen tot uiting komen door het 
expliciet maken en negeren van kennisonzekerheden. Dit leidt tot de aanbeveling dat 
verschillende manieren van kennis interpretaties erkend moeten worden in natuur- 
beschermingsvraagstukken. Verder geef ik aan dat concepten niet neutraal zijn. Zo wordt 
bijvoorbeeld adaptief management strategisch gebruikt. Daarnaast zou niet alle aandacht 
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naar de effectanalyses van economische activiteiten moeten gaan. Ook al is effectbeoor-
deling momenteel een wettelijke verantwoordelijkheid, er is ook ondersteuning nodig 
voor het innovatief en alternatief gebruik van natuurgebieden.
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